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This thesis explores the correlation between changes in Taiwanese identity and   
presentations of the performing arts at Taiwan’s National Performing Arts Centre, 
formerly the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre, an institution that operates at 
arm’s-length from the Government. It also investigates the way the Centre operates in 
relation to national cultural policy. The evolution of Taiwanese identity and 
government cultural policy between 1949 and 2017 is analysed with a special focus on 
1987-2017 to see whether any changes are reflected in the Centre’s programmes.  
Senior politicians, artists and arts administrators were interviewed about the way 
government cultural policy is formulated and how programming at the Centre has 
responded. All confirm that changes in cultural policy are only related to the work of 
the Centre through a general understanding of the zeitgeist, rather than ministerial 
demands. Government policy is worded so generally that it does not dictate how the 
Centre should operate, so although programming has changed along with cultural 
policy, it is not because of it.  
Analysis of the Centre’s programming shows that it reflects the way the 
performing arts in Taiwan have developed along with its identity from traditional 
Chinese to multicultural Taiwanese. The Centre responds to national identity and also 
helps to create it. Thus, programming mirrors the development of the way both cultural 
policy and Taiwanese identity has changed.  
The Centre is responsible to a government-appointed Board, rather than to the 
Government itself, but this does not mean that it is free of government control. The 
Centre values its freedom of operation but is sensitive to the unwritten limits to its 
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This research project concerns the cultural life of Taiwan where I was born and where 
I worked for twelve years (2003-2014) as a programmer and later Assistant Manager 
of the Programming and Marketing Department of the National Chiang Kai-shek 
Cultural Centre (NCKSCC) which later became the National Performing Arts Centre 
(NPAC). The research conducted in the course of my PhD thesis was therefore made 
possible and informed by this unique professional experience, which was also a 
significant factor with regard to gaining privileged access to a wide range of elite 
personalities who agreed to be interviewed for the project. Some of the interviewees 
were known professional colleagues, and both this and my prior acquaintance with 
the institutional environment of the Centre, enabled me as a researcher to build trust 
and develop a rapport during interviews (further clarification is found on p. 36).      
As a Taiwanese born in the 1970s when the country was ruled under martial law 
by the Nationalist Kuomintang Party (KMT), I was educated from primary school until 
university in a period of unquestioned Chinese identity, history, and geography. 
Although my father is from a Hakka Taiwanese family and my mother is from a Min-
nan Taiwanese family, both populations originating in China about three hundred years 
ago and with their own dialects and traditions, we had to learn Mandarin, as our 
‘National Language’ (Guo yu, 國語) and were obliged to speak it in school and in 
public. I was taught at school that Taiwan is one of the thirty-six provinces of the 
Republic of China (ROC), and that it is the ‘bastion’ of Chinese democracy which 
would eventually liberate mainland China from the Communist Party. This was a very 
practical demonstration of the way that government policy, especially in education, 
can deeply influence people’s feelings and imagination about their identity. As for 
culture, we believed that Taiwan perpetuated traditional Chinese culture, and that all 
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the people in Taiwan, including the Taiwanese indigenous people, are culturally 
Chinese. At that time, Taiwan as a society had a strong Chinese identity.  
Having been closely involved in programming the events that take place at the 
NCKSCC/NPAC, I became fascinated by the correlation between the programming 
and government cultural policy, in particular, the way that cultural policy has 
influenced what the public is able to experience at the Centre’s events, and how it 
keeps its independence from government as an arm’s-length organisation. Gradually, 
I began to contextualise the development of the Centre and its relationship with 
cultural policy within the broader shift in Taiwanese identity. This has motivated my 
doctoral research project that investigates the national performing arts centre’s 
development and its programming in relation to Taiwan’s cultural policy and 









Author’s statement: most official government legal and political documents quoted 
in this thesis are published in traditional Chinese but referred to and cited in English 
translated by the author.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Taiwan has an area of 36,197 square kilometres and a population of 23 million, and is 
thus ‘more populous than three-quarters of the world’s nations’ (Taiwan.gov.tw, 2017). 
Although historically, Taiwan may have been a province of China, there is a strong 
argument to say that since 1949 it has been a nation in its own right, and since that 
time Beijing has had no part in governing Taiwan. Not everybody, either in Beijing or 
even in Taiwan, agrees that Taiwan is a separate nation but for the present purposes, 
this reality is taken as axiomatic. Because of this fraught situation, unlike most nations, 
Taiwan has been especially concerned to assert its independence. And from the 
political point of view, this has meant that successive governments have taken a 
considerable interest in cultural affairs because they can be used as compelling 
approaches for the country to bring itself to international attention and recognition 
under Taiwan’s challenging diplomacy.  
This aspect of Taiwanese life is analysed in more detail in Chapter 2, but 
significantly, when Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalists arrived in Taiwan in 1949, 
they saw themselves as guardians of Chinese culture and they took pains to ensure that 
traditional Chinese artistic activities were strongly promoted by the Government as a 
matter of policy. Since 1949 there have been substantial political changes in Taiwan 
and parallel changes in the Government’s attitude to the island’s cultural life, as well 
as in the cultural identity of its population. Whereas in 1949 there was a determination 
to be very traditionally Chinese, nowadays there is an equally strong emphasis on a 
specifically ‘Taiwanese’ culture that acknowledges its Chinese basis, but also the 
variety of other cultures that exist in the island, and welcomes influences from 
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elsewhere. This thesis begins its timeline from the point in 1949 when Taiwan became 
a de facto sovereign state. 
Generally speaking, performing arts centres act as central organisations in 
national cultural life, and the way they are administered critically affects that role. 
From the government point of view, publicly owned performing arts centres are a 
practical expression of national cultural policy and are thus closely related to national 
identity. The formation of Taiwan’s first national performing arts centre, the National 
Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (NCKSCC) in 1987 and then its upgraded successor, 
the ‘umbrella-type’ National Performing Arts Centre in 2014 with the subsequent 
opening of two new regional performing arts centres in 2016 and 2018 were ground-
breaking moments in Taiwan’s cultural life. From 1987 to 2016, Taiwan had only a 
single national performing art centre, the NCKSCC, which supported Taiwanese 
performing arts companies as well as introducing international programmes to the 
country. Yet, the fact that there was only one performing arts centre in the whole of 
Taiwan may well be a reflection of the Government’s focus on Taipei (north Taiwan) 
as the capital city to the exclusion of the regions, but also the low priority that the 
Government gave to its cultural policy.  
The expansion of the original NCKSCC with two additional centres in Taichung 
(central Taiwan) and Kaohsiung (south Taiwan) to form the NPAC has removed the 
capital’s monopoly in the performing arts and initiated an era of localism. But because 
the NCKSCC/NPAC has been predominantly dependent for its existence on 
government funding, it is pertinent to ask whether government cultural policy has 
influenced what the public is able to experience at the Centre’s events, and how the 
Centre keeps its independence from government as an arm’s-length organisation. As 
the two new NPAC centres, the National Taichung Theatre (NTT) and the Kaohsiung 
Centre for the Arts (Weiwuying) are still young with limited programme data, this 
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thesis mainly focuses on the NCKSCC where there is much data on programmes 
between 1987 and 2017. This provides the material for an analysis of the NCKSCC’s 
development and its programming within the changing context of cultural policy and 
Taiwanese identity and for an examination of whether the NPAC, with its satellite 
centres round the country, operates independently, or whether it acts on the 
Government’s behalf to achieve government cultural policy goals concerning 
Taiwanese identity. 
This research therefore investigates, under the circumstances of a country which 
is confused about its name, its status and its national identity, the extent to which 
programming at the NCKSCC/NPAC has developed in line with the changes in 
cultural policy and has reflected the shifting identity of the Taiwanese 
Through my position at the Centre, I have been fortunate enough to know 
personally many of the significant people in its management and in the Government’s 
oversight of it since its inception. All of those individuals have been kind enough to 
allow me to interview them about their vision for the Centre and their experiences in 
its operation. These interviews form, I believe, a unique source of insight into a 
seminal period of Taiwanese performing arts history.   
 
1.2. Research Questions (RQs) 
Nicola Green and Paul Stoneman (2016: 44-45) stress that the centre of a research 
design is its research questions, and to start a research project, setting up good research 
questions is a crucial step. They suggest some starting points, such as ‘previous reading 
and thinking, a perceived social problem, a media report, personal experiences, and 
observation and participation’ (ibid.) that can give rise to the research project, one of 
which is ‘personal experiences’ which, in this thesis, take an important role because of 
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my involvement with the topic. When research interest is generated from personal 
experience, more understanding, and commitment can be devoted to the research, but 
it also requires the researcher to be especially careful to remain objective. The next 
step is to pay attention to the research question to make sure that it is ‘researchable’, 
which means, according to Green and Stoneman (2016: 46), that needs a number of 
characteristics: ‘interesting, relevant, feasible, ethical, concise, and answerable’. 
David Silverman (2011:33) suggests that an efficient way to develop a researchable 
question which can be answered ‘within the constraints of time and available resources’ 
is to narrow down the topic and to focus the research.  
Following the criteria above I therefore propose to construct this research project 
by using as a starting point my personal experience of the shift in Taiwanese identity 
and my contextual knowledge of the NCKSCC and subsequently the NPAC. These 
have inspired the research and led to the main research question (RQ):  
What is the relationship between Taiwanese identity, government 
cultural policy and programming at the National Chiang Kai-shek 
Cultural Centre/National Performing Arts Centre?  
This question can be broken down into lower-ranking questions: 
RQ 1. How can Taiwanese identity be defined, and how has it evolved? What are the  
factors that shape or influence Taiwanese identity?  
RQ 2. How has Taiwan’s cultural policy evolved under different government regimes? 
Does Taiwanese identity relate to the making of cultural policy and if so, how? 
RQ 3. How have the performing arts and performing arts centres developed in Taiwan? 
How does the Government support them? Have changes in Taiwanese identity 
affected the performing arts?   
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RQ 4. What is the relationship between the Government and the state-owned 
NCKSCC/NPAC? How is government cultural policy translated into the 
Centre’s programmes? 
RQ 5. What is the relationship between the historical changes in programming at the 
NCKSCC/NPAC and Taiwanese identity?  
In order to answer the above questions, the study will trace the evolution of Taiwanese 
identity since 1949 when the KMT transferred to Taiwan and it became a state-like 
island. It will also review Taiwan’s cultural policy development from 1949 to 2017, 
with a special focus on the period from 1987 to 2017 in a case study of the programmes 
produced and presented at the NCKSCC/NPAC during that period. 
 
1.3. The National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre 
(NCKSCC) and National Performing Arts Centre (NPAC) 
Whatever its political status, Taiwan has a vibrant cultural life in which the performing 
arts play a significant role. But in 1949 there was a mere handful of centres which 
could act as venues for performance and the Government decided to take action to 
improve this situation. On the death of President Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, the 
Taiwanese KMT government launched a plan to construct a ‘Chiang Kai-shek 
Memorial Park’ with, on one side, a main memorial hall and, on the other, a theatre 
and concert hall. These latter formed the NCKSCC which then appeared on Taiwan’s 
cultural map as its first and only professional performing arts centre (NCKSCC, 2007: 
16). It remained the only national performing arts centre for more than nearly three 
decades until, as described in the section 4.3.2 in Chapter 4, it was upgraded and joined 
19 
 
by another two complexes, the National Taichung Theatre (NTT) and the National 
Kaohsiung Centre for the Arts (Weiwuying), to become the NPAC in 2014.  
 
1.3.1 The NCKSCC 
As the main purpose of establishing the NCKSCC was to honour the memory of the 
late President Chiang Kai-shek, it is not difficult to perceive that its origin was 
politically motivated although the inception was also a significant national cultural 
policy of that time (Huang, interview of 4 December 2015). In the original plan, the 
two venues of the NCKSCC were ‘attachments’ to the main, centrally-located Chiang 
Kai-shek Memorial Hall within the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park. The two 
performing arts buildings were opened in 1987 whereas the Chiang Kai-shek 
Memorial Hall had been opened in 1980 (NCKSCC, 2007: 14-16). Today, when 
visitors come to the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park in Taipei, they enter the area by 
passing through a huge archway, after which they see a gigantic Chinese-style white 
stone hall with a blue octagonal roof at the far end of a vast plaza, as though they were 
pilgrims coming to pay their respects to the late President Chiang Kai-shek. As they 
progress across the plaza, they see splendid northern Chinese-style palaces on both 
sides of the plaza and feel that the buildings have a familiar look. It is no accident that 
the whole building complex resembles the Forbidden City in Beijing. These lateral 
palaces on the plaza are the National Theatre and National Concert Hall. The initiation, 
design and layout of the NCKSCC clearly reflect the political and cultural climate of 
Taiwan at the time of their conception. They seem to depict the national theatre and 
concert hall as two ‘guard buildings’ to the main memorial hall. This epitomises the 
Government’s attitude to the performing arts at that time. The plate below shows the 
layout of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park which illustrates this idea.  
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Plate 1.1 Overview of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park (Source, official website).  
Despite the fact that official name of the Centre is NCKSCC, for decades the 
public in Taiwan (even including the people working there) rarely used that name, but 
often referred to the ‘National Theatre’ and ‘Concert Hall’. As the two buildings look 
very similar, few members of the public can distinguish them and people normally 
refer to them as a pair using the name ‘Liang Ting Yuan’ (兩廳院) which means ‘two 
venues’ in Chinese. But more significantly, while I was working there to use the 
official name of the NCKSCC became politically incorrect1, especially after Taiwan’s 
ruling party changed from the Nationalist Party (KMT) to the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) in 2000. Even after 2008, when the ruling party changed back to the KMT, 
the name ‘Liang Ting Yuan’ was still used in referring to the national theatre and 
concert hall. Eventually, ‘Guo Chia Liang Ting Yuan’ (國家兩廳院 ) meaning 
‘national two venues’ in Chinese became the official name used in all kinds of 
publicity even when the NCKSCC became one of the member organisations of the 
                                                          
1 The NCKSCC was the official name, but in the time of democratisation, Chiang Kai-shek 
became regarded as an authoritarian figure out of sympathy with modern sensibility. A process 
of ‘de-Chiang-ification’ (Chiu Chiang hua, 去蔣化, a commonly used neologism) has been 
evident since the DPP came into power.  
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NPAC. This is a strange and confusing way to create an official Chinese name for an 
institution, although the official English name is ‘National Theatre & Concert Hall 
(NTCH), the National Performing Centre’. The evolution of the name change from the 
National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (NCKSCC, Guo Li Zhong Cheng Wen Hua 
Zhong Hsin, 國立中正文中心) to the National Performing Arts Centre (NPAC, Guo 
Chia Biao Yen Yi Shu Zhong Hsin, 國家表演藝術中心) not only demonstrates the 
transformation of the Centre’s role as a centre that uses the arts as social education 
(Wen Hua Zhong Hsin, 文化中心) to one that functions as a real ‘performing arts 
centre’ (Biao Yen Yi Shu Zhong Hsin, 表演藝術中心), but it also reflects Taiwan’s 
political and social shift over that time. Accordingly, ‘NCKSCC’ refers to the centre 
from 1987-2014 whereas ‘NTCH’ has been the name since 2014. Initially, the 
NCKSCC had the status of a government agency under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Education (MOE), but in 2004 it was converted into a public corporation at arm’s-
length from direct government control, although still under the MOE’s oversight.   
 
1.3.2 The NPAC 
Following the establishment of new Ministry of Culture (MOC), which took 
responsibility for overseeing Taiwan’s cultural life in 2012, another significant change 
took place in 2014. On 9 January 2014, the Legislative Yuan approved the Act for 
Establishment of the National Performing Arts Centre, and a new Board of Directors 
was set up in March that year. The NPAC was officially opened on 2 April 2014 under 
the supervision of the newly created MOC. The original NCKSCC resident company, 
the National Symphony Orchestra (NSO) soon became an affiliated performance 
company of the NPAC along with its three complexes (NPAC, 2018). These initiatives 
have been heralded as a milestone in the development of Taiwan’s performing arts 
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since there has been no new professional national performing arts venue created after 
the NCKSCC was launched in 1987 (NPAC, 2016).  
Although the idea to establish new national performing arts centres had been 
proposed many years before, there was a long gap between the opening of the 
NCKSCC and any action to make local performing arts centres a reality. This is good 
evidence that performing arts policy takes a low priority for the Government even 
though performing arts companies are lively and well developed in Taiwan. And in 
practice, the focus was always on the capital, Taipei. While it may now sound logical 
to have three NPAC complexes in north, central and south Taiwan to make a good 
nationwide balance, a scheme which omits east Taiwan is still unbalanced. 
Geographically, the NPAC cannot be seen as truly national until there is also a complex 
in east Taiwan. After repeated postponement, the National Taichung Theatre was 
eventually opened in September 2016 whereas the Weiwuying was opened in October 
2018. For more details on this, see Section 4.3.2 in Chapter 4.  
All three complexes share collectively joint goals. However, it is expected that 
each individual complex will set up its own objectives to establish its own character 
with local connections, and by doing so will play its own part in the development of 
Taiwanese identity as a whole by bringing a regional perspective separate from that of 
the capital, Taipei. 
The NPAC, as a comparatively new organisation, is still in a state of considerable 
flux, so whether and how it will be able to affect Taiwan’s performing art environment 
in relation to cultural policy and identity is an ongoing question whose answer will 
change with time. In this thesis, although the NPAC is one of the topics to be studied, 
the research will focus on the case study of the NCKSCC/NTCH and its history. The 
following Chart 1.1 demonstrates the insitutional construction of the NPAC and its 
relationshionship with the MOC. 
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Source: own compilation from the official website of the National Performing Arts Centre. 
https://npac-ntch.org/npac/about.html, accessed 20 February 2018.  
 
1.4 Research Themes 
This thesis unfolds under the conceptual framework of three research themes: national 
and cultural identity, cultural policy and cultural autonomy to present an analysis of 
the trajectory of the performing arts centre in Taiwan with its programming. In the 
chapters that follow, each theme will start with a literature review and then focus on 
the Taiwanese context and the NCKSCC/NPAC. It will also show the interconnections 
between the different themes.    
 
1.4.1 National and Cultural Identity 
Warren Kidd (2002: 25) explains ‘identity’ by introducing Richard Jenkins’s (1966) 
idea of knowing who we are, stating that it is about how people understand who they 
themselves are and, in contrast, who others are. When it comes to an individual or a 
group of people, there is gender identity, sexual identity, political identity, cultural 
















concept of ‘levels of identity’ which characterises how people in the contemporary 
world have ‘multiple identities’ and can shift from one to another easily with varying 
circumstances. 
The collective Taiwanese identity has been interwoven from both its divergent 
national identity and evolved cultural identity through its complex history. Indigenous 
Taiwanese people have lived on the island as tribal societies for thousands of years 
before a succession of different colonial and Chinese regimes ruled there until the 
KMT’s arrival in 1949 and the modern state was formed (Academia Sinica, 2014). 
Over the past 70 years, the historical changes of sovereignty, politics and diplomacy 
have deeply influenced Taiwanese people in every respect. But their diplomatic 
isolation has also promoted national solidarity and fostered a feeling of Taiwanese 
identity. Since the onset of democracy in Taiwan in 1996, the concept of ‘Taiwanese 
multiculturalism’ (Taiwan duo yuan wen hua, 台灣多元文化- Paragraph 9 of Article 
10, The Amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of China, 1997) with its five 
ethnic groups has become politically accepted, even though there is a huge disparity 
in the size of the populations between the majority and minority groups. As a result, 
there is increasing awareness and acceptance of the hybrid nature of a specifically 
Taiwanese identity and this is now the consensus in Taiwanese society. This influence 
has not only affected politics, but also education and culture and is changing the face 
of Taiwan (Lee, 2006).  
Eric Hobsbawm’s idea of ‘invented traditions’ for the formation of a nation, and 
Benedict Anderson’s (2006) concept of nationalism as ‘imagined communities’ can be 
applied to Taiwanese identity as they describe how Taiwanese people come to a 
consensus regarding or imagining who they are. In this sense, the Taiwanese people 
are a disparate group trying to find a settled position for themselves in the world. 
Taiwanese identity is a moving, fluid and dynamic concept that, according to Stuart 
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Hall (1996), is a process of ‘becoming’. This thesis will explore Taiwan’s identity and 
its evolution, and examine the cultural identity shift from ‘Chinese’ to ‘Taiwanese’. It 
will investigate how this development has influenced government cultural policy, and 
also whether that has affected the programming of the NCKSCC/NPAC. 
 
1.4.2 Cultural Policy 
Public or government policy with respect to culture forms what may be termed 
‘cultural policy’ which implies cultural plans and strategies that governments develop. 
Cultural policy, then involves government promotion of ‘the production, 
dissemination, marketing, and consumption of the arts’ (Rentschler, 2002: 17). It is 
possible to define the word culture in a broad, inclusive way or a much narrower way. 
Culture is all too often immediately associated with the high arts. But these days, it is 
normal for governments to think of culture in a broad sense and one commonly used 
definition is Raymond Williams’s (1958, 1983) assertion that culture is ‘a whole way 
of life’. 
Toby Miller and George Yudice (2002: 9) argue that cultural policies are a form 
of ‘hegemony’ that is secured when ‘the dominant culture uses education, philosophy, 
religion, aesthetics and art to make its dominance appear normal and natural to the 
heterogeneous groups that constitute society’. This view corresponds closely to 
Taiwan’s situation with its majority ethnic composition of Han Taiwanese. Thus, 
examining how cultural policy changes from year to year illuminates the way that 
society is changing and is a reflection of cultural identity. Although it is commonly 
regarded that ‘high culture’ cannot represent the complete spectrum of culture, it is 
irrefutable that throughout the world the arts sit in an important position with respect 
to government cultural policy. Oliver Bennett (2009: 70) explains that a government’s 
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reason for engaging with the arts depends on how it can ‘justify its actions on the basis 
of the contributions the arts are said to make to the society’. This kind of relationship 
between a government and its decisions about which cultural and arts activities it is 
prepared to support is becoming a constant across the globe.  
In Taiwan, political ideology and national identity influence the making of 
cultural policy through changes in the party in government power and this has an 
impact on cultural identity. After the central government of the ROC transferred to 
Taiwan in 1949, the KMT’s Committee for Reviving and Promoting Chinese Culture 
(CRPCC) played a central role in cultural policymaking during Taiwan’s authoritarian 
period of single-party rule (Tchen, 2013: 31). For almost two decades, there was no 
government organisation directly in charge of cultural affairs in Taiwan until the 
Cultural Bureau was established under the MOE in 1967, and later the Council of 
Cultural Affairs (CCA) was established in 1981 (Tchen, 2013: 30-31). Taiwan’s 
Ministry of Culture was eventually upgraded from the CCA in 2012. Founded in 1996, 
Taiwan’s National Culture and Arts Foundation (NCAF) is now also involved in 
cultural affairs through holding the purse strings for ‘research and development, grants, 
awards, and resource development’ (NCAF, 2016).  
The way in which Taiwan’s cultural policy has been implemented through its 
various government agencies and the NPAC is a key focus of this research which aims 
to discover and to provide an insight into how both the Government and the NPAC 
have influenced the country’s identity. 
 
1.4.3 Cultural Autonomy 
A state’s cultural policy demonstrates in a positive way how government is involved 
with and supports culture, but on the other hand, it might also express a government’s 
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ambition to influence and even dictate cultural affairs especially through its grant-
making activities. The first Minister of Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture, Lung Ying-tai 
(2008) argued that the liberty of the people is an important feature of a country’s 
cultural life, and that by having a cultural ‘policy’ the government might restrict that 
liberty. Derrick Chong (2010: 33) claims that when the government subsidises a major 
proportion of the country’s artistic activity, there is always a risk of government 
intervention, or even control of the arts. Cultural autonomy is therefore a crucial factor 
in researching the balance between the state and the arts.  
This thesis focuses on ‘institutional autonomy’ of the arts, and thus of the 
NCKSCC/NPAC, which deals with the occurrences under which publicly funded 
institutions operate with their own goals, objectives and decisions for their own 
productions, in a way that is ‘immune from the arbitrary exercise of the authority by 
external power holders’ (Vestheim, 2009: 37). One of the ways in which institutional 
autonomy can be maintained is the so-called ‘arm’s-length’ principle which ‘is implicit 
in the constitutional separation of powers between the judiciary, executive and 
legislative branches of government’ (Hillman-Cartrand & McCaughey, 1989). In the 
area of the arts, the implementation of the arm’s-length principle is intended to solve 
the problem of government control and to make sure that public arts organisations are 
independent and unaffected from undue government influence (Blomgren, 2012: 522).  
    The NCKSCC was the first public corporation in Taiwan to be set up by the 
Government under the arm’s-length principle. In doing so it followed the example of 
Japan’s ‘Independent administrative corporations’ and the UK’s ‘Non-Departmental 
Public Body’ (NDPB) (Directorate-General of Personnel Administration, 2017). The 
aim was to encourage independence, freedom and effectiveness by distancing the 
organisation from government restrictions. Since 2004 the NCKSCC and subsequently 
the NPAC, possessing both financial protection and autonomous operation, have been 
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able to develop their own programming and have promoted Taiwan’s image and 
strength through the performing arts. 
    According to the founding legislation of the NCKSCC and NPAC, the Board 
should be composed of between eleven and fifteen Directors who are selected and 
recommended by the MOE/MOC, but are appointed by the Premier of the Executive 
Yuan. Apart from scholars, experts in the performing arts (up to four members), 
education and cultural academics (up to four members), and professional operators and 
managers (up to four members), who comprise the majority of the Board, the 
Government appoints its own three representatives (Laws & Regulations Database of 
the ROC, 2016). Appointment of Board members by the Government potentially 
compromises the arm’s-length principle and it might increase the possibilities of the 
interference from the Government. Thus, the key question is whether the ‘length’ of 
the arm is adequate to secure independence (Mundy, 2000, 33) while the Government 
is the paymaster and controls the Centre’s budget. This research will investigate the 
relationship between the NCKSCC/NPAC and the Government, how Taiwanese 
identity interacts with the programming at the NCKSCC/NPAC and the extent to 
which it is influenced by government cultural policy. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology  
Nicholas Walliman (2011: 15) suggests that ‘research is about acquiring knowledge 
and developing understanding, collecting facts and interpreting them to build up a 
picture of the world around us, and even within us’. Under the themes of 
national/cultural identity, cultural policy and cultural autonomy, the research 
methodology used here provides the mechanism by which the research questions can 
be approached and answered. Pertti Alasuutari (1995: 41) explains ‘the method 
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consists of all the practices and operations through which these observations can be 
modified and interpreted in order to assess their meaning as clues’. In other words, the 
presentation of the research method is the opportunity to explain how the research 
questions will be answered. Research methods are therefore the techniques that 
provide an effective way to collect and analyse data so that any conclusions are 
demonstrably valid (Walliman, 2011: 7).   
 
1.5.1 Research Design 
There are two main categories of research method: qualitative and quantitative. Ian 
Dey (1993: 10) explains the difference by saying ‘whereas quantitative data deals with 
numbers, qualitative data deals with meanings’. David Silverman (2011: 4) expands 
this by saying that quantitative research normally starts with a hypothesis that is 
examined ‘using accepted statistical measure on a large number of cases which are 
often randomly selected’.  
    However, the distinction between quantitative and qualitative researches is not 
necessarily quite so clear-cut and they can sometimes be combined. For example, one 
of the ways in which qualitative data can be analysed is ‘content analysis’, a procedure 
normally used in quantitative research, but which can also be helpful in qualitative 
research (Silverman, 2011: 64). Generally speaking, qualitative research deals with an 
approach to ‘examine people’s experience in detail, by using a specific set of research 
methods such as in-depth interviews, focus group discussion, observation, content 
analysis, visual methods, and life histories or biographies’ (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 
2011: 8-9). Silverman (2011) sets out some features of qualitative research showing 
that it is used for investigating issues where research results are not collected 
numerically, but as personal views or opinions. He also points out that qualitative 
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research commonly emerges from ‘observation, recording, and the analysis of printed 
and internet materials’ and warns that the various methods for analysing collected data 
can ‘sometimes conflict with each other’ (p. 5).  
    The main research question (RQ) of this thesis is: what is the relationship 
between Taiwanese identity, government cultural policy and programming at the 
National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre/National Performing Arts Centre? This 
is broken down into component RQs, addressed systematically throughout the thesis 
using the acronym RQ (as set out on p. 17-18). Answering this question needs to 
employ a range of different research methods to collect data. Some will be quantitative, 
and others qualitative. While the former involves a rigorous statistical analysis of the 
Centre’s produced and presented programmes, the latter, despite being more difficult 
to analyse, are essential when issues relating to cultural policy and identity are in 
question. Robert E. Stake (1995: 37) claims that qualitative methods are used to 
‘understand complex interrelationships among all that exists’. This applies to my 
investigation of the relationship between programming at the NPAC and its 
predecessors; Taiwan’s government policy with respect to culture and Taiwanese 
identity is an excellent example of a system of complex interrelationships.  
    This then leads to case studies. According to Stake (1995), a case study is chosen 
for research where the case is unique and special. The purpose of the study is to learn 
about that individual case, but not to extrapolate to more general issues relevant to 
other cases. As this kind of research arises from an intrinsic interest in the case, it is 
called ‘intrinsic case study’ (p. 3). Stake (1995: 4) explains that ‘case study research 
is not sampling research’ and the purpose of the study is to learn and understand that 
selected case. The case study here focuses on the NCKSCC/NPAC. 
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The main research question of the thesis can be broken down into a hierarchy of 
lower-ranking research questions (RQs) and the table below demonstrates the research 
methods that will be used to answer each question. 
Table 1.1 Lower-ranking research questions (RQs) with methods applied 
Lower-ranking research questions Methods applied 
Taiwanese Identity (RQ 1) 
 How can Taiwanese identity be 
defined, and how has it evolved? 
 What are the factors that shape or 
influence Taiwanese identity? 
 
 Secondary data analysis. 
 Data include: Taiwanese identity 
surveys, relevant news reports and 
academic literature. 
Taiwan’s Cultural Policy (RQ 2) 
 How has Taiwan’s cultural 
policy evolved under different 
government regimes?  
 Does Taiwanese identity relate 
to the making of cultural policy 
and if so, how? 
 
 Review of: cultural policy documents 
regarding the CRPCC, CCA, MOC 
and NCAF. 
 In-depth interviews: 3 Ministers and  
1 officer of the CCA, 2 artists, 
1 producer, and 3 scholars who have 
been involved in the making of 
cultural policy.  
Performing Arts Development in 
Taiwan (RQ 3) 
 How have the performing arts and 
performing arts centres developed in 
Taiwan?  
 How does the Government support 
them? Have changes in Taiwanese 
identity affected the performing arts?   
 
 
 Secondary data analysis includes: 
relevant academic literature, cultural 
policy documents and news reports. 
 In-depth interviews: 3 Chairmen,  
10 Artistic Directors, and  
2 Programme Managers of the 
NCKSCC/NPAC, 3 artists,  
1 producer, 1 critic and 3 scholars. 
The NCKSCC/NPAC’s Autonomy 
(RQ 4) 
 What is the relationship between the 
Government and the state-owned 
NCKSCC/NPAC?  
 
 In-depth interviews: 3 Chairmen,  
10 Artistic Directors, 2 Programme 
Managers and 2 Executive Secretaries 
of the Board of the NCKSCC/NPAC, 
3 artists, 1 producer, and 1 critic. 
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 How is government policy translated 
into the Centre’s programmes? 
 Review of policy documents on the 
mission and KPI contents of the 
NCKSCC/NPAC.  
The NCKSCC/NPAC’s Programming 
and Taiwanese Identity (RQ 5) 
 What is the relationship between 
the historical changes in 
programming at the 




 In-depth interviews: 3 Ministers and  
1 officer of the CCA, 3 Chairmen,  
10 Artistic Directors, 2 Programme 
Managers and 2 Executive Secretaries 
of the Board of the NCKSCC/NPAC, 
3 artists, 1 producer, 1 critic and  
3 scholars. 
 The NCKSCC/NPAC produced and 
presented programme data analysis 
(1987-2017).  
 
1.5.2 Data Collection 
The purpose of data collection and analysis, is to answer research questions as research 
findings or results are revealed (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011: 33). Data collection 
is therefore a vital component of the research process. As the essential nature of data 
is the information they contain, the data needed for the research ‘depend on the issue 
being investigated’ (Walliman, 2011: 63).  
Data can be categorised as ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’ according to how they are 
formed (Finnegan, 1996: 141; Williman, 2011: 69). Williman (2011: 69) explains that 
primary data are what ‘has been observed, experienced or recorded close to the event’, 
and that they are ‘the nearest one can get to the truth’. Ruth Finnegan (1996) clarifies 
that primary data were ‘written (or otherwise came into being) by the people directly 
involved and at a time contemporary or near contemporary with the period being 
investigated’, this therefore offers ‘the basic and original material for providing the 
researcher’s raw evidence (p. 141). On the other hand, secondary data are normally 
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‘written sources that interpret or record primary data’ (Walliman, 2011: 69) or ‘copy, 
interpret or judge material to be found in primary sources’ (Finnegan, 1996: 141). 
Regarding the importance of primary and secondary data, although in Williman’s 
(2011: 69) view secondary data ‘tend to be less reliable’, Finnegan (1996) argues that 
both can be useful, depending on the particular research case and its distinguishing 
circumstances. She further claims that an ideal research mode is to ‘involve 
acquaintance with all the relevant primary and secondary sources for the topic being 
studied’ in an appropriate way (p. 141-142).  
 The sources of data used here combine both primary and secondary material, 
but with the former in the majority. There are four types of primary data which can be 
classified according to how they are collected: (1) Measurement (2) Observation (3) 
Interrogation (4) Participation (Walliman, 2011: 70)2. The produced and presented 
programmes at the NCKSCC/NAPC from 1987 to 2017 which have been accessed 
from the Performing Arts Library of the NCKSCC/NPAC belong to the ‘Measurement’ 
category and are mostly listed in Chinese with the programme dates, titles, and 
performers. In total, data from 4,067 programmes were collected for further analysis. 
Content analysis of the programmes has been carried out by checking the origins of 
performers/companies and the essence of the programme itself, thus showing the 
composition of the NCKSCC/NPAC produced and presented programmes and looking 
for any shift from Chinese to Taiwanese which might coincide with the transformation 
of Taiwanese identity and cultural policy.   
                                                          
2 According to Walliman (2011: 70), four basic types of primary data collection are: (1) 
Measurement—collection of numbers indicating amount. (2) Observation—records of events, 
situations or things experienced with your own senses and perhaps with help of an instrument. 
(3) Interrogation—data gained by asking and probing. (4) Participation—data gained by 
experiences of doing things. 
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    But the main origin of the data used here is the interviews which fall under the 
‘Interrogation’ category of primary data. Interviews are a widely used research method 
which are ‘often used to document the variety of opinions concerning a topic or 
establish the relevant dimensions of attitudes’ (Fielding & Thomas, 2016: 282-283). 
The interviewer plays an important role during interviews and ‘is in a good position to 
judge the quality of the responses’ so that the interviewer can further prompt, 
encourage, and probe more information from interviewees (Walliman, 2011: 99). 
Depending on how interviews are structured, three different types can be recognised: 
Structured, Semi-structured and Unstructured/Focused (Walliman, 2011: 99; Fielding 
& Thomas, 2016: 282). This study used semi-structed interviews in which the main 
questions asked related to the research themes of the thesis and were asked in the same 
way at each interview. The interviewees were free to extend or expand their answers 
and, as interviewer, I was able to adjust the sequence of questions according to ‘the 
respondent’s level of comprehension and articulacy’ and then to ‘probe for more 
information’ (Fielding & Thomas, 2016: 282). 
    In-depth interviews are customarily employed for specific research topics related 
to people’s experiences, for example, how they make decisions, and what their 
motivation for particular behaviour patterns was (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2011: 
109-110). In face to face in-depth interviews, the mutual interaction within a semi-
structured framework can be very productive in obtaining insightful information and 
prompting comments about interviewees’ experience. This relies on the interviewer’s 
knowledge and experience of the topics, and also on interview techniques. Therefore, 
as Hennink, Hutter and Bailey (2011) quote from Hesse-Biber and Leavy (2006: 128), 
the process of in-depth interview can be depicted as ‘a special kind of knowledge-
producing conversation’ co-developed under ‘a meaning-making partnership’ between 
interviewers and interviewees (p. 109). Hennink, Hutter and Bailey further explain that 
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the significance of the in-depth interview is to receive so called ‘emic’ or insider’s 
perspective which can ‘reinforce the purpose of gaining a detailed insight into the 
research issues from the perspective of the study participants themselves’ (ibid.).  
For this thesis, in-depth face-to-face semi structured interviews were carried out 
with twenty-five distinguished individuals in government, Centre administration, 
iconic Taiwanese performing artists, producers, arts critics and scholars (see Appendix 
1 p. 320-322 for the list of names and backgrounds, and also an indication of the 
author’s professional relation to each interviewee). These people included all the 
surviving Directors and Artistic Directors, three Chairmen, two Programme Managers 
and two Executive Secretaries of the Board of the NCKSCC/NPAC, as well as artists 
and cultural professionals who have practical experience of collaborating with the 
NCKSCC/NPAC, also scholars who have been involved with creating cultural policy 
in Taiwan, and one former CCA/MOC Officer. The interviewees from the 
NCKSCC/NPAC included not only individuals who were currently in post at the time 
of the interviews, but also people who had retired from those responsibilities and were 
able to look back with detachment. People who were not members of the organisation 
but used to dealing with the NCKSCC/NPAC from the outside, provide opinions from 
a different perspective from those who are responsible for programming. It is also 
worth noting that three of the NCKSCCC/NPAC Chairmen and Artistic Directors had 
been Ministers of the CCA, and during the interviews were therefore able to talk about 
cultural policy issues. This has been a unique opportunity to obtain insightful opinions 
and inside information from high profile cultural policy makers who have themselves 
been responsible for formulating national policies and administering the Centre that 
delivers them. This provides important raw material for understanding the history of 
the performing arts in Taiwan, and contributes a substantial source of original 
information to the related literature. 
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Interviews were carried out during visits to Taiwan in November/December 2015, 
and May/June/July 2018. One interview was held in London in May 2016. All of the 
interviewees are acquainted with me in various ways as a result of the different roles I 
have fulfilled during my professional career. This boosts the validity of the research 
as Hennink, Hutter and Bailey suggest that ‘rapport (a trust relationship)’ between the 
interviewer and interviewee is one of the approaches ‘to achieve both the in-depth and 
emic perspective’ (2011: 109). The interviews were carried out in Mandarin and have 
been recorded on an Android smart phone; the 3GPP files generated and the recordings 
made have been stored digitally. Full transcripts in traditional Chinese were made by 
the author and can be provided on request. All the data stored is in the possession of 
the author and maintained securely under conditions stipulated by Birkbeck College, 
University of London data storage policy. The interviews were conducted according 
to the ‘Ethics Guidelines’ of Birkbeck College, University of London. Full consent 
was obtained from the interviewees. 
The fact that the interviewees were all asked the same questions means that their 
responses can be cross-checked against one another for consistency. The interview 
questions were designed to address specific aspects of the research questions (RQs): 
1. Policy: the relationship between the policy of the NCKSCC/NPAC and 
national cultural policy (cf. RQs 2, 3 and 4). 
2. Mission: the NCKSCC/NPAC’s task on the nation’s cultural development 
and correlation with Taiwanese identity formation (cf. RQs 1 and 3). 
3. Programming: why and how to plan programmes in relation to the two factors 
above (cf. RQ 5).  
Additional data relating to the cultural policy theme, including primary data such 
as published government policy with respect to the arts and culture, e.g. the culture 
white papers (1998 & 2004, Wen hua bai pi shu, 文化白皮書), and the organisation’s 
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mission and policy statements were sourced from their official websites (see the 
Appendix 2 on p. 322-323 for list of cultural policy documents used) in order to 
demonstrate how policy has changed as different governments, ministers and cultural 
policies have come and gone. As for secondary data, literature covering the history 
and evolution of Taiwanese cultural policy has also been analysed. In addition, surveys 
of Taiwanese identity and news reports which reveal changes to Taiwanese identity 
have been examined for references to relevant research topics.  
 
1.5.3 Data Analysis 
The data in this research thesis brings together data from three principal sources: policy 
published by the Government, interviews and NCSKCC/NPAC produced and 
presented programmes. The first two have been analysed by thematic analysis, the 
third by content analysis.  
Thematic analysis is commonly used to make ‘raw data’ manageable and 
understandable. It is more of ‘a process for synthesising and analysing data that has 
been collected using various qualitative methods’ than ‘a standalone qualitative 
method that is used for collecting data’ (Seal, 2016: 444). Alexander Seal (2016) 
introduces two types of thematic analysis. When themes are ‘specifically generated 
from the coded segments of data’, they are what Boyatzis (1998) defines as ‘data 
driven code’ which identifies themes from coded data (p. 454). However, if the themes 
are already ‘identified in previous research studies and literature within the area 
investigation’ by other researchers, then they are referred to as ‘a priori themes’, which 
‘accept another researcher’s assumption, projections, and biases’ (Boyatzis, 1998). It 
is sometimes inescapable that ‘a priori themes’ are used in research because, as Seal 
(2016) explains, it is quite common to employ theories and themes from other 
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researches which ‘can often be beneficial for comparing, contrasting and building on 
the works of others’ (p. 455). Also, it depends on the characteristics of different 
research projects. Here, it is appropriate to employ ‘a priori themes’ because, as Seal 
comments: ‘a good thematic analysis lies in the ability to develop the themes that 
adequately reflect what your data is telling you and to provide a justification for that 
interpretation’ (ibid.). 
    Thematic analysis of cultural policy, data from interviews, case studies of the 
NCKSCC/NPAC and the programmes it has produced and presented over the course 
of thirty-one years, generates an enormous amount of information. Stake (1995: 74) 
suggests there are two ways to gain new understanding through case studies: ‘through 
direct interpretation of the individual instance and through aggregation of instances 
until something can be said about them as a class’. The ultimate purpose is to find 
‘patterns and consistency with certain conditions’ within the collected data and 
‘usually the important meaning will come from reappearance over and over’ (Stake, 
1995: 78). Because of the nature of programme data, the category aggregation method 
has been used here. Patterns may be apparent before the analysis since, as Stake (1995: 
8) explains, ‘often, the patterns will be known in advance, drawn from the research 
questions, serving as a template for the analysis’. Content analysis is then used in order 
to analyse the large amount of programme data. Silverman (2011: 64) explains that 
‘content analysis involves establishing categories and then counting the number of 
instances when those categories are used in a particular item of text’. Through the 
textual investigation, a set of categories is built up and then ‘the number of instances 
that fall into each category’ can be counted (ibid.). Any tendencies for movement or 
development in the categories can then be looked for and interpretation sought.  
    The programmes produced and presented at the Centre during the study period 
have been collated and analysed in order to discover whether and how the proportions 
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of the different cultural influences have changed year by year. When all the sets of 
data have been analysed, they can then be set against changes in Taiwan’s cultural 
policy and Taiwanese identity over the same period so that the relationship between 
policy and the programming at the NCKSCC/NPAC can be seen.  
Because I have worked at the Centre for a considerable time, I knew personally 
all the people I interviewed in a working capacity and therefore had practical 
experience of how those people operated and what the history of their actions and 
decisions had been. Many of the actions and decisions of the interviewees have 
resulted in consequences that are on the record as a matter of history, but what I sought 
was the thoughts and motivations behind recorded actions. 
    Unlike scoring data from lists of past programmes, interpreting interviews and 
collating data from them is not a straightforward mathematical process because it 
requires an element of scepticism and judgement. At interview, everybody is likely to 
want to paint their past actions in a favourable light, and senior politicians and director-
level personalities are likely to be past-masters at presenting events positively from 
their own point of view. There is no question that any of my interviewees lied in 
response to my questions, they are all honourable people, but it is natural to be 
‘economical with the truth’. 
    As a result, in selecting comments to use in this thesis, I have tried to ensure that 
they represent not only the opinions of the interviewees, but also that what was said to 
me coincides with the factual record when this is available. Wherever possible I have 
cross-checked comments from one person against comments on the same subject from 
others to look for consistency. I believe that what is recorded here represents genuine 
thoughts and opinions and that wishful thinking on the part of the interviewees has 




1.6 Significance of the Study 
To date, there are no major published research studies on the subject of the relationship 
between Taiwan’s cultural policy, public performing arts centres and Taiwanese 
identity in the public realm. This is the first time that such research has been 
undertaken and the interviews referred to above, along with a further set of interviews 
with key figures in government, iconic artists, senior performing arts administrators 
and cultural study scholars have been combined with an analysis of all the produced 
and presented programmes that have been staged at the Centre over the last thirty-one 
years to determine whether and how cultural policy has influenced Taiwan’s 
government-supported performing arts centre and to relate it to the country’s identity.  
This is timely as the first three-centre National Performing Arts Centre (NPAC) 
of Taiwan has just been established and begun to operate across the country. The 
NPAC’s predecessor, the NCKSCC, has been in operation for more than 30 years but 
there has been little research on its programming, its relation to the Government, its 
contribution to cultural policy, and especially its agenda of Taiwanese identity. This 
PhD research project generates new findings and knowledge that helps to expand 
academic study of Taiwan’s cultural life. It also considers the extent to which the 
NCKSCC and NPAC are able to function autonomously in order to understand better 
the future work at the NPAC. In addition, this research can contribute towards 
improving cultural policies in Taiwan and helping to recognise practical collaboration 
between the state and the arts. The primary data collected from the NCKSCC/NPAC 
produced and presented programmes and the interviewees may provide material for 
future research and will provide a significant reference point to enable experiences to 
be shared with those establishing similar arts centres elsewhere. It will also build up 
new knowledge of Taiwanese identity, cultural policy making and arts management. 
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Although the research focuses exclusively on the performing arts at the NPAC and 
NCKSCC, the arts world does not only consist of performing arts and there are other 
arts centres that are just beginning to operate. As a consequence, other art forms and 
work at other arts centres that are not considered here will provide rich research 
material for continuing this research into a more comprehensive field in the future.  
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
There are six chapters in this thesis. Chapter 1 has introduced the research background, 
topic, question, themes, design and methodology. 
    Chapter 2 starts with a literature review of the way in which the concepts of 
‘culture’, ‘nation’, ‘state and nation-state’, ‘national identity’ and ‘cultural identity’ 
can be defined in the Taiwanese context, focusing on the period after World War Two. 
It examines the development of Taiwanese identity with respect to: history; ethnic 
composition; and international status. It describes the phenomenon of cultural diversity 
(Wen hua duo yang shing, 文化多樣性) in Taiwan today and examines what the 
younger generation of Taiwanese people feel about their ‘Taiwanese identity’ and the 
way that is changing in the light of the challenges that Taiwan currently faces.  
    Chapter 3 then goes on to explore Taiwan’s cultural policy in relation to 
Taiwanese identity and its development from 1949 when the KMT transferred to 
Taiwan, to 2017 after the third Minister of Culture took office. Since cultural policy 
reflects changes in the cultural environment and the shift of Taiwanese identity, it is 
important to examine the evolution of cultural policy along with changes in the way 
the Government implements its policy through its cultural agencies. The chapter starts 
with a literature review of the concept of cultural policy and its domain, beginning 
with definitions by Western scholars and Taiwanese academics, in order to provide a 
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basis for an overview of cultural policy. The second part of the chapter conducts an 
analysis of Taiwan’s cultural policy development focusing on government cultural 
agencies and the problems and conflicts that exist in Taiwan’s cultural policy today. 
    Chapter 4 presents the context for the performing arts, examining Taiwanese 
definitions and then placing them in the context of Western academic definitions so 
that the developments that have taken place in Taiwan can be better understood. The 
second part looks at those national developments in relation to Taiwanese identity and 
performing arts policy. It then concentrates on the development of performing arts 
centres and explores the organisation and governance of the NCKSCC to show how it 
acts as an independent administrative corporation with autonomy from government 
control. This leads to a series of interviews conducted with those responsible for arts 
direction and programming at the NCKSCC, and explores whether the Government’s 
cultural policy has had an influence on the programming and administration of the 
NCKSCC. The final part investigates the establishment and current situation of the 
NPAC.  
    Chapter 5 focuses on the NCKSCC’s programming, taking the produced and 
presented programmes of the NCKSCC as the main case study, and investigating how 
they have developed over time. The data demonstrated here cover the programmes 
produced and presented at the Centre from its opening to 2017, a total of 4,067 
programmes. Through analysing the content of these programmes, it examines the 
correlation between the Centre’s programming and the shift of Taiwanese identity. 
Three case studies: the Centre’s Flagship productions, the programmes of the Cloud 
Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan, and the programmes of the National Guo Guang Opera 
Company are selected to further demonstrate the shift of Taiwanese identity. 
    The concluding Chapter 6 discusses the key findings of the research in relation to 
the questions posed at the start of the thesis. It examines the fundamental issues 
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concerning the relationship between Taiwanese identity, cultural policy and the NPAC. 
It also suggests potential directions for the future development of the NPAC, and 



















Chapter 2: Taiwanese Identity and Its Development 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets a historical and theoretical context of the research that is the subject 
of following chapters. There are two areas of interest that underly the question set up 
by the title of the thesis: the first part explores the concepts of culture, nation and 
identity via reviewing a relevant literature to establish a framework for research. The 
second part summaries the history of Taiwan to illustrate the development of 
Taiwanese identity. In particular, it stresses the political situation of Taiwan with 
respect to its recognition by other countries, and the effect this has on Taiwan as an 
independent state with its own political identity. 
Taiwan, officially known as ‘The Republic of China’ (ROC) is not recognised as 
a state either by the United Nations (UN) or most other countries, and its status is 
therefore contentious both legally and politically. Within the last century, the island of 
Taiwan has been governed by a series of different regimes: it has been a part of the 
Japanese empire, it was then a province of the Chinese Nationalist government, until 
it eventually became a de facto sovereign state under the name of the ROC. Because 
of this, Taiwan has undergone parallel changes in respect of both national and cultural 
identity and this has been a problem for its population. The uncertainty in people’s 
minds when they cannot give a firm answer to the question ‘What is Taiwanese?’ or 
by extension, ‘Who am I?’ is the core issue in the development of a specifically 
Taiwanese identity and one that influences every aspect of Taiwanese life. It becomes 
critical when the Taiwanese people are seeking consensus about their unity as a nation 
and its solidarity when under threat from a powerful neighbour. 
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    The performing arts hold an important position in the cultural life of Taiwan, and 
they both affect and are affected by the national identity because they express, interpret, 
and help to form that identity. Furthermore, performing arts centres, especially those 
owned by the state, occupy a vital position in the spectrum of national cultural life.  
This chapter therefore starts by introducing Raymond Williams’s work for a broad 
definition of culture. Then Anthony D. Smith, Eric Hobsbawm, Ernest Gellner, 
Michael Billig and Benedict Anderson’s work is used to analyse how a nation is 
defined and how national identity is formed. Stuart Hall’s work gives more 
contemporary thoughts about how cultural identity is formed.  
    The chapter then considers the specific case of Taiwan’s cultural and national 
identity especially in relation to mainland China, to its international recognition and to 
the self-image of its population. Taiwanese identity has been a constantly changing 
phenomenon since the 1949 arrival of the KMT, through the initiation of democracy 
on the island to today’s western-influenced multicultural society. This will be used in 
later chapters to trace the way in which the evolution of Taiwanese identity has been 
reflected in government cultural policy and in programming at the National 
Performing Arts Centre.  
 
2.2 Understanding Culture, Nation, and Identity 
The words ‘culture’, ‘nation’ and ‘identity’ are difficult to define and have been used 
in many different ways. This section gives a literature review of the definitions and 







General definitions  
Academics including philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, and linguists have 
attempted to define the word culture from their own separate standpoints but there is 
no single accepted definition. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO, 2016) acknowledges that the word ‘culture’ is used in a 
variety of ways, but it favours a commonly used definition given by the British 
anthropologist, Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917): ‘(Culture) is that complex whole 
which includes knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, laws, customs, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by (a human) as a member of society’. David 
Matsumoto (1996: 16) puts it in a different way: ‘(Culture) is the set of attitudes, values, 
beliefs, and behaviours shared by a group of people, but different for each individual, 
communicated from one generation to the next’. So, ‘culture’ not only covers any 
human activity or operation, but also gives a defining characteristic to diversified 
human communities. In the words of Geert Hofstede (1994: 5), culture ‘is the 
collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or 
category of people from another’. Other authors phrase their definitions somewhat 
differently. According to Oliver Bennett (2009: 67) culture ‘in its broadest sense, 
represents all of the important factors which constitute the experience of living’ (2009: 
67), while Kevin V. Mulcahy (2006: 319) thinks ‘culture suggests a process for the 
deliberate and systematic acquisition of an intellectual sensibility. Typically, culture 
is used in political discourse as the arts’. 
    Traditionally, according to Chris Jenks (1998: 8), mainstream linguistics equates 
‘culture’ with ‘civilization’, showing how the German word ‘Kultur’ refers to the arts, 
literature, music, and all kinds of human achievements. In Jenks’s opinion this 
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suggests an elitist attitude, that connects with what is often referred to as ‘high culture’. 
He also asserts that the concept of culture covers such a diversity of opinion that it is 
impossible to give a definition that everybody agrees with. Simon During (1993: 2), 
on the other hand, insists that the word ‘culture’ should not be used as an ‘abbreviation 
of high culture’ but should ‘have constant value across time and space’. 
    In an attempt to bring clarity to the way the term culture is used, Raymond 
Williams (1958, 1983: xvi) outlined the evolution of the terminology of culture:   
Before this period [the late decade of the eighteenth century, and in the first 
half of the nineteenth century], it [culture] had meant, primarily, the ‘tending 
of natural growth’, and then, by analogy, a process of human training. But 
this latter use, which had usually been a culture of something, was changed, 
in the nineteenth century, to culture as such, a thing in itself. It came to mean, 
first, ‘a general state or habit of the mind’, having close relations with the 
idea of human perfection. Second, it came to mean ‘the general state of 
intellectual development, in a society as whole’. Third, it came to mean ‘the 
general body of the arts’. Fourth, later in the [twentieth] century, it came to 
mean ‘a whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual’.   
The changes in usage of the word culture reflect changes in society in different periods. 
Williams (1961, 2001: 57) picks out critical features in three stages: first, ‘the idea, in 
which culture is a state or process of human perfection, in terms of certain absolute or 
universal’; second, ‘the documentary, in which culture is the body of intellectual and 
imaginative work, where in a detailed way, human thought and experience are 
variously recorded’; and third, ‘the social definition of culture, in which culture is a 
description of particular way of life, which expresses certain meaning and values not 
only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour’. Williams’s 
conclusion that the best modern definition of culture as ‘a whole way of life’ reflects 
the notion that whereas in times past culture was seen as a perquisite of the bourgeois 
classes, and anything relating to working class people should not be termed culture, 
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nowadays popular culture is as legitimate a form of culture as any other. Williams 
challenged the notion that culture should only refer to ‘high culture’, e.g. performing 
and visual arts, which were exclusively for the wealthy classes. He argued that both 
high (elite) and low (popular) culture are properly seen as part of a single broad cultural 
spectrum. This idea of breaking down cultural hierarchy is relevant to the theme of 
this thesis which reveals the formulation of Taiwan’s cultural policy aims in 
‘democratisation of culture’ and further to ‘cultural democracy’ at the political level 
(Section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3) and a parallel evolution of performing arts centres from 
elite venues to places for the entire community (Section 4.2.3 in Chapter 4).  
    Although there is a spectrum of views about what ‘culture’ means, from the broad 
anthropological or ethnographic stance to a narrower definition relating to what might 
be termed ‘the arts’, nowadays Williams’s conclusion that ‘the idea of culture is a 
general reaction to a general and major change in the conditions of our common life’ 
(1958, 1983: 295) is commonly accepted.      
Taiwanese definitions 
Turning to Taiwanese definitions, Kuo Wei-fan, Taiwan’s Minister of the Council for 
Cultural Affairs (CCA) from 2010 to 2013, favours a broad perspective. He sets out 
the traditional Chinese view, explaining that for the Chinese people, culture is both the 
tangible and intangible aspects of human heritage which reflect the adaptability that 
has enabled mankind to survive and strive for a better life. This way of thinking 
includes heritage, customs, rituals, etiquette, literature, language, characters, 
institutions, sciences, arts, morals, lifestyles, philosophy and even cosmology. Kuo 
(2011:31) summarises this by saying that in ancient China, culture corresponded to 
‘humanity’ as opposed to ‘nature’. Tchen Yu-chiou, another former Minister of the 
CCA (2000-2004), defines culture by combining the Edward Burnett Tylor definition 
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with the Taiwanese anthropologist Lee Yi-yuan’s view that ‘culture’ can be seen in 
multi-dimensional levels, with outer parts (observable factors) and inner parts 
(unobservable factors). In Tchen’s view, culture includes not only the arts and 
literature, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of human beings, value 
systems, traditions and beliefs (Tchen, 2013: 22-23). She considers that culture is an 
all-encompassing human concept that not only includes literature, architecture, nature, 
heritage, and arts, but also includes life styles.  
    Han Pao-teh, the National Policy Advisor to the President of Taiwan (2000-2004), 
also attempted to characterise culture, and agrees with the western notion that culture 
can be understood in either a narrow or a broad way (Han, 2014: 19-31). In the narrow 
definition, culture refers to ‘arts’ (high culture) which include the nurturing of taste, 
and appreciation of high cultural activities. Han regards this as the view of the elite in 
both East and West and criticises it as outdated for a post-modernist age. He prefers a 
broad definition that covers every domain of human life showing the diversity of 
modern society. Meanwhile, Lung Ying-tai, before she became the first Minister of 
Culture in Taiwan (2012-2014), wrote in Taiwan’s China Times that culture is the 
basic education of the nation which develops people’s taste (Lung, 2008). For her, 
culture includes not only all the experiences that individuals have accumulated during 
their lifetime, but much more besides: the economy, diplomacy, and ways in which 
hostility can be eliminated. In Lung’s broad definition, culture is the mind and brain 
of a country which decides the country’s power and future.  
    Thus, although there is no agreed definition of the word culture, nowadays it is 
usual to define it in a broad way rather than equating it with ‘high culture’. Current 
thinking in Taiwan closely mirrors the current western view of culture as all-inclusive. 
This thesis accepts the broad-spectrum approach which has been the starting point for 
policy makers as they think about setting national cultural policies for Taiwan.  
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2.2.2 Nation, State and Nation-state 
When ‘culture’ is seen as the whole way of life, it becomes the central component in 
defining human communities or nations. In Anthony D. Smith’s view (1991: 14-15) 
the word nation ‘signifies a cultural and political bond, uniting in a single political 
community all who share an historic culture and homeland’. Nowadays, this political 
community referred to as ‘nation’ may be thought of as interchangeable with ‘state’ or 
‘nation-state’ so it is essential to be clear about the definition of each of these terms 
for this thesis as it examines the formation of national identity and the central role it 
plays in state cultural policy. 
A nation and its formation  
The definition of ‘nation’ is debatable in the view of scholars such as Anthony D. 
Smith, Eric Hobsbawm and Ernest Gellner. Smith (1991: 74) stresses that modern 
nationalism plays a fundamental role in the process of formation, or growth, of 
contemporary nations as ‘nationalism is a political ideology with a cultural doctrine at 
its centre’, and that cultural doctrine includes concepts, languages, and symbols. For 
him, nationalism is ‘an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the 
autonomy, unity, and identity of a nation’ (ibid.).  
Even though Smith feels that defining a nation is open to argument, he endeavours 
to do so using both objective and subjective factors. Objective factors can be language, 
religion, customs, territory and institutions, whereas subjective factors include 
attitudes, perceptions and sentiments. However, even using all these, it is not possible 
to cover the situation of every nation. Smith explains that the definitions ‘nearly always 
exclude some widely accepted cases of nations, sometimes quite intentionally’ (2001: 
11). He then proposes a definition of ‘nation’ as: 
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A named human community occupying a homeland, and having common 
myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and 
common rights and duties for all members. (Smith, 2001: 13) 
Bearing in mind the exceptions that Smith acknowledges, Hobsbawm (1990: 5), thinks 
that ‘no satisfactory criteria can be discovered for deciding which of the many human 
collectives should be labelled in this way’. In his view, the search for objective criteria 
for nationhood has never resulted in a precise and useful definition, especially when 
single criteria such as language or ethnicity are used, or even when combinations of 
criteria that include common culture are taken into account. Despite the difficulty in 
arriving at a definition, there is a general acceptance that a shared common culture is 
an important factor as well as common ethnic origin. Smith (1991:21) therefore 
introduces the concept of ‘ethnic cores’ using the French term ethnie to denote a group 
of people with common features such as shared historical memory and association 
with a specific homeland. For Smith, ethnies dominate the concept of nationhood and 
influence national identity. 
    Any definition of ‘nation’ will always have exceptions, so tying the word down 
to an exclusive definition is unrealistic. In Ernest Gellner’s (2006: 6) view, ‘nation’ is 
a ‘contingency’ in human history and ‘not a universal necessity’. He explains: 
Nations are not inscribed into the nature of things; they do not constitute a 
political version of the doctrine of natural kinds. Nor were national states the 
manifest ultimate destiny of ethnic or cultural groups. What do exist are 
cultures, often subtly grouped, standing into each other, overlapping, 
intertwined; and there exist, usually but not always, political units of all 
shaped and sizes. (Gellner, 2006: 47) 
Gellner concludes that the origin of a nation is ‘the consequence of a new form of 
social organisation’ which consists of ‘deeply internalised, education-dependent high 
cultures, each protected by its own state’. He points out that a nation’s formation 
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would involve ‘pre-existent cultures, generally transforming them in the process, but 
it cannot possibly use them all’. Gellner’s view is that a modern state that is capable 
of sustaining its own culture has to reach a minimum population size and that the finite 
land space on earth puts a limit on the number of states that can exist at any one time 
(ibid).  
    In Hobsbawm’s view however, modern nations are developed with ‘invented 
tradition’. He explains: 
Invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by 
overtly or tacitly accepted rules, and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which 
seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which 
automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they 
normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past. 
(Hobsbawm, 1983: 1) 
For Hobsbawm (1983: 9), there are three overlapping types of invented tradition: the 
establishing or legitimising institutions; the systems of socialisation, education and 
convention; and the establishing or symbolising social cohesion communities such as 
a nation. To invent tradition is then ‘a process of formalisation and ritualisation’ which 
is characterised by reference to the community’s past, and for the community to be 
referred to as a nation also implies the existence of a feeling within it’ (Hobsbawm, 
1983: 4). Hobsbawm concludes: 
And just because so much of what subjectively makes up the modern ‘nation’ 
consists of such constructs and is associated with appropriate and, in general, 
fairly recent symbols or suitably tailored discourse (such as ‘national 
history’), the national phenomenon cannot be adequately investigated 
without careful attention to the ‘invention of tradition’. (Hobsbawm: 1983: 
14) 
    Meanwhile, Benedict Anderson (2016: 4) suggests that terms such as nationality, 
nation-ness or nationalism are cultural artefacts that are mainly of interest in 
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researching their origins and historical use. He sees a nation as ‘an imagined political 
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (Anderson, 2016: 
6). From this point of view, a nation is imagined by those people who discern 
themselves to be part of the group:  
The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, 
encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, 
boundaries, beyond which lie other nations…. It is imagined as sovereign 
because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and 
Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, 
hierarchical dynastic realm. (Anderson, 2016: 7) 
And the nation ‘is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual 
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each other, the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (ibid.). The main reason that Anderson 
suggests that a nation is an ‘imagined political community’ is because the members of 
even the smallest nation are unlikely to know most of the other members of the nation 
and have no chance to meet or even be aware of them. However, they believe they are 
members of the nation and they live in a community which shares interests, memories 
or identities.  
    By combining the ideas of Anderson and Hobsbawm, Smith thinks ‘imagery’ 
plays a vital role in illustrating the formation of nations and ‘the conscious invention 
of essentially new traditions to meet new needs’ is crucial in their invention (Smith, 
1993: 9, 11). As a result, ‘the nation becomes a construct of the modern imagination 
and an historical invention on the part of particular categories or classes of modern 
societies’ (Smith, 1993: 10). For example, national landscapes, literature, heroes, 
figures, etc. all combine to create a national consciousness of the need to form a nation. 
    Michael Billig (1995) believes that in everyday life, the citizens of a nation have 
constant reminders and emblems their nationhood which he terms ‘flaggings’. These 
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are ubiquitous and ‘this reminding is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously 
registered as reminding’ (p. 8). Billig calls this ‘banal nationalism’ and goes on to 
explain: 
The media of mass communication bring the flag across the contemporary 
hearth. Daily newspapers and logomanic politicians constantly flag the world 
of nations. They routinely use a deixis of words. ‘Here’, ‘us’, and ‘the’ are 
so easy to overlook. They are not words to grab the attention, but they 
perform an important task in the business of flagging. Banally, they address 
‘us’ as a national first-person plural; and they situate ‘us’ in the homeland 
within a world of nations. Nationhood is the context which must be assumed 
to understand so many banal utterances. (Billig, 1995: 174) 
In this sense, contemporary nationalism can appear in unnoticed and ordinary parts of 
daily life, for example, the national flag, coins and notes, daily-used language and so 
on. The performing arts are also a part of daily life, so Billig’s concept is an excellent 
pointer to the way they can reflect shifts and transformations in national identity 
through a ‘natural’ process rather than deliberately. This therefore provides a dynamic 
foundation to this thesis.    
    To summarise, looking at the variety of definitions available, there are common 
features. Objectively, a nation requires a group of people to have their own government, 
territory, history, language, tradition, culture, economic life, and institutions. 
Subjectively, it is necessary that those people recognise each other as part of the same 
nation, and share identities, rights and duties with all other members. This concept of 
nationhood may be imagined and developed by the community as a group in a way 
that is mundane and quotidian. If we follow this idea, the most important factor in the 
process of forming a nation is that people regard or recognise their ‘community’ as a 
nation. The primary recognition of nationhood is therefore within the community, and 
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recognition by other communities or nations is probably not a significant criterion in 
the formation of a nation.  
State and nation-state 
The definition most commonly used for the term state is that given by Max Weber: a 
‘human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory’ (Weber, 1946: 78). Using this concept, 
sovereign states define themselves as independent political establishments that have a 
government which maintains political power and legitimate authority within their 
territory. States thus proclaim their existence and status by the collective action of their 
community and the term ‘state’ may be interchangeable with ‘nation’ or ‘country’. 
Smith clarifies the distinction between state and nation:  
…(State) refers exclusively to public institutions, differentiated from, and 
autonomous of, other social institutions and exercising a monopoly of 
coercion and extraction within a given territory. The Nation, on the other 
hand, signifies a cultural and political bond, uniting in a single political 
community all who share an historic culture and homeland. (Smith, 1991: 14-
15) 
In international politics, the United Nations (UN) is recognised as the most important 
organisation, and any country that is accepted as a member of the UN is regarded as a 
‘nation’ (although in Smith’s terms it should be referred to as a ‘state’). According to 
the UN’s guidance on How does a new State or Government obtain recognition by the 
United Nations? and How does a country become a member of the United Nations?, 
membership ‘is open to all peace-loving “states” that accept the obligations contained 
in the United Nations Charter’, and stipulates that the final decision on membership is 
made by the UN’s General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security 
Council (UN, 2017). Such recognition may only be granted by other states that are UN 
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members. Thus, international political relations and the diplomatic situation are crucial 
for a state’s UN recognition.  
    Literally, a nation state is a sovereign state which consists of a single nation and, 
according to Smith, exists ‘only if and when a single ethnic and cultural population 
inhabits the boundaries of a state, and the boundaries of that state are coextensive with 
the boundaries of that ethnic and cultural population’ (Smith, 1998 :86). This is an 
ideal situation of a country ‘where the cultural boundaries match up with the political 
boundaries’ (UNESCO, 2019). In reality, most modern states have a number of 
different ethnic communities and fewer than 10% of the states in the United Nations 
fit the ideal definition of a nation-state (Smith, 1998: 86).  
    The political ideology of a movement whose doctrine advocates gaining and 
maintaining a nation’s sovereignty gives rise to nationalism (Smith, 1991: 74), and 
nationalism is closely related to concept of ‘state’, as Adrian Hastings illustrates: 
Nationalism means two things: a theory and a practice. As a political theory 
—that each ‘nation’ should have its own ‘state’—it derives from the 
nineteenth century. However, that general principle motivates few 
nationalists. In practice nationalism is strong only in particularist terms, 
deriving from the belief that one’s own ethnic or national tradition is 
especially valuable and needs to be defended at almost any cost through 
creation or extension of its own nation-state. (Hastings, 1997: 3-4) 
Hastings’s idea reflects the dark and negative sides of nationalism, and the way in 
which a nation-state might react when it feels threatened by expansion or being divided. 
The principle of ‘the right to national self-determination’ and the demand that ‘people 
should govern themselves’ became a political tendency after World War One for those 
nations with empires and colonies (UNSECO, 2019). But nation-state nationalism has 
become problematic and even dangerous according to UNSECO, in a way ‘that 
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operates at many different levels, ranging from extreme xenophobic forms to the more 
moderate forms of cultural nationalism’ (ibid.).  
    To conclude, prominent scholars on the topic of nationhood such as Hobsbawm, 
Gellner and Anderson broadly agree that modern nations are artefacts that are the 
product of political and diplomatic factors. Cultural doctrine, including concepts, 
languages, and symbols, plays a significant role and identity is an important 
component in constructing nationhood. The evolution of nationhood can be followed 
in different ways according to context and David Miller (2000: 27) therefore 
introduced ‘three interconnected propositions’ for a nation’s formation. His first deals 
with ‘personal identity’ and suggests that everybody specifies for themselves the 
elements that make up their identity, the group that they belong to and thus their 
nationality. The second proposition, echoing Smith, states that a nation is related to its 
ethnic community so that nations are ‘contour lines in the ethnic landscape’. The third 
proposition relates to politics and states that when people form a national community 
in their own territory, they have the right to political determination. UNESCO agrees 
when it writes ‘today, the idea is that nations should be represented within a 
territorially defined state’ (UNSECO, 2019). 
    Whichever definition is used, Taiwan appears to fit all of the criteria of 
nationhood; it has its own people, territory, government, sovereignty and culture. The 
only exception is that Taiwan is not diplomatically recognised by the UN and most 
other nations of the world, even though they may be involved in unofficial nation-to-
nation diplomacy with it. Anderson’s suggestion that nationhood is imagined may well 
be a pointer to Taiwan’s destiny by describing this island state both virtually and 
practically. For many years, Taiwan has been accepted diplomatically as a de facto 
state with sovereignty over the island (Schubert & Damm, 2011: 2) and this thesis 
therefore takes this proposition as axiomatic in the following discussion. 
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2.2.3 Identity: Cultural and National 
Living in the contemporary world with its convoluted network of relationships and 
circumstances, questions arise about how individuals see themselves with respect to 
other people and how groups of people identify themselves as distinct from other 
groups. The concept of ‘identity’ is fundamental to these questions. ‘Consequently, an 
identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life, Such habits include those 
of thinking and using language’ (Billig, 1995: 8). Identity is not only the force that 
unites people who recognise common origins but also a vital element in the 
construction of nationhood (Miller, 2000). ‘Identity’ is another complex idea that has 
been defined in different ways by different authors and the following section will 
explore those definitions and then look at how cultural and national identities develop. 
The definitions of identity 
We all, as individuals or members of a wider group, carry our identity with us and it 
forms our appearance to the outside world. But there are different ways of defining 
what that identity might be. Warren Kidd (2002) explains identity is ‘our 
understanding of who we are and who other people are, and, reciprocally, other 
people’s understanding of themselves and of others (which includes us)’ (p. 25). 
Anthony D. Smith (1991), takes a more straightforward approach and equates identity 
with ‘sameness’. In a collective context, this translates as ‘the members of a particular 
group are alike in just those respects in which they differ from non-members outside 
the group’ (p. 75).  
    But there is more to the subject than simple definition. When it comes to different 
individuals or distinctive groups of people, there are layers of identity such as gender, 
political, cultural, national and so on. Smith describes ‘levels of identity’ where people 
describe themselves as having ‘multiple identities (composed of) a variety of collective 
59 
 
affiliations—family, gender, parties, confessions and ethnies,—and can move from one 
to the other, often quite easily, as circumstances require’ (Smith, 2001: 18).  
In this way, identity is a changeable concept, as Stuart Hall emphasises:  
It is accepted that identities are never unified and, in modern times, 
increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply 
constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, 
practice and positions. They are subject to a radical historicization, and are 
constantly in the process of change and transformation. (Hall, 1996: 4) 
This is why Hall claims that the formation of identity is ‘produced in special historical 
and institutional sites’ and is emerged ‘within the play of special modalities of power’ 
(ibid.). For Alan M. Wachman, identity is characteristically ‘driven by emotion’, is 
‘dynamic’ and is ‘seldom exclusive’. In his view individuals have ‘multiple, 
overlapping, or sometimes competing identities’, and the basis of their ‘disparate 
sentiments of identification’ might well be changeable (Wachman, 1994: 56). This 
emphasises a significant feature of identity today when travel is easy and mass media 
make everywhere accessible, but at the same time when national borders are still 
rigorously maintained.  
Cultural identity 
If we define culture as ‘a whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual’, then 
the spectrum of cultural identity can itself be broad and inclusive like an umbrella that 
covers different layers of identity. In this case, there is an obvious connection with 
national identity in relation to community cohesion. Just as a variety of ethnic cultural 
groups can come together in a single sovereign state, a variety of national states can 
share a cultural identity. Thus, the definition of cultural identity, according to Warren 
Kidd (2002: 26), ‘refers to a sense of belonging to a distinct ethnic, cultural or 
subcultural group’.  
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    Stuart Hall suggests that in this collective way of looking at identity, there are 
two approaches to defining cultural identity (Hall, 1998: 223). The first emphasises 
the sameness of a community of people who share the same history and ancestry. Their 
cultural identity is ‘one shared culture, a sort of collective “one true self”, hiding inside 
the many other, more superficial or artificially imposed “selves”’. In this sense, 
cultural identity reflects ‘common historical experiences and shared cultural codes’ 
which contribute to make a community ‘one people’ with solid and abiding ‘frames of 
reference and meaning’ within an ever-changing human history. Hall’s second 
approach emphasises that as well as similarities there are also differences within an 
imagined cultural community that result from ‘what we really are’ and ‘what we have 
become’ (Hall, 1998: 225). Thus, it is a matter of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’. In this sense, 
Hall claims that cultural identity not only links communities with their past but also 
resides in the future, and that it ‘undergoes constant transformation’ through history as 
it is ‘subject to the continuous “play” of history, culture, and power’. Hall’s view is 
that ‘identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and 
position ourselves within, the narratives of the past’ (ibid.).  
    On the other hand, Vivian Hsueh-Hua Chen, from Nanyang Technological 
University, Singapore, claims that the formation of cultural identity involves a process 
of sharing collective knowledge of tradition, heritage, religion and so on (Chen, 2014). 
But she also argues that the study of cultural identity began in Western academia and 
therefore applies primarily to Western nations with their mixed historical backgrounds. 
As a result, the mainstream concepts of cultural identity are not entirely applicable to 
the social and cultural trajectories in other parts of the world, such as Asian countries 
where some nation-states contain relatively homogenous ethnic communities. She 
suggests that ‘enhancing and sharing vernacular knowledge rooted in non-Western 
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cultures will lead to further refinement of the concept (of cultural identity)’ (ibid.). 
Smith is also aware of this phenomenon:  
Genealogy and presumed descent ties, popular mobilisation, vernacular 
languages, customs and traditions, these are the element of an alternative, 
ethnic conception of the nation, one that mirrored the very different route of 
nation-formation travelled by many communities in Eastern Europe and Asia 
and one that constituted a dynamic political challenge. (Smith, 1991:12-13) 
Looking more closely at the influence of this ethnic factor which stresses the ‘birth’ 
and ‘native culture’ of a community, Smith identifies distinct ways of looking at 
national identity: Western and non-Western. In the former, an individual could choose 
which nation to belong to, no matter what their ethnic background. In the latter, 
ethnicity is everything and even after emigration, an individual is perceived as 
belonging to his or her birth nation. ‘A nation was first and foremost a community of 
common descent’ (Smith, 1991:11). This phenomenon is very apparent in the Chinese-
speaking world where ethnic Chinese who happen to live in different states still regard 
themselves and are regarded by others as having Chinese cultural or national identity. 
This is very significant in Taiwan and crucially affects the formation of ‘Taiwanese 
identity’. 
    Smith emphasises the importance of the ethnic ties and identity links that are the 
cultural foundation of a community and which form the basis of a nation. He illustrates 
two types of ethnic communities (ethnies): the lateral and the vertical3. In a lateral 
                                                          
3 According to Anthony D. Smith (1991: 53), the lateral ethnie ‘was usually composed of 
aristocrats and higher clergy, though it might from time to time include bureaucrats, high 
military officials and the richer merchants. It is termed lateral because it was at once socially 
confined to upper strata while being geographically spread out to form often close links with 
upper echelons of neighbouring lateral ethnie’. The vertical ethnie ‘was more compact and 
popular. Its ethnic culture tended to be diffused to other social strata and classes. Social 
divisions were not underpinned by cultural differences: rather, a distinctive historical culture 
helped to unite different classes around a common heritage and traditions, especially when the 
latter were under threat from outside’.  
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ethnie, the dominant upper social strata confine themselves to their own circle and fail 
to integrate with other strata of the community; when they disperse, they move to the 
same upper strata of neighbouring lateral ethnies. In this mode, allegiance to the state 
takes precedence over ethnic ties and Smith claims that lateral ethnies tend to produce 
‘civic’ nations, such as France, Spain, England and other west European states. 
Vertical ethnies, on the other hand, exist across all social strata. They share a persistent 
historical culture which can survive across long periods of time, as they have in Greece 
and Catholic Ireland (Smith, 1991:52-54). The ‘Zhonghua’4 (中華, Chinese) culture 
can be categorised as a vertical ethnie which is ancient, but still viable and able to 
influence the formation of national and cultural identities without preventing the 
establishment of modern sates. 
National identity 
In simple terms, ‘national identity’ refers to the people of a nation who recognise and 
share a common perception of the identity of that nation. From the formative elements 
of a nation described above, the fundamental features of national identity consist of 
the history, symbols, traditions, values, legal rights and, most importantly, the culture 
of the nation. Thus ‘any attempt to forge a national identity is also a political action 
with political consequences’ (Smith, 1991: 99). This necessary connection between 
cultural and political identities is often the origin of conflict within or between states. 
Roxanne L. Doty believes that ‘national identity is arguably one of the more 
                                                          
4 Zhonghua (中華) is a Chinese term for the historical concept of the Chinese nation and 
civilization. The official names of both the ROC (Zhonghua Minguo, 中華民國) and the PRC 
(Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo, 中华人民共和国) contain Zhonghua, but it indicates the 
civilization and is not limited to the state of Zhongguo (China,中國). Zhonghua remains a 
border perspective and mainly designates ‘Chinese culture, or cultural accomplishments of 
Chinese people’. ‘With its focus on culture, Zhonghua is often disguised as a less ideologically 




problematic constitutive elements of a contemporary state’ (Doty, 1996: 240). It is one 
of the things that states would like ‘to have naturalised, to take as given and 
unproblematic’ (ibid.).  
    Smith has examined the way that national identity has been formed in new 
modern sates, especially ex-colonial countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia 
(Smith, 1991:110-112). He finds two main models: the first is the ‘dominant ethnie’ 
model in which the majority ethnic group of the state ‘becomes the main pillar of the 
new national political identity and community’. In this model, the new national identity 
of state is ‘shaped by the historic culture of its dominant ethnie’. But when there is no 
dominant ethnie in a newly established state, the second model applies and the state 
has ‘to find ways of creating a supra-ethnic political culture for the new political 
community’ in order to develop its new national identity. 
    Another significant factor in the formation of national identity in a modern state is 
migration. According to Doty, ‘the international movement of peoples is one concrete 
site where the interior/exterior tension is particularly evident’ (Doty, 1996: 240). 
Migration to seek a better life has been a constant factor throughout human history and 
Sheila L. Croucher sees it as ‘the reason that ethnic identities and ethnic politics exist’ 
(Croucher, 2004: 135). When migration groups of different cultures, language, religion, 
tradition, physical attributes, and ancestral origin move into a state, their shared 
similarities and their differentiation from other existing groups are evident. These 
differences can become a source of tension and conflict between the newly arrived 
migrants and the existing population. Croucher’s proposition is evidence in favour of 
the view of Gellner and Hobsbawm that ‘the nation is not naturally formed’. Doty (1996: 
240) asserts that ‘human migration highlights the salience as well as ambiguities of 
national identity’ and this fits well with Anderson’s idea of an ‘imagined community’. 
Doty suggests that we should accept continual re-definition of national identity as the 
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norm rather than trying to halt the process of evolution by producing unchanging 
definitions (Doty, 1996: 225). Smith comments on the political aspects of national 
identity which regulate both ‘the composition of the regime’s personnel’ and its 
legitimacy. National identity therefore plays a vital role in the formulation of a 
government’s policy goals as well as its administrative practices which ‘regulate the 
everyday lives of each citizen’ (Smith, 1999: 144). 
    To conclude, ‘by noticing the flaggings of nationhood, we are noticing something 
about ourselves. We are noticing the depths and mechanism of our identity, embedded 
in the routines of social life’ (Billig: 1995: 175). The ideology that lies behind national 
identity is of critical importance, but the formation of that identity is a constantly 
evolving process that depends on factors such as migration, the ethnic mix of local 
populations and changing political situations. Thus, national identity is a fluid attribute 
of a population that is unstable and is related to ‘traditions’ that may already exist or 
be invented. Identity is not just about ‘being’, but more importantly it is about 
‘becoming’ (Hall, 1996: 4). 
    Because nations comprise diverse collective identities, national identity is a mix 
of components such as class, religion or ethnicity. It is ‘fundamentally multi-
dimensional and can never be reduced to a single element, even by particular factions 
or nationalists, nor can it be easily or swiftly induced in a population by artificial means’ 
(Smith, 1991: 11). Michael Wintle (1996: 230) has observed that ‘feelings of loyalty 
and identity are often infinitely varied about the same nation’ and the power of national 
identity is such that it can ‘unite sometimes wildly different people into powerful 
alliances, without them even sharing the same ideology’. The formation of a national 
identity is challenging and time-consuming, nevertheless it is a ‘becoming’ process 
that can integrate otherwise unrelated cultural groups. 
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2.3 The Development of Taiwanese Identity 
According to Max Weber (1946), for a state to exist, it needs to have a monopoly 
legitimate government within its territory. In this sense, Taiwan is a ‘state’ with its 
own sovereignty over Taiwan island, despite retaining a constitution that was 
formulated in China in 1947 (Laws & Regulations Database of the ROC, 2019). Thus, 
the word ‘Taiwan’ which is in everyday use worldwide is the geographical name of an 
island but is not constitutionally the name of a sovereign state. The official name of 
the political entity in Taiwan is ‘The Republic of China’ (ROC) and this is still seen 
on all official documents. The fact that different political regimes have attempted to 
change the name of the country (the current DPP government’s name for it is ‘the ROC 
Taiwan’) reflects their views of Taiwanese identity (Chang & Holt, 2015: 3). History 
and a complicated political situation are closely linked to the development of a distinct 
identity for the Taiwanese population and, as Hall (1996) suggests, sophisticated 
history and modalities of power compose a trajectory for identity. This section outlines 
the essential characteristics of Taiwan through its history, ethnic composition and 
international position, and then analyses the chronological development of Taiwanese 
identity focusing on the period after World War Two.  
 
2.3.1 About Taiwan 
2.3.1.1 Turbulent History 
The history of Taiwan is labyrinthine both politically and culturally. It is textured and 
multi-layered because of its different rulers as well as Taiwan’s various ethnic groups 
with their own cultures. Over the centuries, immigration has enriched every aspect of 
the island’s life and, as Croucher (2004) suggests, this is a compelling factor in 
shaping its national identity. As a result, Taiwanese identity has always been in a state 
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of constant change making it an exemplar of Hall’s mode of ‘becoming’ (Hall, 1998). 
Since the arrival of democracy, the concept of a developing specifically Taiwanese 
identity has been at the core of Taiwan’s politics and has influenced both the cultural 
and artistic life of the country.  
    Until AD 1600, the island of Taiwan was populated by indigenous people along 
with some Chinese fishermen, smugglers, and pirates (Wills Jr., 2007: 85). But In the 
early seventeenth century, European ships from Portugal, Spain and The Netherlands 
travelled to the Taiwan area, and Spanish and Dutch traders set up bases on Taiwan 
from which they could trade with China and Japan (Academia Sinica, 2014). These 
traders did not bring large numbers of Europeans to Taiwan to form colonies but the 
Dutch regime brought in labour from nearby regions of southern China. Over the years, 
these workers were gradually absorbed into the local indigenous population of west 
Taiwan and the island population became mixed. The identities of the various people 
who lived on the island at that time related to the cultural identity of the different 
ethnic groups who shared cultural features such as language, custom and history (Hall, 
1998; Kidd, 2002). The name ‘Taiwan’ was invented at the time of the Dutch regime 
when one tribe of Taiwanese indigenous Peipo5 people in south Taiwan referred to 
the newcomers (Dutch) to their region as ‘Taian’ which means ‘foreigners’ or 
‘outsiders’. This was then translated by the Dutch to ‘Taioan’ which in due course 
became ‘Taiwan’ (Mao, 2014: 81).  
    When the Han Chinese Ming dynasty was replaced by the Manchu Qing dynasty 
in 1644, some remaining Ming supporters were exiled to China’s borderlands and 
Cheng Ch’eng-kung, one of the Ming dynasty’s officials, fled to Taiwan with his army 
                                                          
5 According to Taiwan’s Council of Indigenous Peoples (2019), Peipeo refers to Taiwanese 
indigenous people who lived in the plains of west Taiwan and were part of Austronesian 
Linguistic Family. There were nine main tribes: Kavalan, Ketagalan, Taokas, Pazeh, Papora, 
Babuza, Hoanya, Siraya, Makatau, but through different regimes they have been assimilated 
into the immigrant Chinese population. 
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where he defeated the Dutch in 1661. The Dutch regime was forced to leave Taiwan 
and ‘Taiwan had a Chinese ruler for the first time’ (Wills Jr., 2007: 95). The Cheng 
family governed the southern part of Taiwan for only 23 years, but they replicated the 
Ming government system by establishing Chinese institutions and customs in their 
small and isolated feudal regime. During this period Ming-style Han Chinese culture 
was naturally regarded as the mainstream compared to that of the Qing dynasty on the 
mainland. At the same time, there were still indigenous people also living in Taiwan 
who had their own customs. Nevertheless, this is the key period when the Chinese 
population of the island started to grow and the island became more ‘Chinese’ (Copper, 
2013: 35). This short two-decade regime was the initiation of Chinese Taiwan when 
Chinese immigration formed a dominant ethnie (Smith, 1991).   
Subsequently, the Qing rulers in China defeated the Cheng family and ruled 
Taiwan for more than 200 years, longer than any subsequent regime. During its time 
in power the Qing dynasty did not rule the whole of Taiwan but created an east-west 
border across the island to separate the Han Chinese from the indigenous tribes. But 
the power and organisation of the Qing rulers consolidated the reality of a ‘Qing 
Chinese Taiwan’ in place of an ‘indigenous Taiwan’. In the dramatically changing 
world of the nineteenth century, the Qing government eventually realised the strategic 
importance of Taiwan and in 1885 decided to upgrade the island to provincial status 
(Gardella, 2007: 187). During the Qing dynasty, ‘Chinese’ culture took over as the 
majority culture on Taiwan under the influence of the people who today are referred 
to as ‘Han Taiwanese’ and who share a common ancestry and cultural codes (Hall, 
1998). As the indigenous culture faded into obscurity, the basis of Taiwan’s essentially 
Chinese cultural identity was formed. 
    The Taiwan Province of the Qing Government was ceded to Japan in 1895 after 
the Qing regime was defeated in the Sino-Japan War. Being forced to become part of 
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the Japanese nation and to have a new national identity imposed on it caused serious 
tension (Croucher, 2004) as the ethnic and cultural identities of Taiwanese were very 
different from those of Japan. To the dismay of the Taiwanese people, who had not 
been consulted, their island became Japanese territory and despite resistance by both 
Han Taiwanese and indigenous people, Japan gradually took control of the whole 
island. Their ruling style was ‘efficient and in many ways enlightened, but it did not 
lay the groundwork for self-rule, much less democracy’ (Copper, 2013: 38-39). Japan 
brought modernity to Taiwan, but the Taiwanese population (both Han Chinese and 
indigenous) were treated as inferior to the dominant Japanese ethnie (Smith, 1991) 
whose historic culture was about to shape the new national identity in the island. Fifty-
one years later, at the end of World War Two, the island returned to the Republic of 
China. Although this might be seen as liberation or recovery, the discrepancy between 
the Japanese Taiwanese population and their new mainland Chinese rulers was 
considerable. After the 1949 civil war in China between the Nationalist Kuomintang 
(KMT) party and the Communists, the KMT was defeated and retreated to Taiwan 
Province which eventually became their last remaining territory (Academia Sinica, 
2014).  
    This thesis begins its timeline from this point in 1949 when Taiwan became a 
state which was independent from mainland China. It was dominated by a single 
political party, the KMT, and ruled by the Chiang family (Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang 
Ching-kuo) under martial law. Taiwan eventually became a democratic state when 
martial law was lifted in 1987. Direct popular elections were held and a President was 
elected in 1996 (Chang, 2003: 77). All these events have had a strong influence on 
Taiwanese identity and its cultural environment and this will be discussed more detail 





An ethnic community with a common language and culture is the foundation of a 
nation (Hobsbawm, 1990; Smith, 1991) and because the ethnic composition of 
Taiwan’s population has changed repeatedly through history, various cultures have 
influenced the island and its identity as a nation is complex.  
    According to the Ministry of the Interior’s Department of Statistics (2017), 
Taiwan has a population of approximately 23,510,000 of which Han Taiwanese form 
97.3% whereas indigenous people are only 2.3%. The remaining 0.4% are new 
naturalised immigrants. Although the overwhelming majority of the population is Han 
Taiwanese, because of immigration at different times from various dialect areas of 
China, there are today three separate ethnic groups of Han Taiwanese: Min-nan 
Taiwanese (70%) whose ancestors came to the island centuries ago during the Qing 
dynasty who mainly speak Taiwanese (Min-nan Chinese) the language of the south 
Fujian Province of China; Hakka Taiwanese (15%) whose ancestors also arrived in the 
island in the Qing dynasty mainly from Guangdong Province of China, who speak 
Hakka; and mainland Chinese (13%) whose parents or grandparents arrived in the 
island after the civil war in 1949 who speak Mandarin. These so-called ‘Four Ethnic 
Groups’, have been joined by the new immigrants as a ‘Fifth Ethnic Group’ (see below) 
who speak either Mandarin or a variety of other languages. 
    The indigenous Taiwanese live in separate parts of Taiwan in their own tribes and 
speak Austronesian languages. Anthropologically, each tribe has its own culture and 
tradition which are quite different from those of the Han Taiwanese (Stainton, 2007: 
28-29). The Taiwanese indigenous legislator Lin Tian-sheng proclaimed in 1987 in the 
Legislative Yuan that ‘Indigenous people are the only true Taiwanese’ (Stainton, 2007: 
37) but they have not been a dominant force in Taiwan ever since Han Chinese people 
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started to arrive on the island. Over the course of more than two centuries of Qing rule, 
increasing numbers of Chinese people arrived in Taiwan and eventually became the 
majority of the population. However, through intermarriage6 with the local Peipo 
people, most of the population of Taiwan today are of mixed ancestry (Shepherd, 
2007:109-111) and this has created the unique Taiwanese culture with the integration 
of the Peipo culture.  
Numerically the most significant immigration in Taiwan’s history is the one and 
half million mainland Chinese who followed the KMT government to Taiwan in 1949. 
Since Taiwan’s population at the end of World War Two was only about six million, 
the arrival of so many influential people linked with the new government had an 
extraordinary impact on the country (Copper, 2013: 9) and the mainland Chinese 
immigrants then became, in Smith’s (1991) terminology, the dominant ethnie. They 
formed the basis of the new nation of Taiwan, and have had a significant and lasting 
impact on subsequent Taiwanese identity.  
    In the new millennium, either through marriage or work, migration groups of 
various cultures have been introduced to Taiwan in sufficiently large numbers that they 
are now unofficially recognised as the ‘Fifth Ethnic Group’. According to the National 
Immigration Agency of the Ministry of the Interior, up to the end of 2016 the number 
of immigrant spouses (including those from the People’s Republic of China) was 
521,136, which amounts to 2.2% of the total population of Taiwan. Among this number, 
there are 350,309 (67.2%) from China, Hong Kong and Macao while the rest are mainly 
from Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Japan and South Korea. 
                                                          
6 In the early days of its rule, the Qing government issued a bill for the ‘Prohibition of 
Immigration to Taiwan’ in order to control the population in Taiwan, and to save 
administrative costs. This limited access to the island to people who had previously obtained 
permission, and then only to single travellers without their wives or families. This policy 
influenced the development of the Taiwanese population since many single Chinese immigrant 
men married Peipo indigenous women (Shepherd, 2007:109-111). 
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Immigration is making Taiwan’s population ever more diverse. Croucher (2004) has 
described how the immigration of new ethnic groups into a country gives rise to ‘ethnic 
conflict and group tension’ (p. 135) during the slow process of integration that leads to 
the eventual formation of a new identity. This prediction is currently being borne out in 
Taiwan. 
    Since the start of democracy in Taiwan in 1996, the concept of Taiwanese 
multiculturalism (Taiwan duo yuan wen hua, 台灣多元文化) with its five ethnic 
groups has become politically accepted, even though there is a huge disparity in 
population size between the majority and minority groups. The three Han Taiwanese 
groups all have similar cultures and customs but within the 2.3% Taiwanese 
indigenous group, there are 16 tribes7 all speaking different languages and having 
different cultural backgrounds (Council of Indigenous People, 2017) and now new 
immigrants have arrived from at least seven different foreign countries.  
    Throughout Taiwanese history there has been constant conflict and tension due 
to ethnic identity (Croucher, 2004), not only between Han Taiwanese and indigenous 
people, but also between the three ethnic groups of Han Taiwanese. Discrimination 
between existing Taiwanese and new immigrants is not uncommon although these 
differences are fading away as increasing numbers of ‘Taiwanese’ were born in 
Taiwan. The majority of mainland Chinese who arrived nearly 70 years ago have now 
died and their descendants, having been born in Taiwan, have strong connections with 
the land of their birth and where they live, and this forms their Taiwanese identity. 
Also, the new generations born to immigrant spouses and referred to as ‘new children 
of Taiwan’ are growing up with a mixed heritage of their parents’ countries. The 
process of formulation of Taiwanese identity reflects Michael Wintle’s view that 
                                                          
7 According to Taiwan’s Council of Indigenous People, the current 16 Taiwanese indigenous 
tribes are: Amis, Atayal, Paiwan, Bunun, Puyuma, Rukai, Tsou, Saisiyat, Tao, Thao, Kavalan, 
Truku, Sakizaya, Sediq, Hla'alua and Kanakanavu. 
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‘integration’ is the means by which ‘an all-embracing national identity and awareness’ 
is created (Wintle, 1996:23). 
    Consciousness of this hybrid nature of a Taiwanese identity has increased and is 
now the consensus in Taiwanese society. This has influenced politics, but also 
education and culture and is changing the face of Taiwan (Lee, 2006). It reflects the 
direction of Taiwan’s national policy which nowadays focuses on integration, 
especially in its cultural policy, as a way of celebrating the country’s cultural diversity 
(Wen hua duo yang shing, 文化多樣性 ) (Lung, 2008). It is now accepted that 
Taiwanese culture is a hybrid blend of various heritages, and the progressive view is 
to value the multicultural nature of the island. Consequently, Taiwan has its own 
unique identity and culture and Copper (2013:15) comments that ‘at least as reflected 
in Taiwan’s demographics, ties between Taiwan and China are weakening fast’. This 
also corresponds to the way in which Smith (1991) sees the ethnie as the crucial factor 
in the formation of a nation. The majority of the Taiwanese population is a Han 
Taiwanese ethnie, but this is not a homogeneous group and there are significant 
differences within it. Hall (1998) describes how, in a population that contains both 
similarities and differences, an imagined cultural community develops which 
comprises both ‘what we really are’ and ‘what we have become’. Taiwan is ‘becoming’ 
a nation with a diverse cultural identity. 
 
2.3.1.3 Ambiguous International Status  
Taiwan’s international position has had a significant effect on its identity because of 
the strained relationship between Taiwan and its much larger neighbour, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). The defensive stance that the Taiwanese people have been 
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forced into by international diplomacy has made them very aware of issues of 
nationality and therefore of their identity as a nation.  
    When, at the end of World War Two, responsibility for Taiwan’s government 
passed to the Nationalist Chinese regime (the ROC) on the mainland, Taiwan’s legal 
status had not been decided (Copper, 2013: 186). In that same year the global order 
was reorganised by the formation of the United Nations Organisation and the United 
Nations Charter was ratified by China (the ROC), France, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States’ (UN, 2017). The ROC at that time enjoyed respect 
for being on the winning side at the end of the war and, under the name the Republic 
of China, the nationalists represented the whole country not only in the United Nations 
but also around the world.  
    However, in 1949, the Nationalist government was defeated by the Communists, 
and was forced to move to Taiwan, leaving the Communists in charge on the mainland 
and establishing the PRC there. This change was not followed by a change of 
representation at the UN until 1971 when the PRC was recognised by the international 
community as the legitimate representative of China and the ROC ‘was expelled and 
quickly lost formal diplomatic ties with most nations of the world’ (Copper, 2013: 
185). Taiwan’s isolation from the international community made the people of the 
island anxious of invasion by the PRC but at the same time it promoted national 
solidarity and a feeling of Taiwanese identity.  
    This awkward state of affairs still haunts Taiwan which has found it impossible 
to resolve its international diplomatic status, despite the repeatedly changing political 
scenarios in the island. Taiwan nowadays still keeps the official name ‘The Republic 
of China’, as a counterpart to ‘The People’s Republic of China’ on the mainland. This 
is confusing for foreigners who are often unclear about what the word Taiwan refers 
to, and internally there is conflict about the use of the word ‘China’ in the country’s 
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title between the two dominant political parties, the KMT and DPP (Wu, 2011: 51-52). 
Controversy over the name of the country is evident in the confused identity of 
Taiwanese people (Chang & Holt, 2015). Today, Taiwan is forced by its larger, 
forceful neighbour into an awkward position in its dealings with the rest of the world. 
Although Taiwan today is a democratic country, its ambiguous and uncertain 
international status leads to its struggle to find an identity that its population can agree 
on. 
 
2.3.2 From Imagined Chinese Identity to Taiwanese Identity 
Because of its history and situation, the evolution of Taiwanese identity is likely to be, 
in Hall’s (1998) words ‘fragmented and fractured’. However, through its ‘becoming’ 
process, it looks to follow the trajectory to forge its ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 
2016) by employing the method of ‘inventing tradition’ (Hobsbawm, 1983). This 
section looks at the development of Taiwanese identity through the various historical 
changes that have taken place, focusing on the period after World War Two.  
Imagined Chinese identity 
Smith (1991: 99) suggests that nationalism is ‘a doctrine of culture and symbolic 
language and consciousness’ that creates ‘a world of collective cultural identities or 
cultural nations’. It is also a political ideology which generates a political system, its 
institutions and its government and these all play a critical role in the development of 
national identity. But, as Billig explains, for most people, nationalism is not something 
they think about as they go about daily life, it develops unconsciously in parallel with 
the surrounding zeitgeist (Billig, 1995). The majority of the Han Taiwanese population 
along with the indigenous Taiwanese were forced into a Japanese national identity 
before 1945, but after World War Two most Taiwanese people looked forward to re-
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joining their ‘motherland’ of China and some hoped to gain autonomy and democracy 
(Lamley, 2007: 244-247). People not only had to get used to their new nationality, but 
also needed to recover from the turmoil of both the war and the ‘February 28 Incident’8 
in 1947. The term ‘mainlander’ was invented at this time to distinguish the recent 
arrivals from the existing Han Taiwanese population whose ancestors had arrived on 
the island centuries before.  
    When the KMT arrived on Taiwan, the nationalist government gave itself the 
responsibility of preserving traditional Chinese culture since the communists on the 
mainland had other priorities (Han, 2001). This meant that Taiwan became de facto 
the centre for the promotion of Chinese (Zhonghua, 中華) culture. One priority was 
to remove all traces of Japanese influence and this led to the creation of a range of 
initiatives to ensure that Chinese culture was at the heart of life in Taiwan (Copper, 
2013: 16) (see Chapter 3). As well as removing any trace of Japanese influence, it was 
also an aim of the KMT government to prevent any spread of communist ideals or 
influence. The Government was at that time led by mainlanders and this meant that 
local Taiwanese people were at a disadvantage when seeking significant government 
or educational posts. One major problem was that they did not speak Mandarin well 
enough. Not surprisingly, with many highly-educated mainlanders arriving on a 
provincial island, mainland culture was predominant (Copper, 2013: 85). This meant 
that the existing Han Taiwanese population had eventually to accept the new ruling 
government, and the national identity became ‘Chinese’. The mainlanders imagined 
that they had moved to Taiwan temporarily and would be able to return home before 
                                                          
8 The February 28 Incident happened in 1947 ‘when plainclothes police officers killed a 
Taiwanese woman who had been selling black-market cigarettes to make a living. An angry 
mob formed and threatened the police, whereupon the police fired into the crowd, killing four 
people. Widespread civil disobedience followed and what seemed to some to be a rebellion’ 
(Copper, 2013: 45). ‘There is no accurate count of the total number of people killed or injured 
during the Incident, however, the most frequently mentioned number is between 10,000 and 
20,000’ (Lee, 2004). 28 February is now ‘Peace Memorial Day’ in Taiwan. 
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too long, but the return to the mainland never happened (Wachman, 1994: 18) and this 
created a dramatic change in circumstances for the generation of Taiwanese who had 
been born and grew up during the Japanese regime.  
    There was an inevitable culture clash as the Government persuaded people to 
believe that Taiwan needed to preserve traditional Chinese culture (Copper, 2013: 16). 
They also proclaimed as a matter of policy that all the people in Taiwan were of 
Chinese ethnicity. This included the Taiwanese indigenous people who, according to 
the Government’s propaganda, were originally from south China. This policy was put 
into practice through the education system with a school curriculum designed to imbue 
the new generation with Chinese patriotism, and to persuade people to accept that the 
‘real’ China existed in Taiwan, along with traditional Chinese culture (Ye, 2014: 50-
51). This imposed ideology corresponds to Hobsbawm’s (1983) suggestion of 
‘invented tradition’ for nationhood. It formed a new nation in an unnatural way that 
was based on ‘education-dependent high cultures’ which used some aspects of pre-
existent cultures to shape a new identity for Taiwan (Gellner, 2006). It was an attempt 
to force a population to imagine a nation for themselves in the Andersonian sense.  
    Politically, culturally and nationally an ‘imagined’ identity was created on 
Taiwan by the mainland Chinese KMT. All the previous residents of the island, both 
Han and indigenous Taiwanese, were forced to accept this situation as they now lacked 
sufficient status or influence in their own homeland. The mind-set of those people, 
who used to live in mainland China but had now moved to Taiwan, was still that China 
retained its former integrity. Those who were born in Taiwan and had never been to 
China were educated using teaching materials relating to Chinese history and 
geography as if they were living in the larger unified country, even though they had 
never been to that land. Thus, they were led to believe that their ‘nation’ was China, 
with the consequence that they were taught very little about the island where they lived 
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and the concept of a separate Taiwanese national or cultural identity was not 
considered at that time (Ye, 2014; Academia Historica, 2017).  
The influence of democracy 
The year 1987 saw the lifting of martial law and the start of Taiwan’s democracy. As 
Murray A. Rubinstein comments, ‘the system of extraordinary measures that provided 
the Government and the ruling party with much of its real power was now taken away’ 
(Rubinstein, 2007: 447). President Chiang Ching-kuo also allowed immigrants from 
the mainland to visit their families in China. This dramatic and emotional step allowed 
many mainlanders in Taiwan to reconnect with China as they went back for visits. By 
starting communication with China after nearly 40 years of separation, the process of 
making ‘Taiwanese’ special and different began. The first-generation mainlanders 
went to visit their former homeland and realised that ‘home’ was no longer what they 
remembered after years of communist rule there. They no longer recognised it and 
were themselves not recognised there; their Chinese families and relatives called them 
‘Taiwanese’ (ibid.). Those Taiwanese who visited China began to appreciate the 
political, social and cultural differences that had grown up since 1949 and this brought 
home to them the distinctiveness of their new Taiwanese identity (Corcuff, 2004). 
Significantly, in the performing arts, the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Center 
(NCKSCC) was opened in that same year of 1987. 
    Political liberalisation gradually moved ahead in Taiwan with the establishment 
of opposition political parties, free speech and freedom of assembly. Taiwanese people 
directly elected their President in 1996 and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
won the presidency in 2000 to end the continuous rule of the KMT (Chang, 2003: 77). 
It was a new era in Taiwan in which a new and specifically Taiwanese identity was 
formed that was clearly different from Chinese identity and the country’s leaders tried 
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to find a way, under an adverse international diplomatic climate, to affirm the reality 
of Taiwan as an independent country. It was seen as important to build up Taiwan’s 
sovereignty, status and national identity, echoing Smith’s (1991: 74) description of 
‘movement for attaining and maintaining the autonomy, unity, and identity of a nation’. 
Establishing Taiwanese identity 
Following democracy, there have been a range of influences on the development of 
Taiwanese identity, especially the freedom and encouragement to search for Taiwan-
based knowledge and a Taiwan-centred history. Ann Heylen (2011: 21) describes this 
as an ‘escape from the Chinese-based prospect’ and ‘leaving the “imagined nation” of 
China’. In the Government, President Lee Teng-hui proposed the idea of ‘New 
Taiwanese’ to form a new national identity for Taiwan in which everyone who lived 
in Taiwan is Taiwanese (Liberty Times, 2005). This concept then had compelling 
impact on every aspect of Taiwanese society, especially cultural policy making. It was 
a critical stage in the reshaping of Taiwanese identity because society then became 
divided into those who relished the idea of the New Taiwanese and those who did not 
(Clark, 2007: 524-527). This is a key factor for new generations of Taiwanese, whether 
originally from the mainland, or from Han or indigenous Taiwanese families. Their 
historical and political views are now quite different from those of their parents and 
grandparents. This process also demonstrates the way in which politicians can 
conceive the formation of a nation, and then through regular ‘flagging’ that idea may 
become reality in people’s minds. As a result, ‘national identity is seldom forgotten’ 
(Billig, 1995: 174). 
Alan M. Wachman (1994: 91) discusses the causes of the rise of a specifically 
Taiwanese identity among which, separation from the rest of China with the 
development of a divergent collective memory is the most significant. The mainlanders 
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who came to Taiwan after 1949 with their memories of the old China, bringing with 
them a national identity of the original Republic of China, are fewer as time goes by. 
There is now a progressive disappearance of the distinction between the views of the 
new generations of mainlanders and those of pre-existing Taiwanese. As a result, 
within the 98% of the population who are Han Taiwanese, the distinction between the 
views of each of the so-called ‘ethnic groups’ is disappearing as they come together in 
their shared Taiwanese identity (Lee, 2006).  
An article on the ‘Taiwanese National Security Survey’ by Department of 
Political Science of Duke University, North Carolina, USA appeared in The Reporter 
on 29 January 2016. It reveals that 70% of the generation born after 1980 (the so-called 
‘naturally independent Taiwanese’, Tien ran du shih dai, 天然獨世代 ), regard 
themselves as Taiwanese, whereas almost none of them regard themselves as Chinese. 
On the other hand, the generation born between 1966 and 1980, who tend to consider 
themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese, has declined from 63% in 2002 to 40% in 
2015. Another national survey about identity conducted by Common Wealth Magazine 
(3 January, 2017) shows that for the population as a whole, 61.6% regard themselves 
as Taiwanese, 28.2% as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and 6.9% as Chinese. However, 
when people between 30 and 39 years old are asked the same question, 67% regard 
themselves as Taiwanese, while for people between 20 and 29 years old the figure goes 
up to 76%. Both these latter generations are more likely than the average to call 
themselves Taiwanese, showing that the gap in opinion between the older and younger 
generations in Taiwan is widening, especially for those who were born after martial 
law was lifted in 1987.  
Without the experience of living under the KMT’s authoritarian regime, the new 
generations of Taiwanese people, who have their own lifestyle, and who share 
experiences and values as well as views connected with Taiwan, have formed a strong 
80 
 
Taiwanese identity. What is more, as the PRC once again embraces traditional Chinese 
culture, it now considers that it is the one and only spokesman for Chinese culture (The 
Reporter, 2016). This means that Taiwan is no longer the sole guardian of traditional 
Chinese culture as it was during the Chinese Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 
1976 when the PRC repudiated its historical background. This also has the effect of 
weakening Taiwan’s Chinese identity.  
Since democracy, the view of Taiwanese culture has shifted dramatically because 
politics has always played a vital role in the conception and development of cultural 
identity. More and more local Taiwanese history has been revealed, which has been an 
eye-opener for new generations. There is increasing debate as to whether Taiwanese 
culture is a regional form of Chinese culture, or whether it is a distinct culture of its 
own. In Chuang Wan-shou’s (2003) view, Taiwanese culture is an independent culture 
because of three factors: geographical features, historical accumulation, and resident 
formation. He explains that Taiwan has both Han Chinese and indigenous people, and 
that over the past 400 years, five different ruling regimes in Taiwan have made Taiwan 
special and unique. Taiwanese culture therefore has been formed from the cultural 
integration of these successive waves of legacies and has developed into its own 
culture.  
After becoming The Republic of China, while the Government promoted Chinese 
cultural traditions, the Taiwanese were also encouraged to be open to Western culture, 
particularly in arts and literature and especially from the US which became an 
important ally of Taiwan (Copper, 2013: 16-17). This was another reason why Hsieh 
Chang-ting, a former Premier of Taiwan, contends that cultural diversity (Wen hua duo 
yang shing, 文化多樣性) is one of the main characteristics of Taiwan and one which 
it is important to maintain (Lee, 2006). 
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To conclude, Taiwanese culture today is a hybrid of various cultures with Chinese 
culture as its basis. The numerous indigenous cultures, the colonial legacies, Western 
cultural influences and assorted new immigrant cultures have amalgamated to form 
Taiwan’s multiculture as a new imagination of Taiwanese identity which is creating a 
collective awareness of the island’s own lifestyle.  
 
2.3.3 Contemporary Identity Issues 
Although Taiwan is today a liberal and democratic country that respects its diversity, 
with the current uncertainty over its status as a state, the people of Taiwan have an 
identity dilemma. The main reason for this is that their imagined national identity is 
different according to whether they feel they belong to the ROC or to Taiwan. In 
Copper’s (2013: 30) pinion ‘Taiwan’s past is often cited as evidence for both those 
who advocate that it is part of China, or should be, and those who do not’. This suggests 
that the main problem for Taiwanese identity today is whether or not Taiwan is a 
component of a greater ‘China’. This dilemma has influenced many aspects of life in 
Taiwan, including cultural policy making. Some contemporary issues cited below 
illustrate the complexity of Taiwanese identity nowadays.  
External and internal recognition disorder  
The identity of a community is reflected in its members’ natural affinity for the place 
or land in which they live, and this distinguishes them from all others who do not live 
there. Following Anderson’s argument, people in Taiwan who respond in this way 
would form, or imagine themselves to belong to, a Taiwanese nation. However, there 
is a problem when the official name of the country is not Taiwan, but rather ‘the 
Republic of China’. Externally, for foreigners and others who are not immediately 
involved, despite any knowledge they may have about the political background, this 
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distinction may seem hair-splitting. However, internally, for Taiwanese it is a matter 
of great consequence in every aspect such as travel, international affairs, and most 
importantly, the national identity.  
Lowell Dittmer (2004: 477) believes that ‘the beginnings of Taiwan’s difficulty 
with the concept of identity came with Sino-American détente at the beginning of the 
1970s, which coincided with (and inadvertently facilitated) Taiwan’s eviction from the 
United Nations’. Once the title ‘China’ was taken away from Taiwan and given to the 
PRC, Taiwan’s identity was in a crisis that still haunts it and there are constant threats, 
especially from the PRC, if Taiwan proposes any change to its political status (ibid.). 
In this diplomatic predicament, the Taiwanese Government has felt unable to make 
overt changes to anything related to its political independence over recent decades. 
This underlying political instability is the main reason for ‘recognition disorder’ for 
Taiwanese people because they do not have an internationally recognised state with 
which to identify. The official name of the country, the calendar, the constitution, 
passports and other official documents all proclaim ‘the Republic of China’.  
But this form of words has become increasingly irrelevant for the modern 
population who merely find it an inconvenience. For example, before the word 
‘Taiwan’ was added to ‘the Republic of China’ on the cover of Taiwanese passports 
in 2003, immigration officers in other countries regularly assumed that visitors from 
Taiwan held Chinese nationality and therefore needed visas. This complication has 
improved since 2003, but sometimes immigration officers are still confused to see both 
‘Republic of China’ and ‘Taiwan’ on the cover page of a passport (The Reporter, 2016). 
This example of the many daily inconveniences for Taiwanese people demonstrates 
that, even though ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995) flags nationhood in everyday life, 
they would have a much stronger feeling of association with the land they live in if it 
had its own name, rather than one imposed on it.  
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As far as cultural identity is concerned, people who are ethnically Chinese 
probably feel their Chinese cultural identity no matter which country they live in. 
Wachman explains:  
For instance, one person may believe that ‘Chinese’ encompasses cultural, 
national, and political factors. Another person may distinguish between being 
culturally Chinese and being politically associated with a country other than 
China. There is no list of criteria by which one may determine who is really 
Chinese when people from Vancouver to Penang, Tsingtao to Lukang all 
claim the same label. (Wachman, 1994: 56)  
This is, in Smith’s (1991) terminology, a ‘vertical ethnie’ in which Chinese (Zhonghua) 
culture is a historical culture shared between different communities resident in various 
nations. Although the PRC government would regard all these people as overseas 
Chinese (culturally), it is clear that the PRC would not consider Canadian Chinese or 
Malaysian Chinese to have the PRC nationality. However, the situation is very 
different in Taiwan as the PRC has never stopped claiming that Taiwan is part of China, 
and this causes many Han Taiwanese to deny their Chinese cultural identity. Indeed, 
under the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Taiwanese 
Government, there is constant controversy about cultural ‘desinicisation’ (Chu 
Zhongguo hua, 去中國化)—whether or not to proclaim a fundamentally Chinese 
identity for Taiwan. Dittmer (2004: 477) therefore believes that ‘Taiwan’s quest for 
national identity is not just a search, but an open-minded question, to which there is 
more than one conceivable answer’. In other words, although there is consensus on the 
celebration of cultural diversity in Taiwan, the political situation for the Taiwanese 
people remains in a state of uncertainty. Dittmer sees three possible solutions which 
are also common in Taiwanese society nowadays: 
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1. The formation of a national identity as an independent and sovereign 
Taiwan, eventually (security conditions permitting) a Republic of Taiwan 
with its own constitution and flag.    
2. The retention of the identity of the Republic of China, tracing it back to 
the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. 
3. The status quo, which is no real ‘solution’, but merely a protraction of 
the current identity crisis, consisting of de facto autonomy with neither 
reunification nor independence. (ibid.)  
There is still an ongoing political tension on national identity in Taiwan, and support 
for each of the solutions above ebbs and flows in a way that stimulates debate in 
Taiwanese society, especially during elections, but comes to no agreement. 
Continued pressure from China and the idea of ‘One China’  
Both the ROC and PRC have imagined for themselves their own vision of ‘China’ 
which, in the so-called ‘1992 Consensus’, was described as ‘One China with respective 
interpretations’. In this way ‘both sides could espouse a one China policy, though each 
could interpret this as they wished’ (Copper, 2013: 207).  
What the PRC has in mind is the ‘One country, Two systems’ (The State Council, 
PRC, 2000) formula that exists in Hong Kong and Macau. In Taiwan, the KMT 
government saw ‘One China’ as the ROC and regarded it a lucky charm to keep 
Taiwan at peace within the status quo, but it never entered into an official written 
agreement with China. Thus, when the DPP took over the Taiwanese Government, 
they did not accept the ‘1992 Consensus’, but merely recognised that there was a 
meeting in 1992 dealing with these issues (National Policy Foundation, 2011). The 
result was angry reprisals by the PRC government which stopped most official 
exchanges with Taiwan, for example, tourism in 2019.  
According to a report in Hong Kong’s Apple Daily (2014), based on the 2010 
population census by the Chinese government, there are about two million Taiwanese 
working or living in China. This figure represents nearly 10% of Taiwan’s population, 
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and these people could play an influential part in any election if China tries to control 
their votes. Also, the threat that China might use military force to ‘recover’ Taiwan, is 
constantly present, although this kind of military threat normally fosters a sense of 
Taiwanese solidarity, and hence stronger Taiwanese identity. Nevertheless, China’s 
economic, diplomatic and cultural strength is growing and some Taiwanese, especially 
those living in China who have a personal attachment to the Chinese economy, would 
be influenced. China is not slow to realise the economic power it has over Taiwan. 
These days, this kind of influence from China even spreads to cultural aspects. This 
sort of pressure from Taiwan’s giant neighbour is growing ever stronger.  
Zhonghua cultural identity  
Pierre Moulinier in his book Les politiques publiques de la culture en France (2010) 
claims that many factors influence national identity and culture is one. Although 
Taiwanese culture is a hybrid of various different cultures—Chinese, indigenous, 
Western, Japanese and immigrant—it is unarguably based on Chinese (Zhonghua, 中
華) culture. The influences from elsewhere have developed a distinct Taiwanese 
culture that takes its place within the family of East Asian Zhonghua-influenced 
cultures such as those of Japan, Korea or Vietnam.  
The huge majority of the Taiwanese population has a Chinese cultural 
background, writes with traditional Chinese ‘national characters’ (Guo tz, 國字), and 
speaks Mandarin as the ‘national language’ (Guo yu, 國 語 ), which even the 
indigenous people and immigrants need to use to communicate on the island. However, 
‘Chinese culture’ covers different concepts. In the Chinese language, Zhonghua wen 
hua (中華文化) refers to Chinese civilisation and ethnic culture and does not necessary 
refer to the culture of ‘the nation of China’ (Zhongguo, 中國) (Chang & Holt, 2015: 
162). The difference between Zhongguo and Zhonghua is at the root of the Taiwanese 
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cultural problem. Nowadays, the former refers only to mainland China (PRC), while 
the latter describes all ethnic Chinese people around the world wherever they happen 
to live, even though their nationalities might be Malaysian, Thai, Canadian or 
Taiwanese.  
Researching into Taiwanese identity, the PRC scholar Yang Zhong (2016) reveals 
the tensions between Taiwanese Zhonghua cultural background and nationality. He 
observes:  
Most Taiwanese people reject being called ‘Chinese’ (Zhongguo ren, 中國
人) when asked about their national identity. However, they do not deny their 
ethnic and cultural Chinese identity. What they object to is being called 
Chinese nationals, especially when this China is internationally recognised 
as the People’s Republic of China….….Specifically, changed state 
boundaries, desire for separation from mainland China, and recognition of 
Taiwan as a sovereign state, as well as the distinctive cultural reconstruction 
inside Taiwan, contribute to the national identity shift in Taiwan. (Yang, 
2016: 351) 
It is significant that this research comes from a scholar based in the PRC. Yang, 
perhaps bravely, points to the uniqueness and distinctiveness of Taiwan compared with 
China, though he acknowledges that Taiwan’s cultural identity can still be regarded as 
largely Chinese (Zhonghua). As mentioned above, this is an example of the influence 
of a ‘vertical ethnie’ (Smith, 1991), and why it is possible to conceive a cultural 
identity for Taiwan, founded on Zhonghua wen hua (Chinese culture) but distinct from 
Zhongguo wen hua (culture of China). 
Globalisation as a Taiwanese identity strategy  
As an effectively sovereign state with its own national defence force and all the other 
conditions that characterise a country, Taiwan has devised its own ways to connect 
with the world, and the world implicitly accepts it. In Copper’s (2013: 216) opinion 
87 
 
this situation ‘reflected Taipei’s flexible diplomacy and prevents Taiwan from being 
excluded from important international organisations’. Taiwan and the world have 
found a pragmatic way to deal with each other and culture has played a vital role in 
this. Through increasing international exchanges in cultural events, especially in the 
performing arts, Taiwan has established channels to connect with most other nations.  
For Taiwanese, embracing the world and finding a place in the international stage 
is the strategy to obtain international recognition and to resolve its own issues of self-
identification. Hence, ‘cosmopolitanism and globalisation are the important factors in 
the making of a Taiwanese identity’ which is able to demonstrate a rich variety of 
‘international colour’ through its historical legacies to achieve Taiwan’s ‘cultural 
heterogeneity and hybridity’ (Wang, 2000: 102-103). Kuo Wei-fan, the former 
Minister of Council of Cultural Affairs (CCA) (1988-1993), Minister of Ministry of 
Education (MOE) (1993-1996) and Chairman of the National Chiang Kai-shek 
Cultural Centre (NCKSCC) (2010-2013), analyses the influence of globalisation in 
Taiwan’s cultural environment by taking Taiwan’s joining international organisations 
such as the World Trade Organisation as examples. He argues that, under the 
international structure, tourism, higher education, cultural commodities, international 
chains, and other similar factors have an unconscious impact on Taiwan’s culture, and 
this has then had an effect on the formation of Taiwan’s cultural policy (Kuo, 2011: 2-
10). As a result, even though Taiwan is still not able to participate in international 
political institutions, it can more easily join the world through alternatives, and cultural 
affairs is one of the significant approaches. International cultural exchange has been a 
key agenda for Taiwan’s cultural policy including policy for performing arts and has 
been an influence on Taiwanese identity. 
Michael Wintle (1996) has observed that feelings about national identity and 
culture can be shared by people who share very little else by way of background or 
88 
 
politics and sees it as an issue of the integration of a number of different identities into 
a single national identity. ‘Shared memories, shared hopes, and shared continuity 
(rather than uniformity) are essential; a common subject perception of the group’s 
history’ (p. 23). This indeed reflects the direction of Taiwan’s national policy which 
nowadays focuses on integration, especially in its cultural policy, as a way of 
celebrating the country’s cultural diversity (Lung, 2008). Although Taiwan might not 
be the best example of a multicultural society with its overwhelmingly Han ethnic 
composition, it nevertheless shows that even small minorities can receive attention and 
play important roles in Taiwan’s cultural spectrum.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter introduces the work of a series of significant authors concerning the 
meaning of ‘culture’, ‘nation’ and ‘identity’ in order to establish the most relevant 
definitions for use in the research that forms the main body of the thesis.  
The term ‘culture’ potentially covers a spectrum of activities that include the arts, 
literature and heritage, but various authors select different sectors of the spectrum 
when writing about culture. They may use a narrow definition equating culture with 
the high arts, or they may go to the other extreme and consider that every aspect of 
human life is an aspect of culture in an anthropological sense. Raymond Williams, for 
example, sees culture as ‘a whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual’. As 
far as this thesis is concerned, since it considers the activities of the National 
Performing Arts Centre, a useful definition takes high arts as a primary focus. However, 
the chapter has understood culture more broadly in its endeavour to explore the 
formation and transformation of Taiwan’s national and cultural identity.  
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Regarding the theories of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’, Anthony D. Smith’s ‘ethnie’ 
concept, Eric Hobsbawm’s ‘invented traditions’ and Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined 
communities’ are of great importance when analysing the particular case of Taiwan. 
Also, according to Michael Billig’s ‘banal nationalism’, the flagging or reminding of 
nationhood in people’s daily life includes the effects of the performing arts. This 
therefore makes a link between Taiwanese identity and the performing arts and, over 
time, changes in flagging reflects the evolution of national identity. Although Taiwan 
is still not recognised diplomatically, the process of formation of the ‘nation of Taiwan’ 
and of ‘Taiwanese identity’ is no different from the situation of any other nation. Smith 
(2001: 128) contends that ‘national identity was always being reinterpreted and 
refashioned by each generation’ and the evidence is that this is exactly what is 
happening in Taiwan. As Stuart Hall points out, identity is not just about ‘being’, but 
it is a constantly developing phenomenon about ‘becoming’ (1996: 4). This should 
equally apply for the people of Taiwan. 
This chapter also elaborates how Taiwanese identity is defined and has evolved 
by demonstrating the factors that influence its formation. Taiwanese identity nowadays 
embraces additional elements of cultural diversity not only indigenous, Western or 
new immigrant, but also gender, sexuality, religion, disability, age, and economic 
background (Hong, 2008). Most of these components of Taiwanese culture have 
always existed; the significant change is that they are no longer hidden and ignored, 
but are openly acknowledged and respected. The important role of Chinese (Zhonghua) 
culture is recognised, but prominence is also given to indigenous, new migrant and a 
whole range of other Taiwanese cultures, and the whole package is seen as being 
‘Taiwanese culture’. It is also remarkable that political democracy plays a crucial role 
in the shifting Taiwanese identity in terms of liberty and the change in focus to Taiwan-
centred issues. As a result, people have come to appreciate that there is a unique 
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Taiwanese identity that integrates its varied historical legacies. The concept of 
Taiwanese multiculturalism (Taiwan duo yuan wen hua, 台灣多元文化 ) can 
represent a relatively apolitical way of encouraging a sense of nationhood that can 
allow for the inclusion of not only all the different Han Taiwanese groups, but also the 
other minority groups.  
    Taiwanese identity is a constantly changing and fluid idea which is continually in 
a state of ‘becoming’. It has undergone a series of changes from mono-Chinese culture 
to the multi-Taiwanese culture which are paralleled by the Government’s approach to 
the formulation of cultural policy. The content of cultural policy originates in the 
cultural differences that exist in Taiwan, which then go on to influence cultural identity. 
Within the threatening diplomatic situation, culture and the arts can be crucial domains 
which Taiwan is able to participate in along with the international community. This 
makes it a relevant and significant topic to examine in relation to its role in forming 













Chapter 3: Cultural Policy and Its Development 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores cultural policy development in Taiwan by examining the 
agencies of policy-making and the evolution of Taiwanese identity through successive 
governmental changes. It starts with a literature review on the way cultural policy is 
defined and looks at how the term is used by the Taiwanese Government. A distinction 
is drawn between ‘democratising culture’ and ‘cultural democracy’, after which the 
chapter looks at the various ways in which governments formulate and use cultural 
policy objectives. The distinction between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ cultural policies 
helps to exemplify the different forms of cultural policy and to show how the non-
cultural institutions, organisations and agencies that are responsible for formulating 
cultural policies set about their work. 
Cultural policy is a component of public policy through which it influences a 
country’s cultural activity, in particular the performing arts. When thinking about 
culture in a broad way, a public policy, whether or not it carries the title ‘culture’, 
affects a country’s cultural life both explicitly and implicitly. As a result, cultural 
policy-making promotes the national brand through an unintentional, though constant, 
process of flagging (Billig, 1995) which therefore builds up a national identity. 
    There have been three successive periods in the way the Taiwanese Government 
has established its cultural agencies: 1949 to 1981 (period 1); 1981 to 2012 (period 2); 
and 2012 to 2017 (period 3). These periods reflect political changes and the consequent 
development of the way in which the Government has conceived its cultural policy. 
Three aspects of each period have been examined: the agencies in charge of 
implicit/explicit cultural policy; the way cultural policy is formulated and 
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implemented; and the transformation of Taiwanese identity. Specifically, the chapter 
seeks to answer the following questions: ‘Who sets Taiwan’s cultural policy?’ ‘How 
has this changed under different government regimes?’ and ‘Does Taiwanese identity 
relate to the creation of government cultural policy?’. 
The answers to these questions demonstrate how Taiwanese identity has shifted 
during a time when those responsible for formulating cultural policy have themselves 
changed as Taiwan moved from one-party authoritarianism to democracy. They also 
highlight how the changes of identity among the Taiwan population have gone hand-
in-hand with government cultural policy, sometimes implicitly and sometimes 
explicitly. Cultural affairs in today’s democratic Taiwan have become prominent in 
the political agenda and are seen as politically significant when the country’s 
international status is uncertain. They have become important tools in the creation of 
the nation’s international branding and in marking Taiwan out as separate and different 
from other nations.  
 
3.2 Understanding Cultural Policy 
Under the influence of globalisation with what Pertti Alasuutari (2009: 99-102) has 
called ‘the world culture of the moderns’, most countries share similar norms and 
values. They all profess to endorse such values as equality and freedom of speech, put 
in place institutional systems to encourage or enforce them and thereby gain 
international recognition. Those concepts have shaped the face of cultural policy 
throughout the modern world, and for Alasuutari, ‘arts patronage’ linked with the 
cultural policy is a crucial element of world culture. This explains why many 
government regimes across the world have established cultural departments to take 
responsibility for national cultural policy. Culture is accepted as an important 
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component of national life. Today, all types of government regularly assume that 
cultural affairs are good business and develop relevant public policies. Clearly, 
Taiwan’s cultural policy today is part of ‘world culture’, but it is also important to 
recognise that the policy is a product of political and socio-cultural shifts in Taiwanese 
society, as Section 3.3 will demonstrate. This section starts with definitions of cultural 
policy and then explores the domain of that policy in the modern world.  
 
3.2.1 Cultural Policy Definition and Domain  
The definitions of cultural policy 
The phrase ‘cultural policy’ implies the plans and strategies which governments 
develop in order to support ‘culture’ in the broad sense. The English word ‘policy’ is 
normally translated into Chinese as Cheng tse (政策) which relates more specifically 
to government strategy and planning. In English a similar term in meaning might be 
‘public policy’ or ‘national policy’. Hence, Tchen Yu-chiou, Minister of the CCA from 
2000 to 2004, defines ‘policy’ as the plans and tactics set by governments, 
organisations or institutions for fulfilling their specific goals through a process of 
research, discussion, induction and legislation (Tchen, 2013: 23). Meanwhile, Han 
Pao-teh, Taiwan’s National Policy Advisor to the President from 2000 to 2004, defines 
policy as ‘a statement with positive goals and practical strategies’ (Han, 2001:1). He 
argues that ideas and ideology alone cannot form policy, which should include a 
hierarchy and framework. Thus, a nation’s policy should start with constitutional laws 
and regulations (ibid.). In a similar vein, Kevin V. Mulcahy sums up his view of public 
policy by suggesting two general notions:  
First, that governmental actions (or inactions) constitute value choices, that 
these choices are policies, and that the policies are politically determined; 
second, that the decisions of public officials are implemented by the 
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production of goods and services that produce discernible societal outcomes. 
(Mulcahy, 2006: 320) 
Public policy therefore echoes government’s vision, intentions, goals, and more 
importantly the way to achieve them. Mulcahy (2017: vii) goes on to explain how the 
value choices mentioned above are formed into ‘a nation’s public policies which 
reflect the historical experiences and value system that have characterised its social 
development’. As a result, the infrastructure of public policy consists of national 
constitutional laws, legislation and regulations concerning people’s daily life under the 
administrative and executive agencies of government. The development of public 
policy influences every aspect of a nation’s evolution and, as Mulcahy (2017) points 
out. Taiwan is no exception to this.  
Public policy with respect to culture in Raymond Williams’s broad sense, forms 
what may be termed ‘cultural policy’, although J. Mark Schuster (2003: 1) refines the 
definition of cultural policy as ‘the sum of a government’s activities with respect to 
the arts (including the for-profit cultural industries), the humanities, and the heritage’. 
It is clear that traditionally defined culture sits at the core part of cultural policy.  
Regarding the factors influencing cultural policy, David Bell and Kate Oakley 
(2015: 6) believe that because it is also one of the forms of public policy, ‘it is subject 
to the same political changes, financial challenges and global tensions as any other 
form of public policy’. Mulcahy (2017: viii) then asserts that, depending on their 
political culture, governments ‘vary in the ways that their cultural policies are 
conceptualised and implemented’. The mechanism by which cultural policy is 
normally implemented is set up by the Government with various laws and regulations, 
and the strategy of distribution of governmental grants (Tchen, 2013: 23-24). Mulcahy 
gives a useful summary: 
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With regard to the variety of institutions and programmes that have been 
created to implement a cultural policy, their aesthetic values reflect popular 
perceptions about what is acceptable. In this sense, cultural policies represent 
a microcosm of broader social and political world views. (Mulcahy, 2017: viii)  
Changes in society influence political culture and consequently, the development of 
cultural policy. Through the evolution of cultural policy, ‘flaggings’ or reminders of 
identity (Billig, 1995) that are encountered in everyday life include the language used 
in cultural policy documents and reflect the transformation of a nation’s identity, a 
main focus of this thesis. 
The domain of cultural policy 
Concerning the domain of cultural policy, Oliver Bennett (2009: 68-69) believes that 
‘within the discourse of cultural policy, culture was thus defined as those activities 
deemed worthy of support by public authorities’. And nowadays this tends to be the 
arts since ‘arts patronage’ (Alasuutari, 2009) forms the main part of government 
cultural policy. Jim McGuigan (2001: 124) regards cultural policy to be ‘quite closely 
associated with arts policy, the objects of which are the aesthetic, the affective, and 
values’, cultural policy covers in addition ‘civic and national identity, and cultural 
citizenship’. In this way, looking at how cultural policy changes from year to year 
illuminates the way that society is changing and is a reflection of the identity of the 
country. 
Eleonora Redaelli (2012: 145) also thinks that the core of cultural policy is arts 
and heritage, and that formulation of cultural policy is characteristically through a 
ministry of culture or similar governmental bureau. State intervention can mean 
positive support and protection for culture, but a policy of non-intervention by the state 
does not necessarily mean that the state ignores or even takes no responsibility for 
culture or the arts.  
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The sphere of contemporary cultural policy thus inevitably retains its traditional 
core of arts and heritage, but also takes in new areas of activity as it progresses and 
develops. The inclusion of commercial cultural and creative industries is a good 
example of this and Clive Gray gives a good modern summary of the domain of 
cultural policy: 
Community cultural development, cultural diversity, cultural sustainability, 
cultural heritage, the cultural and creative industries, lifestyle culture and eco-
culture, planning for intercultural city, cultural planning per se, support for 
national languages, currently controversial issues in the wider society. (Gray, 
2010: 218) 
However, many commentators (e.g. Gray, 2010; Hesmondhalgh, 2005; McGuigan, 
1996) have pointed out the problem of defining culture too inclusively. Bell and 
Oakley (2015:17) explain that ‘the issue raised by using a very board definition of 
cultures as way of life is that it is difficult to know where “culture” ends and 
“everything else” begins’. For practical purposes, a limit is needed to what is included 
in culture. Bell and Oakley propose that John Storey’s view is accepted: ‘the culture 
of cultural policy is, as Storey (2006: 2) puts it, the texts and practises whose principal 
function is to signify, to produce or to be the occasion for the production of meaning’ 
(Bell & Oakley, 2015: 17). This includes a wide range of symbolic and creative 
activities and products, which demonstrates the contemporary trend of a widening the 
domain of cultural policy from the arts and cultural heritage to additionally include 
creative industries. 
Taiwanese definition 
Up to 2017, the national Taiwanese Government published two culture white papers 
(two acts of national policy legislation, Wen hua bai pi shu, 文化白皮書), one in 1998 
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with a follow-up in 20049. The Government defines the sphere of cultural policy in 
both papers. The 1998 paper covers daily life, community life, literature, arts, antiques, 
heritage, folk arts, publication, broadcasting, television, film, and the internet. The 
2004 paper includes all these categories but adds another: cultural and creative 
industries, referenced from a 1997 publication of the UK’s ‘creative industries’ (Tchen, 
2013: 192). Thus from 2004, all creative activities giving rise to intellectual property 
have been included within the scope of cultural policy.  
    A means of exploring how Taiwan defines its ‘cultural and creative industry’ is 
by reference to the Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries 
which was enacted in 2010. The domain of this law is very broad and covers: the visual 
arts, music and performance art, cultural assets application and exhibition and 
performance facility, handicrafts, film, radio and television broadcasting, publication, 
advertising, product design, visual communication design, designer fashion, 
architectural design, digital content, creative living, popular music and culture (MOC, 
2016). In parallel with the broad scope of this law, the responsibilities of the Ministry 
of Culture (MOC) of Taiwan not only include the classical arts, literature, museums 
and heritage, but also film, radio, popular music, and the cultural and creative 
industries.  
Although ‘culture’ has now been given an entirely new face and contemporary 
identity in Taiwan, this broad understanding has not put an end to definitional debate. 
It is not easy to see how this will resolve itself in today’s digital era with instantly 
renewing cyber media when popular and commercial cultures are all involved in the 
spectrum of cultural policy. One example occurred when a new arm’s-length 
government body, the Taiwan Creative Content Agency, was established to ‘spur on 
                                                          
9 A third culture white paper was published by the Ministry of Culture in 2018. 
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the development of the cultural content industry and of cultural industries’ (Laws & 
Regulations Database of the ROC, 2019). Considerable concern was expressed in 
Taiwan’s arts fraternity about whether the substantial budget allocated to this new 
institution would soak up a large proportion of the budget of the Ministry of Culture 
(United Daily News, 2019). 
While the ministry now embraces the inclusive definition of culture, there is still 
a clear distinction made between high culture/arts and commercial/popular culture/arts 
in its day-to-day policy making. Questions about the former are likely to centre on the 
need for financial support and sponsorship and, indeed, on the extent and level of 
financial support that the state should give to its sponsored institutions. While for the 
commercial sector the issue is how to create an effective environment that allows 
commercial businesses to prosper.  
    This thesis focuses on the arts in the traditional sense, which is the core of 
Taiwanese cultural policy, because the main concern here is government-sponsored 
performing arts institutions—the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (NCKSCC) 
and the National Performing Arts Centre (NPAC)—and how those institutions relate 
to government cultural policy. In formulating its policy for the NCKSCC and NPAC, 
the Government needs to be aware of the current state of Taiwanese identity to decide 
in what direction it would like things to change and then to formulate arts policies to 
promote change in that direction.  
    Similarly, publicly funded performing arts institutions need to take account of the 
nature of their audience in their programming at the same time as they operate within 
the framework of cultural policy. Against this backdrop, this thesis looks into the 
relationship between Taiwan’s cultural policy and the programming of a government-
sponsored performing arts organisation. 
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3.2.2 Democratising Culture and Cultural Democracy 
Different types of government, from their differing political standpoints, conceive and 
formulate cultural policy in different ways (Mulcahy, 2017). Taiwan has experienced 
considerable political change from authoritarian to democratic government over the 
past three decades and that has affected every aspect of Taiwanese society. How has 
the progress of democracy influenced cultural policy during this time?  
   Geir Vestheim points out that political systems and cultural policy are mutually 
interconnected: 
Cultural policy emerges when agents of the political system intervene with 
production, distribution and consumption of cultural products, services and 
experiences. Cultural policy then expresses a relationship between a political 
system and the cultural field. That relationship may be ideological, normative, 
economical or organisational of character. (Vestheim, 2012: 497)  
In Vestheim’s (2012: 496) view ‘culture and cultural policy in pre-democratic times 
were used to ‘glorify and legitimise the privileges of the power holders’ so that, as far 
as they are concerned, ‘culture might be a useful instrument to secure their privileges 
and to control and oppress populations’. Harry Hillman-Chartrand and Claire 
McCaughey (1989) have created a typology of arts patronage in different political 
states recognising national support (or intervention) for the arts in democratic states as 
‘facilitator, patron and architect’ or, by contrast, in authoritarian states as ‘engineer’. 
The way in which cultural policy is made and implemented by varying types of 
government is discussed further in Chapter 4 Section 4.3.1.2 ‘institutional autonomy’.  
    With similar trajectories from colonial regime, through authoritarian government, 
to democracy, Taiwan and South Korea have a comparable political history in modern 
times. Hye-Kyung Lee (2018) in her book Cultural Policy in South Korea: Making A 
New Patron State shows that the existence of a cultural policy is not limited to 
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democratic states and that there is no automatic relationship between democracy and 
cultural policy. Nevertheless, in the case of South Korea, the development of cultural 
policy since its democracy in the late 1980s demonstrates that ‘they can be closely 
interconnected and mutually affecting’: democracy can ‘shape cultural policy’s 
purpose and means’, and in return, a democratic cultural policy is then able to facilitate 
the ‘socio-political advancement of a society’ (Lee, 2018: 63).  
    In an analogous way, since Taiwan started its move towards democracy in the 
late 1980s, its cultural life has also experienced a progressive democratisation. The 
influence of political democracy on the development of cultural policy became a 
significant factor because it stimulated a change in Taiwanese identity in parallel with 
that of cultural policy. However, both Lee (2018) and Mulcahy (2017) emphasise that 
‘democratising culture’ and ‘cultural democracy’ are different. For them, 
‘democratising culture’ refers to the provision of good public access to those cultural 
activities that are normally considered high culture which was once the preserve of the 
elite in society. Meanwhile, cultural democracy ‘gives people power to decide their 
own cultural pursuits and to explore a wider meaning of culture, inclusive of popular, 
commercial, folk and amateur cultures’ (Lee, 2018: 63). Mulcahy (2017: xviii-xix) 
adds that it provides ‘for a more populist approach in the definition and provision of 
cultural opportunities… The government’s responsibility is to provide equal 
opportunities for citizens to be culturally active in their own terms’. 
    Both ‘democratising culture’ and ‘cultural democracy’ are crucial in the 
development of cultural policy; they are not sequential processes, but work together 
and complement one another. In the case of Taiwan, the action of ‘democratising 
culture’ has been to make cultural activities accessible regardless of people’s 
background, even during the pre-democratic period. However, before democracy, 
culture was defined by the KMT regime as Chinese (Zhonghua) culture, and 
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monocultural Chinese identity was a matter of government policy at a time when 
censorship was used to enforce that objective. 
    ‘Cultural democracy’ only came about after Taiwan progressed into political 
democracy and people became free to express themselves and to create new work as 
they wished. This in turn influenced the direction of development of Taiwan’s cultural 
policy and resulted in a respect for diverse multiculturalism. As new Taiwanese 
identity has been formed it has moved away from pure Chineseness and the National 
Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (NCKSCC) epitomises this development. When it 
was launched, the Centre was the foremost national performing arts centre in the 
country, offering its programmes to the elite. But in more recent years its aim has been 
to make high-quality programmes that are accessible to the general public. It now 
celebrates Taiwan’s cultural diversity, and at the same time promotes cultural 
democracy by introducing new kinds of performance such as circus, street dance and 
Taiwanese folk music which the audience are keen to see (NCKSCC, 2007).  
 
3.2.3 Cultural Policy Objectives 
In the opinion of Tchen Yu-chiou, Taiwan’s Minister at the CCA from 2000 to 2004, 
a cultural policy is the ‘inescapable consequence’ of the existence of a state (2013: 24). 
She claims that cultural affairs are ideally a property of the entire population, and only 
through the awareness, participation, and support of the entire population, can the need 
for a cultural policy be established and the foundation of a cultural policy be built. 
Oliver Bennett (2009: 70) adds that ‘cultural policy must produce demonstrable social 
benefits’ for its legitimacy. In his view, the reason that a government engages in the 
arts depends on how it can ‘justify its actions on the basis of the contributions the arts 
are said to make to the society’ (ibid.). The relationship between a government and its 
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decisions about what cultural and arts activities it is prepared to support is a continuing 
topic for debate across the globe.  
    In relation to the way cultural policy can produce social benefits, Bennett (2009: 
70) claims that there are three recurring themes. The first is moral improvement, in 
which culture and the arts have a ‘civilising influence’ that ‘has been the dominant 
justification for cultural policy’. This objective was at play during the KMT regime 
when the Government imposed control through its cultural policy as it tried to make 
people ‘good citizens’. The second theme is economic benefits which reflects the way 
that the creative industries have become prominent worldwide in recent years. Taiwan 
is a good example of this as the Government has developed policies with a belief that 
it can boost the economy by encouraging the creative industries. What is more, the 
economic benefits that creativity can bring act as a powerful justification for public 
(financial) support for creativity. The third theme is national identity and prestige. 
Although Bennett describes how this has evolved from older traditions in Europe, for 
example, to display French exceptionalism in France, Victorian confidence in the UK, 
and the reconstruction of national determination in post-war Germany, this feature 
would apply in many developing countries which harness culture and the arts to 
(re)develop cultural or national identity and confidence.  
    Regarding this third theme, Kevin Robins (2007) explains the connection 
between a country and its cultural policy as he points out:   
For it is the nation and nation-state that have served as the primary frame of 
reference for cultural policy in the modern period. Indeed, we may say that 
the national state created an entirely new and unprecedented institution of 
culture and cultural policy. In the nation-state era, cultural policy has 
essentially been about shaping and managing national cultural orders. The 
central objective has been to create a sense of belonging and allegiance to the 
national community. (Robins, 2007: 150) 
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David Throsby (2010) also emphasises the relationship between national identity and 
cultural policy: 
The recognition and celebration of national, regional or local identity is an 
important objective of cultural policy at each of these levels of government. 
The objective can be articulated in terms of the cultural value accruing to 
individuals through understanding of who they are. (Throsby, 2010: 43) 
In this sense, a nation’s identity and its cultural policy mutually influence one another 
and are both significant factors in determining new phases in national history. Taiwan 
gave an example of this when the KMT regime made Chinese monocultural identity 
its foremost cultural policy objective, and then that objective was overturned by the 
subsequent democratic governments in favour of the promotion of Taiwanese 
multicultural identity. The continuing evolution of Taiwanese identity is a significant 
factor in the development of a cultural policy for Taiwan and this will be discussed in 
Section 3.3.  
    David Hesmondhalgh and his colleagues (2015) feel that the goals of cultural 
policy nowadays are commonly ‘national branding or promotion, protection of 
heritage and historical artefacts, support for cultural production, and distribution and 
cultural consumption’ (Hesmondhalgh, Oakley, Lee & Nisbett, 2015: 7-9). Taiwan is 
no exception to this agenda and the direction of Taiwan’s cultural policy development 
has now changed from the construction of a national identity to the branding of the 
nation to the outside world since, as a matter of policy, Taiwan is keen to embrace 
global cultural values and to become a recognised member of international society. For 
Taiwan, the objective of national branding and promotion is vital because of its 
diplomatically difficult situation. The conflict between national and cultural identity 
discussed in Chapter 2 prompts Taiwan to operate in a determined way to achieve its 
aim. Nevertheless, there still is an ongoing debate about which ‘nation’ Taiwan is 
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trying to brand and promote. Is it the Republic of China or Taiwan?  
 
3.2.4 Explicit and Implicit Cultural Policy 
Lung Yin-tai, who was Taiwan’s first Minister of the Ministry of Culture (MOC) 
between 2012 and 2014, advocates the special status of cultural policy because cultural 
development provides government with a means of coordinating all kinds of policies 
at different levels of government (Lung, 2008). In her view, the key aspect of policy 
implementation is the integration of cultural policy across the complete span of 
government policies: public policies ought to influence and react with one another. 
Echoing Lung’s idea, David Throsby (2010: 28) explains that nowadays cultural policy 
is not a single system existing in isolation but rather one that brings together the work 
of different departments of the government’s administrative structure in a way that 
expands the concept of cultural policy. He lists the areas of government responsibility 
that are likely to have some involvement with cultural policy. These include: 
arts/cultural ministry, finance/treasury, industry development, labour, trade, education, 
urban/regional development, environment, information technology and the media, 
legal affairs, and social welfare (Throsby, 2010: 28-29). In this view of modern society, 
cultural policy may appear in diverse forms and could be made by disparate 
administrative institutions. It is not only policies and policy-makers that bear the name 
‘cultural’ that have an influence on cultural affairs, because many, if not all, public 
policies and ministries can have influenced people’s cultural life. 
The question then is, as David Bell and Kate Oakley (2015: 55) ask, ‘when is a 
public policy classifiable as a cultural policy?’. Jeremy Ahearne (2009: 142) starts by 
explaining that for him the concept of ‘culture’ is broad, and is ‘taken to signify 
embodied systems of values and attitudes’. In this way, his use of ‘the term (culture) 
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is thus not synonymous with that of arts’, although he admits that ‘arts denote the 
domain of consciously crafted symbolic works (in cultural policy studies)’. To 
demonstrate his ideas, Ahearne (2009: 141) explains that ‘explicit’ or ‘nominal’ 
cultural policies refer to those policies clearly labelled as ‘cultural’, whereas ‘implicit’ 
or ‘effective’ cultural policies refer to those without the label ‘cultural’, but which are 
intended to ‘prescribe or shape cultural attitudes and habits over given territories’. He 
points out that:  
Explicit cultural policies will often identify culture quite simply with certain 
consecrated forms of artistic expression, thereby, deflecting attention from 
other forms of policy action upon culture. Within the domain of implicit 
cultural policies, one might also distinguish between the unintended cultural 
side effects of various kind of policy and those deliberate courses of action 
intended to shape cultures but which are not expressly thematised as such. 
(Ahearne, 2009: 144) 
In Ahearne’s opinion, an explicit cultural policy is easily recognised whereas an 
implicit cultural policy is more ‘in the air’ and cannot easily be perceived (2009: 142). 
When a policy can be only seen to relate to culture in a vague and indirect way, it can 
be regarded as ‘implicit’ and this is why Ahearne suggests that Joseph Nye’s idea of 
‘soft power’ might also be included in the domain of implicit cultural policy because 
soft power has an effect across the spectrum of contemporary cultural policy. Vestheim 
(2012: 496) points out that implicit cultural policies may have a more influential effect 
on the political system than explicit policies because ‘they are less visible and 
consequently represent a “hidden” ideology that legitimises power structure outside 
and inside the political system’.  
Under Ahearne’s concept, the potential sphere of ‘implicit’ cultural policy is 
immense. Thinking in this inclusive way increases the difficulty of identifying a policy 
that can be labelled ‘cultural’ and, as Bell and Oakley (2015: 55) have pointed out, 
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‘this is quite a conundrum, where are we to “draw the line” in terms of policies that 
we would include as part of our analysis and those that are outside our concern?’. 
While it is easy to appreciate that any policy can have an effect on culture when culture 
is defined in an all-inclusive way, this is not helpful when attempting to analyse the 
effect of a government’s policies.  
    The balance between explicit and implicit cultural policies might be more heavily 
weighted in favour of the implicit in countries such as Western democracies ‘where 
the state is almost invisible as the task of governance is dispersed and decentralised 
among many non-state professional organisations, private individuals and their 
practices’ (Lee, 2018: 10). However, not every country fits this pattern and in the case 
of a country with an illiberal government, or where there is a restrictive approach to 
liberty, liberal governance is not a necessary feature of the regime. Instead, censorship, 
control and even police monitoring of cultural affairs may be the government’s method 
of operation and when this happens the balance is likely to favour explicit policies. 
According to Lee (2018), many Asian countries which experienced colonialism and 
autocracy give examples of this situation. Having experienced Japanese colonial rule 
which was then followed by an authoritarian government, Taiwan is one. The KMT’s 
explicit policy to promote Chinese culture was deliberately implemented in such a way 
that implicit effects were at a minimum. Nowadays, however, Taiwan is a closer fit 
with the typical models of Ahearne’s theory because explicit cultural policies are not 
implemented in so forceful a manner but at the same time Taiwanese culture is 
implicitly promoted by many areas of government policy.  
Regarding the types of public policy which are more likely to function implicitly 
as cultural policy, David Throsby (2009: 181) finds that ‘economic policy broadly 
defined is implicitly cultural because it reflects and reinforces accepted cultural norms 
(or what the government takes those norms to be)’. He also suggests that cultural 
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policy can act as an implicit economic policy, taking the example of creative industry 
policies ‘whose objectives are explicitly cultural but whose real though covert 
intention is economic’ (Throsby, 2009: 182). Similarly, many other public policies 
such as immigration policy, redistributive taxation and labour market policy, media 
regulation and international trade policy can all be implicitly cultural. In Throsby’s 
view, educational policy, indigenous policy, diplomatic policy and social warfare 
policy can be included within the list of policies that are implicitly cultural because, as 
Ahearne (2009: 147) says, they are ‘policies whose immediate explicit benefits are the 
condition of their long-term implicit cultural goals’.  
This is also the case for Taiwan. During the authoritarian period, the KMT 
government’s non-cultural agencies made ‘explicit’ cultural policy. Those ministries 
may not have been entitled ‘cultural’ organisations, and may not have had an overt 
responsibility for cultural affairs, but they nevertheless had a significant effect on 
cultural institutions and their activities. On the other hand, in the contemporary 
democratic period, the current Minister of Culture, Cheng Li-chun, who has been in 
post since 2016, is of the opinion that ‘every ministry is a cultural ministry’ borrowing 
the idea from France’s ‘44 cultural ministries’ indicated by Jack Lang (Cheng, 2016). 
She believes that culture is the core value of government administration and that every 
ministry should therefore have its own cultural vision. It is then vital that the cultural 
visions of all the ministries are properly coordinated, and in order to do that it is 
valuable to use Ahearne’s approach because ‘to ignore such strategically interesting 
nexuses of culture and policy simply because they do not bear the appropriate labels 
or crop up in familiar administrative sectors seems myopic’ (Ahearne, 2009: 151). 
Indeed, ‘effective cultural-shaping policies have often existed in implicit or 
unthematised mode’ and ‘the actual impact of policy upon culture may not always be 
where we are accustomed to look for it’ (ibid.). Thus, as Taiwan’s cultural policy is 
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investigated in this thesis from its origins in 1949, when the KMT regime took power, 
up to the democratic era of 2017, it will be important to look at both explicit cultural 
policies and organisations as well as other organisations and policies that have an 
effect on the cultural life of the country, but are not directly charged with responsibility 
for it. 
 
3. 3 Cultural Policy Development in Taiwan 
Analysis method 
This section analyses cultural policy development in Taiwan, using the thematic 
structure discussed in Section 3.2 for three periods from 1949 to 2017. Firstly, it 
explores the agencies in charge of cultural policy and the content of the policies, using 
the concept of explicit/implicit cultural policy. This is especially useful during the 
early period when there was no government agency or cultural institution with specific 
responsibility for cultural affairs, so cultural policy was promoted through 
organisations such as the Government Information Office (GIO) and the KMT’s 
Committee for Reviving and Promoting Chinese Culture (CRPCC). Secondly, it 
examines the way cultural policy is formulated and implemented in order to reveal 
how democratising culture/cultural democracy applies. Finally, after bringing together 
the factors influencing cultural policy, it will highlight any evidence for shifts in 
Taiwanese identity.  
Historic context 
The formation of various cultural agencies by Taiwan’s central government can be 
split into three chronological periods. In Period One which ran from 1949 until 1981 
there was no specific government cultural agency and cultural affairs were mainly 
under the control of the KMT. Period Two ran from 1981 when the Council of Cultural 
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Affairs (CCA) was established through the period when Taiwan became democratic, 
until 2012. Period Three started in 2012 when the Ministry of Culture (MOC) was 
upgraded from the CCA, and runs until 2017.  
Before examining these three periods, it is useful to summarise Taiwan’s 
complicated political situation which was explained in more detail in Chapter 2. Even 
today, Taiwan still retains The Constitution of the Republic of China (December, 1947) 
which was promulgated in 1947 when the Government still dominated mainland China. 
Chapter XIII: Fundamental National Policies of this constitution includes, in Section 
5, at least four articles that deal with culture and show its importance to the country. 
Those articles specify: the function of culture, the minimum government budget for 
culture, support for artists, and the protection of heritage and culture 10  (Laws & 
Regulations Database of the ROC, 2016). Culture is given equal prominence with other 
Fundamental National Policies including National Defence, Foreign Affairs, National 
Economy, Social Security/Welfare, and Education. When the KMT government 
transferred to Taiwan and instituted martial law there, they imposed a constitution on 
the country that was quite divorced from the reality of day-to-day government, but 
                                                          
10 Some important articles of The Constitution of the Republic of China concerning cultural 
policy are as follows: Article 158: Education and culture shall be aimed at the development 
among the citizens of a national spirit, the spirit of self-government, national morality, good 
physique, scientific knowledge, and the ability to earn a living. Article 164: Expenditures of 
educational programs, scientific studies and cultural services shall not be, in respect of the 
Central Government, less than15% of the total national budget; in respect of each province, 
less than 25% of the total provincial budgets; and in respect of each municipality or hsien 
(county, 縣), less than 35% of the total municipal or hsien (county) budget. Educational and 
cultural foundations established in accordance with law shall, together with their property, be 
protected. Article 165: The State shall safeguard the livelihood of those who work in the fields 
of education, sciences and arts, and shall, in accordance with the development of national 
economy, increase their remuneration from time to time. Article 166: The State shall 
encourage scientific discoveries and inventions, and shall protect ancient sites and articles of 
historical, cultural or artistic value (Laws & Regulations Database of the ROC, 2016). 
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even today it is still politically too difficult to make changes to the 1947 Constitution 
which is therefore still in force. The biggest controversy is that, according to the 
constitution, the official name of Taiwan still remains ‘The Republic of China’ (ROC) 
and the articles of the constitution are supposedly still in force across the whole of 
China, including the mainland, as well as Republic of Mongolia. This unrealistically 
outdated constitution is, however, the starting point for an investigation of Taiwanese 
identity. 
Between 1945 and 1949, Taiwan was a province of China, and at that time the 
Ministry of Education (MOE) had sole responsibility for cultural affairs. But, as 
Taiwan was still in a chaotic and unstable state as it recovered from World War Two, 
and civil war seemed imminent, cultural policy had low priority. Nevertheless, as early 
as 1948, the year before the arrival of the KMT government in Taiwan, the Historical 
Document Committee of Taiwan Province was established and this was the beginning 
of an official concern for cultural affairs (Kuo, 2011: 232). Every hsien (county, 縣) 
in Taiwan then launched its own historical document committee and Kuo Wei-fan, a 
former Minister of the CCA (1988-1993), identifies these committees as the most 
important institutions for protecting local culture (mainly literature and documents) 
before county cultural centres were introduced (ibid.). Thus in the early period, the 
main goal of cultural affairs was to preserve the heritage. 
 
3.3.1 Period One: The KMT Control (1949-1981) 
This is the longest of the three periods during which Taiwan was ruled by the 
Kuomintang party. Before there was a government ministry specifically charged with 
responsibility for cultural policy, KMT committees played an influential role in every 
aspect of Taiwan’s cultural life. There were few explicitly stated cultural policies 
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beyond the KMT’s overriding intention of respecting Chinese traditional culture. 
Nevertheless, this intention was explicit in every aspect of the Government’s work and 
it was rigorously applied by censorship. Chinese ideology and identity were imposed 
on the Taiwanese people.  
‘Agencies’ in charge of cultural affairs 
In the early years of the KMT government in Taiwan, there was no institution with 
direct responsibility for cultural affairs at the central governmental level until the 
Cultural Bureau was established in 1967 under the Ministry of Education (MOE). The 
Bureau was given responsibility for cultural and arts development, publication, radio, 
television, and film. It only existed for about six years during which cultural policy 
was, in the words of Tchen Yu-chiou (CCA Minister from 2000 to 2004), formulated 
to conform to, and to be a sub-set of, overall national (KMT) policy. Its objectives 
were to promote ethics and morality within a Chinese context, to ensure that traditional 
Chinese culture was effectively preserved and promoted in Taiwan (Tchen, 2013: 115). 
Tchen also notes that while the performing arts were officially supported during this 
period, performing arts companies could only play in school halls, community centres, 
and temple plazas because there were no proper performing arts venues. In 1972 the 
Cultural Bureau was wound up and its responsibilities for cultural and arts 
development were handed over to another branch of the Ministry of Education, the 
Department of Social Education. The Government Information Office (GIO), of the 
Executive Yuan took on publication, radio, television, and film (Tchen, 2013: 30-31).  
In parallel with this, during the period of one-party rule, two non-governmental 
committees shared responsibility for Taiwan’s cultural policy and for covering most 
of the country’s cultural activities. There was the KMT Cultural and Promotion 
Committee and also the Committee for Reviving and Promoting Chinese (Zhonghua) 
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Culture (CRPCC, 中華文化復興運動推行委員會). The Taiwanese cultural study 
scholar, Wang Li-jung (2014: 39) stresses that ‘during this period, the KMT 
government maintained tight control over cultural policy, and policies were 
implemented directly by the KMT party and administrative institutions’. As a result, 
the KMT was the main cultural policy decision maker and ‘the government’s cultural 
departments or agencies were essentially executive organisations’ (Kuo, 2011: 229).  
The significant Committee for Reviving and Promoting Chinese Culture (CRPCC) 
was formed in 1967 by Chiang Kai-shek11 (GACC, 2015). Tchen Yu-chiou comments 
that the CRPCC was not a government organisation, but rather a cultural agency under 
the control of the KMT (Tchen, 2013: 31). Its aims were to encourage the revival of 
Chinese culture, to construct a culture based on the Three Principles for People (San 
min chu yi, 三民主義)12, and to preserve orthodox Chinese culture (ibid.). Each week, 
the CRPCC held meetings chaired by President Chiang Kai-shek which all cabinet 
members of the government were obliged to attend. Between 1967 and 1970, the main 
tasks of the CRPCC were: 
 Academic research and publication.  
 Building up a guiding principle for the daily lives of the population. 
 Counselling and promoting new arts. 
 Innovating the educational system. 
 Reviving the culture of overseas Chinese. 
 Setting up cultural opposition to the enemy Communist party. 
                                                          
11 When the ‘Cultural Revolution’ movement started in China in 1966 it attempted to promote 
Chinese Communism by destroying traditional elements of Chinese society. Soon afterwards 
in Taiwan, the establishment of the ‘Committee for Reviving and Promoting Chinese Culture’ 
(CRPCC) was proposed by Chiang Kai-shek and launched on 28 July 1967. It advocated 
protecting and preserving traditional Chinese culture and encouraged all kinds of institutions 
and organisations in Taiwan to follow this discourse. President Chiang Kai-shek appointed 
himself the first leader of the CRPCC (GACC, 2015). 
12 The Three Principles of the People is a political philosophy developed by Dr Sun Yat-sen, 
the founding father of the Republic of China. The three principles are: people’s 




 Planning a special exhibition of revived Chinese culture for the celebrations of 
the 60th anniversary of the Republic of China in 1972. 
(Tchen, 2013: 31) 
This is a good example of what Oliver Bennet (2009) calls ‘moral improvement’ as a 
function of cultural policy, through the addition of objectives related to ideology and 
propaganda. It was seen as a vital approach to initiating the ‘civilising influence’ of 
culture and the underlying rationale for the country’s cultural policy was set by it. The 
belief was that there is a direct connection between culture and civilization that can 
thereby promote social transformation. 
    The CRPCC, as an idiosyncratic non-governmental cultural organisation, 
produced explicit cultural policies that have ‘culture’ in their title, but also, through its 
behind-the-scenes influence on government organisations, promoted implicit cultural 
policies that were intended to shape people’s way of life, thoughts and identity. The 
CRPCC still exists today, although it has had several name changes over the years and 
has gradually declined in importance with the change of the political climate.  
    During this period of highly censored activity, responsibility for the arts lay with 
the Ministry of Education (MOE), but the main work of that Ministry naturally focused 
on education. Culture was a small part of the responsibilities of a large ministry and 
this gave it low priority amongst the Ministry’s more immediate concerns. The result 
was slow progress in the development of cultural activities in Taiwan over the many 
years that they were under the Ministry of Education’s guardianship.  
    For this reason, it is interesting to consider the application of Ahearne’s ideas 
about the relationship between explicit and implicit cultural policy in Taiwan at that 
time. As far as explicit policy was concerned during authoritarian rule, culture was the 
business of the MOE and its Cultural Bureau, but in reality, their role was only 
superficial because the MOE had other priorities. At a time of fierce cultural 
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censorship, the strings of power were held by other government departments such as 
the Government Information Office, the Ministry of Interior and even the police 
organisation, all of whom were kept under strict control by the KMT party committee. 
The result was an implicit cultural policy across the country masterminded by such 
non-governmental institutions as the KMT’s Committees who were intent on 
moulding people’s way of life and ideology, leaving the MOE as merely the explicit 
public face of government culture.  
Authoritarian rule and censorship  
During this period, censorship, prohibition and policing were the Government’s main 
tools used for the control of cultural activities. Wang Li-jung (2014: 39) explains that 
the KMT ‘censored the media and all publications, and established cultural and arts 
associations under the control of the KMT party’. Cultural affairs became one of the 
controlling tools used by the Government. Han Pao-teh, Taiwan’s National Policy 
Advisor to the President from 2000 to 2004, explains that cultural policy during this 
period focused on resistance to the KMT’s perceived opponent, the Communist Party 
in China (Han, 2001). The KMT believed that one of the reasons that they lost the civil 
war was because of the strong cultural propaganda of the Communist Party that 
dominated in China. The KMT therefore deliberately set up a ‘cultural policy’ in 
Taiwan in an attempt to control ideology and thoughts by what they called an ‘anti-
Communist and revival base’ (fan gong fu hsing ji di, 反共復興基地) in Taiwan 
(ibid.).  
This is a reflection of the cultural objective of ‘national branding’ where Taiwan 
is presented to international society as the real, traditional and free China. In his review 
of national cultural policy, Han explains that arts and literature during this period were 
used as tools to ‘cultivate’ people, and traditions tended to be preserved (Han, 2001). 
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Freedom of thought was suppressed and the cultural environment was controlled by 
censorship. Although none of this was specified as official cultural policy and merely 
took the form of practical political action, cultural groups resented political pressure 
on their freedom. According to Taiwanese popular cultural historian Li Kun-cheng, 
the Taiwan Garrison Command, the Ministry of Interior and the Government 
Information Office were successively in charge of censorship (Li, 2007). Music and 
publications were prohibited for a range of reasons, such as being pro-communist, anti-
government, against public order and good morals. Sometimes no reason was given 
for prohibition, but merely a requirement for patriotism to ‘Greater China’ 
emphasising that the ROC is the real, liberal and democratic China, which will 
eventually take back the mainland to liberate benighted fellow Chinese people there. 
Censorship was common and ubiquitous, especially for clearly visible artistic activities.  
    The implementation of cultural policy not only encouraged what the Government 
wanted people to follow, but also banned what the Government wished people not to 
have contact with. This kind of domination and imposition shaped the character of 
Taiwanese society, the nature of its culture, and the identity of the country in Period 
One. 
Cultural construction and democratising culture 
With the rapid economic development during the late phase of this period, Taiwan was 
on a route to become a developed country in terms of its economy. The Government 
then wanted to do the same for cultural affairs and initiated a policy of ‘cultural 
construction’ (Wen hua chien she, 文化建設). This is a broad phrase that could refer 
to buildings which need to be constructed, but in a more abstract way it also can refer 
to enhancing and building righteous cultural values or identity as well as establishing 
a professional mechanism for formulating cultural policy. With this background, and 
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despite the low priority of culture within the Ministry of Education (MOE), there was 
progress and in 1977 Chiang Ching-kuo, the then Premier of the Executive Yuan 
launched The Twelve Construction Plans two of which related to cultural construction: 
Plan of the MOE for Building County/Local Cultural Centres (1978), and Plan for 
Enhancing Cultural and Educational Recreation Activities (1978). These Plans were 
adopted by the Executive Yuan in 1978 (Kuo, 2011: 233).  
Based on the first Plan, counties started to build their own cultural centres 
consisting of performing arts venues, galleries, libraries, museums and community 
centres the first of which appeared in 1979. The Government’s aim was to enable 
people to enjoy the arts and culture in every county, and not just in the capital, Taipei. 
This was a ‘democratising culture’ policy that wanted to make arts and culture 
accessible even though the country was still under authoritarian governance. In the 
absence of a cultural affairs institution at central government level, these county 
cultural centres were initially supervised by the Ministry of Education. Following the 
second Plan, the Government not only decided to establish a cultural agency (the then 
Council for Cultural Affairs) at the central-government level, but also initiated many 
important policies, such as the cultural fund, the annual cultural season, the national 
cultural award, the foundation of a new arts college to support national opera and 
contemporary theatre, and an evaluation of the laws on copyright and antique 
preservation’ (Kuo, 2011: 232-233). These cultural policies are explicit and indicated 
that after years of political stability and economic success, Taiwan now had sufficient 
awareness and ability to take cultural affairs away from the MOE and boost their 






In David Bell and Kate Oakley’s (2015: 112) view ‘there is an obvious connection 
between culture and nation formation, therefore, culture is conscripted into helping 
define the nation’. Taking Taiwan as an example, this corresponds with Benedict 
Anderson’s (2006) idea of ‘the nation as an imagined community’ since ‘the steering 
of the imaginative work of making a nation cohere and self-identify is often down to 
culture’ (Bell & Oakley, 2015: 113). During the KMT regime, despite the existence of 
different Taiwanese ethnic groups with various cultural backgrounds, the Chinese 
culture of the mainland Chinese immigrants became a monocultural identity which 
was forced on all Taiwanese people. As Anthony D. Smith (1991: 52) has described, 
the formation of a new national identity is ‘shaped by the historic culture of its 
dominant ethnie’, and at this time, mainland Chinese became Taiwan’s dominant 
ethnie during this period. The Government was at pains to emphasise that they carried 
the torch for the real China with its traditional Chinese (Zhonghua, 中華) culture and 
the KMT, as a Chinese nationalist party, tried to shape the cultural policy of Taiwan 
based on exclusively Chinese (Zhonghua) traditions when it took over sovereignty in 
Taiwan. 
In this climate, the Government tried to envelop people under one ‘great’ and 
‘historical’ Chinese cultural atmosphere using a strategy of education and media, while 
ignoring the varied cultural backgrounds of Taiwanese people who had occupied the 
country before the arrival of the KMT. Using various propaganda methods, the 
Government tried to construct a single unified Chinese identity for Taiwan on which 
all cultural polices, whether explicit or implicit were focused. To give just one example, 
on 4th October 1967, the inaugural meeting of the CRPCC’s Executive Committee 
adopted The First Draft of the Main Points for Reviving and Promoting Chinese 
Culture and The Plan to Carry Out Reviving and Promoting Chinese Culture. These 
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two explicit cultural policies were influential in the country (National Academy for 
Educational Research, 2000) and demonstrate the strongly Chinese identity imposed 
on the population. During this period, a National language (Mandarin, Guo yu, 國語), 
National opera (Peking Opera Guo ju, 國劇), National music (traditional Chinese 
music, Guo yue, 國樂), National painting (traditional Chinese painting, Guo hua, 國
畫), and so on, were instituted as ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm, 1983) to form a 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006). Cultural policy under this authoritarian 
regime enforced strong Chinese identity to create Chineseness in Taiwan despite the 
fact that pre-1949 the Taiwanese population had been strongly influenced by their 
Japanese colonial masters.   
To summarise, during this period, although there were government agencies that 
dealt with cultural affairs, the KMT’s organisations such as the CRPCC were most 
prominent in making cultural policy. As the President of Taiwan was also the KMT 
party leader, Wang Li-jung (2014) explains how the system worked. The President 
himself: 
was the foremost and highest administrator of cultural affairs. He 
constructed and delivered cultural policy without soliciting any 
collaboration within the central government. The resulting cultural policies 
were explicit and dominated by political considerations, party interests and 
Chinese identity. (Wang, 2014: 39) 
As a result, government institutions such as the MOE and the GIO focused more on 
policy delivery than on formulation as the KMT party was the decision maker. 
Building up mono-Chinese identity was the main interest of the KMT. Whether 
cultural policies were explicit or implicit, censorship and policing played a main role 
during the early phase of this period and prohibition was a prominent feature. 
Nevertheless, during the late phase of the period, the Government started to implement 
an approach of ‘democratising culture’, recognising that excellent cultural services and 
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facilities should not be offered exclusively to any specific social class or particular 
metropolitan area. They should be more accessible and available. The Government 
also realised the importance of establishing a central cultural institution to deal with 
cultural affairs and make a proper cultural policy. These features were forerunners of 
Taiwan’s political and cultural democracy in Period Two.  
 
3.3.2 Period Two: The Establishment of the CCA (1981-2012) 
This period saw an important transition in Taiwan’s democratic development, with a 
substantial change in the political climate, along with a corresponding shift in 
Taiwanese identity. In the cultural sphere, it was also remarkable in that it saw the 
central government’s establishment of a cultural agency as well as a non-government 
foundation for cultural subsidy. Public policies bearing the title ‘cultural’ therefore 
became more explicit through the institutionalised cultural agencies. As part of the 
move to democracy, censorship was removed and an era of liberalised artistic creation 
began. Cultural democracy began while the approach of democratising culture was 
carried on and these developments had a fundamental effect on Taiwanese identity. 
Two culture white papers (1998 & 2004, Wen hua bai pi shu, 文化白皮書) were 
published at this time, and with their significant status along with their process of 
formation, they will be the main foci of examination of the themes of democratising 
culture/cultural democracy and Taiwanese identity shift.   
The Council of Cultural Affairs (CCA) 
The disadvantage of including culture within the remit of the Ministry of Education 
was addressed in 1981 by the creation of the Council of Cultural Affairs (CCA). 
According to an interview with the first Minister of the CCA, Chen Chi-lu (2005), 
which was published in the book Cultural Construction: Cultural Management 
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Pioneer’s Talks, the CCA was the first central government agency under the Executive 
Yuan, and was set up to take charge of cultural affairs in Taiwan. Interestingly, the 
official Chinese name of the CCA actually means ‘Cultural Construction Committee’ 
(Wen hua chien she wei yuan huei, 文化建設委員會) and its original structure was a 
committee consisting of officials from other ministries who came together to discuss 
national cultural affairs (Chen, 2005: 38). It was therefore an institution with a position 
above all the ministries which was supposed to coordinate cultural issues across the 
country. Amongst other issues, it was to deal with the implicit policies of different 
ministries and to take the role of final judge. Whatever the founding intentions had 
been, according to Kuo Wei-fan, Minister from 1988 to 1993, this ideal model was 
never realised and ministries always sent low level representatives to the CCA’s 
meetings rather than ministers themselves (Kuo, interview of 28 June 2018). As a 
result, the CCA was seen as a quasi-ministry government organisation dealing with 
cultural affairs. And at the same time some other aspects of cultural affairs remained 
under the administration of the Ministry of Education (MOE). Museums, performing 
arts venues such as the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (NCKSCC) and the 
National Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall all remained with the MOE while the 
Government Information Office retained responsibility for publication, film, television, 
radio, and popular music and so on. According to Kuo Wei-fan, ‘the CCA was a very 
small government department with a meagre budget and inadequate staff’ (Kuo, 
interview of 28 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author).  
Nevertheless, the indication was that the Government had started the process of 
setting up a body responsible for formulating cultural policy at the central 
governmental level. Kuo Wei-fan, who was the second Minister of the CCA, defines 
the tasks of the CCA as making, coordinating, deliberating and promoting cultural 
policies, even though the powers of execution were not all vested in the CCA, but 
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remained with other Ministries such as Interior, Transportation and Education (Kuo, 
2011: 235). For example, until 2014 the NCKSCC, the sole performing arts centre in 
Taiwan during this period, was under the MOE. This anomaly in the way cultural 
organisations were administered continued until 2012 when the Ministry of Culture 
(MOC) was formed by upgrading the CCA.  
The CCA took charge of setting cultural polices, preserving the cultural heritage, 
promoting the arts, and improving social life (ibid.). It was tasked with planning the 
nation’s cultural infrastructure, with promoting the development of national and local 
cultures, and drawing up and implementing related policies. This would be done 
through supporting artists, cultural exchange and collaboration. In addition, the CCA 
was also responsible for cultural research and any other activities that the Executive 
Yuan felt was part of its remit13. The first Minister of the CCA was anthropologist 
Chen Chi-lu and during his term of office from 1981 to 1987, the CCA mainly 
followed the 1978 Plan for Enhancing Cultural and Educational Recreation Activities 
which gave added emphasis to the preservation of cultural heritage and contributed to 
the legislation in the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act of 1982. The Plan was later 
revised as Plan for Enhancing Cultural Construction under the CCA in 1987 (Kuo, 
2011: 234-235). The main focus of cultural policies during that period could be seen 
in the Plan for Enhancing Cultural Construction, which identified three main aims: 
                                                          
13 According to the first Minister, Chen Chi-lu, the specific breakdown of the CCA’s mission 
is set out as follows: draw up basic guidelines and priority measures for cultural construction; 
set up a plan and course of action for cultural construction; arrange meetings about cultural 
construction and follow up with execution, communication and evaluation; develop and 
encourage talented individuals for cultural construction; plan promotion and evaluation for 
cultural exchange and collaboration, plan promotion and evaluation for the preservation of 
cultural heritage and enhancement of cultural dissemination, plan promotion for important 
cultural events and cultural opposition to communism; data collection, classification and 
research for cultural construction and any other matters related to cultural construction or 




promoting cultural institutions and preserving cultural heritage; enhancing the 
standard of arts appreciation and creativity; and improving the social climate, through 
different programmes. For the performing arts, the Plan aimed to establish the features 
of each county cultural centre, to support both national and local performing arts 
companies, and to cultivate professionals for cultural institutions (ibid.). This was the 
beginning of governmental subsidy for performing arts companies. 
Once the CCA was established to take charge of formulating cultural policy, its 
minister became the key person in making that policy reflected the country’s agendas. 
In other words, the CCA Minister became the President’s representative in dealing 
with cultural affairs and the Minister’s vision should spring from the policies of the 
current government. This phenomenon became more conspicuous after 1996 when 
Taiwanese people started to elect their President directly.  
In this way, the appointment of the Ministers became a crucial act as he or she 
was tasked with representing the views (Cheng chien, 政見) of the newly elected 
President through the CCA’s cultural policy. The development of cultural policies and 
their subsequent implementation is a process that takes time, but cultural affairs have 
always been comparatively low priority for the Government and Ministers have come 
and gone rapidly. Between 1981 and 2012, the CCA had a total of 14 Ministers; the 
longest term of office was 6 years and 8 months (Chen Chi-lu, the first Minister) and 
the shortest 3 months (2 Ministers). Generally speaking, most Ministers only served 
for 1 to 2 years. This kind of frequent change does not allow any individual Minister 
the time needed to give proper attention to cultural policy formulation or 
implementation, especially when each new Minister is keen to make his or her mark 
by making changes. Lin Fang-yi, a former MOC Officer, described when interviewed 
how during her time working in the CCA/MOC, there were three government changes 
following presidential elections. She commented that the difficulty for her as a civil 
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servant was that every time a new Minister came on board, the main aim of the cultural 
policy changed. Normally, it takes a few years for a cultural policy to process from 
proposal, formation, legislation, implementation to evaluation. However, ‘every four 
years, if the Government changes after an election, the cultural officers know that they 
will have to start again as the new government will not be keen to accept the policy of 
the former government. This is the most appalling thing’ (Lin, interview of 8 June 
2018, translated from Mandarin by the author). In this situation, how can long-term 
cultural policies be carried out?  
From the Committee for Reviving and Promoting Chinese Culture (CRPCC) to  
the General Association of Chinese Culture (GACC) 
Although the CCA was launched in 1981, the once-influential Committee for Reviving 
and Promoting Chinese Culture (CRPCC) continued to exist, albeit from 1990 with a 
new title: the General Association for Reviving and Promoting Chinese Culture. After 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidential election in 2004, the 
name changed again in 2006 and it became the National Association of Culture, with 
the removal of the word ‘Chinese’. The 2008 election was won by the KMT and the 
name was changed for a third time in 2010 to the General Association of Chinese 
Culture (GACC), and ‘Chinese’ returned (GACC, 2015). In 2016, the DPP again won 
the election, but this time the word ‘Chinese’ was retained and the English name of 
the GACC has remained the same until today. Its Chinese name ‘Wen zong’ (文總) is 
not literally reflected by the English name and is best translated as ‘the General 
Association of Culture’. This is one indication of the way the evolution of Taiwanese 
identity is influenced by changes in the ruling political party.  
Although the CRPCC was not a government institution, it played a role in cultural 
policy during Taiwan’s martial law period. However, once Taiwan set out on a 
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progressively democratic path, the influence of the CRPCC (and now GACC) has 
declined. Its position became anomalous when the CCA and then the MOC were 
established. However, it seems that the Government is still reluctant, or possibly too 
timid, to abolish it as it has become a symbolic cultural organisation. It has an 
emblematic political role because by tradition its members are often selected from high 
level government personalities including the President. Indeed, the President of 
Taiwan normally acts as its Honorary President. As a non-governmental organisation, 
the GACC (2019) claims to be funded by donation and sponsorship. However, since 
its key individuals are mostly government officials, it is questionable to what extent 
the principle of arm’s-length distance from the Government operates there. 
The main objectives of the GACC under the KMT government between 2008 and 
2016 were: enhancing Chinese (Zhonghua) culture, supporting local culture, inspiring 
national innovation, strengthening cultural exchange, promoting international 
collaboration, and encouraging cultural and creative industry (GACC, 2015). However, 
when the Government changed to the DPP, its main objectives then became: to 
continue enhancing and extending Taiwan’s cultural power; to continue promoting 
cultural exchange and coordination between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait; and to 
reinforce Taiwan’s cultural exchange with international society. There is no mention 
of anything about Chinese (Zhongua) culture, but instead, the emphasis is on ‘culture 
as the accumulation process of life. We live in the contemporary era facing the past as 
well as creating the future’ (GACC, 2019). Again, the varying foci of different 
governments reflect their points of view on Taiwan’s identity.  
National Culture and Arts Foundation (NCAF) 
In 1996, following the model of the USA’s National Endowment of Arts, Taiwan’s 
National Culture and Arts Foundation (NCAF) was founded with an initial capital of 
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NT$6 billion (￡150 million) remitted by the CCA with additional donations from 
private individuals and groups (NCAF, 2016). The NCAF is another arm’s-length 
body rather than a government organisation but despite this there is strong government 
influence, not least through its funding. The Minister of the CCA in 1996, Kuo Wei-
fan, recalls that the establishment of the NCAF was the fruit of the first National 
Cultural Conference in 1990 with the hope that NT$4 billion (￡100 million) of the 
initial capital of NT$6 billion (￡150 million) would come from donations. This never 
happened. The budget of the NCAF continues to be provided by the CCA which is 
responsible for allocating grants to arts and culture (Kuo, interview of 28 June 2018). 
With the foundation of the NCAF, the concept of cultural autonomy was 
introduced, and the Government now subsidises the arts and culture, not directly, but 
through the NCAF with its professional staff so it remains at arm’s-length from the 
NCAF and the activities that it supports. According to the NCAF (2016), its main 
mission is ‘research and development, grants, awards, and resource development’, and 
each year they provide ‘grants, funding, and other assistance to individuals and non-
profit organisations involved in literature, the visual arts, music, dance, traditional and 
contemporary theatre, cultural heritage preservation, audio/video arts, and arts 
environment and development’.  
Although the NCAF proclaims its independence from the CCA and the MOC, its 
Board of Directors are actually nominated by those government bodies and then 
selected by the Premier of the Executive Yuan (NCAF, 2016). Its funding is almost 
entirely from the Government. This means that the work of the NCAF is in reality 
closely related to government cultural policy, and the NCAF is always staffed by 
people with political awareness, who have a sensitivity for the wishes of government 
and to the priorities of government policy. The result is that the Government is able to 
regulate the NCAF’s work with a comparatively gentle hand but in the knowledge that 
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its policies will be adhered to. The Government holds the purse strings. Nevertheless, 
the establishment of the NCAF remains a significant milestone for Taiwan’s cultural 
policy development in terms of institutional autonomy which then became the 
mainstream in future cultural governance. Because the mission of the NCAF in 
practice overlaps with that of the CCA and the MOC in terms of subsidy, the 
Government is now considering its reconstruction. 
Cultural democracy: the National Cultural Conference and  
the Culture White Paper 
As the main cultural agency at the central government level, the CCA is responsible 
for holding the National Cultural Conference which has the function of building 
consensus, of fostering conversation and gathering ideas about culture from the public. 
This concept was initiated after Taiwan’s democracy and it is the critical forum for 
collecting opinions, setting agendas and deciding future cultural policy (Kuo, 
interview of 6 June 2018). However, over a period of more than 30 years, the CCA has 
only held three National Cultural Conferences (in 1990, 1997 and 2002) and only two 
culture white papers were released by the CCA as a result of the conference 
proceedings (in 1998 and 2004). Wei Chun-yin, one of the Board of Directors of the 
Taiwan Association of Cultural Policy Studies traces back the initiation of the first 
National Cultural Conference and, from the conference documents, it is clear that the 
reason to convoke the meeting was ‘awareness of the rapid change in Taiwanese 
society’. The Government felt that an assembly was needed for brainstorming and to 
discuss its cultural vision. Wei therefore considers that: 
A national cultural conference is a process of explaining cultural policy by 
engaging people, and then proposing the vision of culture. For Taiwan, each 
National Cultural Conference and culture white paper demonstrate that the 
Government is aware of the social, political and economic changes and wants 
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to address them. (Wei, interview of 7 June 2018, translated from Mandarin 
by the author) 
As confirmation of Wei’s comments, the background of the second National 
Conference was to ‘reflect Taiwan’s political transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy which acts as an important indicator to a modern civilised country with 
search for enhancement of the quality of social culture’ (Cultural White Paper, 1998: 
1).  
Jerry Chun-yu Liu, the President of the Taiwan Association of Cultural Policy 
Studies observes that ‘from 2000 to 2004, in pursuing a modern outlook on cultural 
policy, the CCA called for the public to participate actively in cultural activities to 
cultivate cultural creativity and competitiveness’ (Liu, 2014: 127). The preparation 
and process for a National Cultural Conference with many preliminary seminars and 
symposia takes place in different parts of the country in order to create a practical 
demonstration of Taiwan’s cultural democracy which ‘entirely echoes the thoughts 
and aspirations of basic-level cultural workers’ (Cultural White Paper, 2004: 1; Wei, 
interview of 7 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author). Wei Chun-yin also 
explains that all of the regional meetings and forums are important in terms of cultural 
issues as they are occasions where government officials, intellectuals, cultural 
workers, artists and citizens gather together face to face to discuss cultural affairs. 
Nowadays, they even use social media to collect as many and as broad a range of ideas 
as they can. Wei claims that this is an example of a ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’ 
process (Wei, interview of 7 June 2018), which is the approach of cultural democracy.  
In this way, the National Cultural Conference gives everybody the opportunity to 
be engaged in policy setting and to have a say in the outcome of the meeting. This 
culturally democratic procedure is therefore a vital stage in forming the direction of 
cultural policy which is then set out in a culture white paper that presents the 
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Government’s preferences for cultural policy and provides guidance on that policy for 
ministry staff and the public. By doing so it elaborates the Government’s intensions, 
its approach to cultural affairs, and offers a future vision for Taiwan’s culture with 
suggestions and opinions from the Taiwanese people.  
Taiwan’s identity shift  
After martial law was lifted in 1987, the consensus notion of Taiwan as home to a 
variety of populations, both indigenous and immigrant was gradually formed. As later 
generations felt increasingly divorced from the distant Chinese culture, they became 
conscious that indigenous Taiwanese culture was being ignored. Wang Li-jung (2014: 
41) describes how ‘Taiwanese consciousness broke up the monoculture of Taiwan and 
forced the KMT to amend its cultural policy’. As the political climate changed, the 
emphasis of cultural policy shifted from Chinese to Taiwanese, and the mission of the 
CCA changed to focus on the synthesis of Taiwanese cultures, and to celebrate 
Taiwanese multiculturalism (Taiwan duo yuan wen hua, 台灣多元文化). In 2000, 
Taiwan experienced a change of government from the long-ruling KMT to the first 
administration of the DPP. Every aspect of the country’s government changed rapidly 
at this time, including the policies for culture. Tchen Yu-chiou, the DPP’s first Minister 
of Culture (2000-2004), provided a first-hand view of this: ‘the most extraordinary 
aspect of the CCA’s cultural policy direction was from monoculturalism to 
multiculturalism’. This is a very clear statement of the way that ‘Taiwan subjectivity’ 
(Taiwan jhu ti shing, 台灣主體性) which refers to the core concept of focus on 
Taiwan itself became prominent (Tchen, interview of 27 November 2015, translated 
from Mandarin by the author).  
In a similar way, but from a different level of the Government, former MOC 
Officer, Lin Fang-yi observed how, when the ruling government changes, it brings in 
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a different public policy which will then stimulate a shift in Taiwan’s identity. She 
feels that politics decides everything:   
Who is the Government? What does the Government want to achieve? Where 
does the Government allocate budget? Answers to these questions stimulate 
the initiation of projects, plans, discourses, and proposals which would shape 
Taiwan’s identity. (Lin, interview of 8 June 2018, translated from Mandarin 
by the author) 
The change of the political climate was recognised in the two culture white papers 
(1998 & 2004), which strongly influenced subsequent cultural policy development. 
Both talked about the current cultural environment, cultural policies, cultural 
administration, support for the arts and literature, preservation of the cultural heritage, 
regeneration, and cultural exchange, which had all been priorities for the CCA since 
its foundation. But there is a big difference between the two culture white papers. The 
1998 Culture White Paper called for a change in the role of culture from 
authoritarianism to democracy. It emphasised the strong connection between a 
country’s development and its cultural construction by stating ‘culture is the power of 
a country’. It also started to pay attention to cultural diversity, even though it still 
focused on how to shape the new ‘Chinese’ (Zhonghua) culture by including other 
Taiwanese cultures within it (Culture White Paper, 1998). By contrast, the 2004 
Culture White Paper undertook a complete reappraisal of cultural policy. It started by 
reviewing the various cultural structures and policies of different countries and then 
argued for the creation of a new Ministry in Taiwan in which all the agencies and parts 
of agencies from across the Government who were responsible for cultural issues 
would come together under a single Ministry of Culture. It also celebrated Taiwan’s 
cultural diversity and aimed to promote Taiwan as a land with its own culture and 
traditions. It encouraged the evolution of traditional culture in such a way that Taiwan 
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could construct its own cultural identity by adding a Taiwanese perspective to an Asian 
foundation while stressing cultural equality for all citizens. In addition, it proposed the 
promotion of ‘Cultural and Creative Industries’ (Culture White Paper, 2004).  
Tchen Yu-chiou, the Minister of the CCA from 2000 to 2004, who was in charge 
of the 2004 Culture White Paper explains that when she took the position of Minister 
of the CCA in 2000, she believed that the core idea of cultural policy must be the 
establishment of ‘a distinct identity for Taiwan’. In other words, it should contain the 
history of Taiwan as well as continuing the development of Taiwan. Tchen feels that 
before 2000, Chinese culture was taken to be the entirety of cultural spectrum in 
Taiwan. Although she acknowledges that Chinese culture is profound and rich, Tchen 
thinks that the people in Taiwan should not ignore the culture of the place where they 
were born and live. Hence, as the CCA Minister, Tchen declared her ideas on the 
direction of national cultural policy:   
I expanded the focus from an overwhelming Chinese culture to a 
multicultural Taiwan. This multiculturism includes all kinds of Taiwanese 
culture, the recognition of our land, our people and innovation for the future. 
(Tchen, interview of 27 November 2015, translated from Mandarin by the 
author) 
In 2004, the CCA was evidently much more confident about the way cultural matters 
played a role in people’s daily lives, and it assumed that culture is regarded as ‘good’ 
nationwide. The formation of ‘Taiwaneseness’ (Taiwan shing, 台灣性) began when 
democracy started to flower in Taiwan and the country has now generated a distinct 
Taiwanese identity that is different from Chinese identity. Huang Pi-twan, who was 
Minister of the CCA in 2008 and 2009 comments that this is a ‘natural’ development 
led by the local consciousness and awareness of new generations of Taiwanese (Huang, 
interview of 4 December 2015). Between 2004 and 2012, despite the 2008 reversion 
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of the Government from DPP to KMT, the recognition of Taiwaneseness became the 
core concept for cultural policy.  
In Period Two the establishment of the CCA was the most significant cultural 
development. Following the launch of the CCA, more explicit cultural policies were 
introduced and at the same time implicit cultural polices were also initiated by other 
ministries or agencies. The CCA’s ministers became the key figures in formulating 
Taiwan’s cultural policy, especially when there were frequent changes to the ruling 
party. However, because the Ministers of the CCA have also changed frequently, the 
efficiency of cultural policy implementation inevitably became weak. This is perhaps 
a sign that whatever it might say, the Government still sees cultural policy as a 
peripheral, superficial and decorative component of Taiwanese life and gives it low 
priority. Meanwhile the decline of the once-influential GACC signifies not only the 
shift in cultural policy agency but also in political democracy.  
In a more democratic Taiwan, its cultural policy emphasised democratising 
culture as well as initiating cultural democracy. The inauguration of the NCAF 
signified the introduction of cultural autonomy to the language of cultural policy. In 
this period however, the most remarkable feature of cultural policy was the change in 
emphasis from monocultural Chinese identity to a culturally diverse Taiwanese 
identity. As David Throsby (2010: 43) suggests that ‘the value of cultural identity 
contributes to cultural policy objectives via a number of avenues’, Taiwanese identity 
has today become a firm and solid feature of the country’s everyday life and identity 
issues are no longer the focus of cultural policy. They have been superseded by the 
rising concern for cultural democracy and engagement of the public in shaping cultural 
policy. In the context of these changes, Chinese (Zhonghua) culture is now seen as but 




3.3.3 Period Three: The Upgraded MOC (2012-2017) 
Although this is the shortest period, it was significant for the launch of the new 
Ministry of Culture (MOC) which epitomised the more central status of cultural affairs 
in the Government. It also demonstrates that the Government intended to maintain and 
extend the process of democratising culture, but was also trying to achieve cultural 
democracy by involving the public in suggesting and deciding the formation of cultural 
policy. As far as Taiwan’s identity is concerned, Taiwaneseness had become the norm 
within cultural policy.   
The Ministry of Culture (MOC) 
Many countries are keen to promote cultural affairs, to protect their heritage, to support 
the arts, to preserve traditions, and perhaps also to attempt to develop soft power, and 
expand their cultural economy. Taiwan is no exception. Despite its lack of 
international diplomatic recognition, Taiwan works hard to fit into the norms of world 
culture and to embrace international standards by formulating national policies that 
reflect its native culture. Cultural affairs in the democratic Taiwan of modern times 
have become fashionable and are perceived as useful, especially in the context of the 
country’s contested international status. Cultural affairs have become an effective 
component of Taiwan’s national branding as it promotes itself internationally.  
After long years of discussion, lobbying by the CCA, research into many kinds 
of ministries of culture worldwide (as presented in the culture white paper of 2004), 
and pressure from arts and cultural communities, the CCA was finally upgraded in 
2012 to form Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture (MOC). It became a Cabinet-level 
government body. Between 2006 and 2008 there was a plan to create a Ministry to 
cover both Culture and Tourism, but the Government eventually decided instead to 
establish the Ministry of Culture without responsibility for tourism because some 
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artists insisted that culture and tourism are different and should not be combined. The 
Tourism Bureau remained under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications 
(Liberty Times, 2008). With the creation of the new MOC, agencies and parts of 
agencies from across the Government with responsibility for cultural issues were 
brought together. These included the management of four museums and the National 
Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (NCKSCC) from the Ministry of Education (MOE); 
publication, popular music, radio, television and film from the Government 
Information Office (GIO); and government publication from the Research, 
Development and Evaluation Commission (MOC, 2014).  
The first Minister was the famous writer Lung Ying-tai who had also been the 
last Minister of the CCA. According to the Ministry of Culture Organisation Law,14 
the Ministry of Culture’s overall task is ‘to plan, coordinate, process and evaluate 
cultural affairs, to enhance the multicultural values of Taiwan, and to enrich its 
spiritual life’ (MOC, 2015). Its seven departments are dedicated to: general policy 
planning; the fostering of international cultural exchanges and the development of the 
arts; the publishing industry; the cultural and creative industries; cultural resources; 
                                                          
14 The functions of the Ministry as listed in Ministry of Culture Organisation Law include: 1) 
Research, planning and execution of cultural policy. 2) Setting in motion, overseeing, 
managing, supporting, rewarding and otherwise promoting cultural construction. 3) Planning, 
supporting, rewarding and promoting the preservation of cultural assets, establishment of 
museums and development of communities. 4) Planning, supporting, rewarding and promoting 
the cultural and creative industries. 5) Planning, supporting, rewarding and promoting the film, 
broadcast, television and pop music industries. 6) Planning, supporting, rewarding and 
promoting literature, publishing, government publications and varied forms of culture. 7) 
Planning, supporting, rewarding and promoting the visual, public, and performing arts as well 
as the art of living. 8) Planning, supporting, rewarding and promoting international and cross-
strait cultural exchanges. 9) Planning, supporting, rewarding and promoting the cultivation of 




and film, television and popular music (MOC, 2016). Inevitably, the MOC’s cultural 
polices are very clearly ‘explicit’.  
Nevertheless, Taiwanese cultural study scholar, Wang Li-jung (2014: 49) points 
out that there are still other Cabinet-level government bodies that deal with cultural 
policies such as the Council of Indigenous People, the Hakka Affairs Council, and the 
Ministry of Labour which all implicitly participate in the development of cultural 
policy in Taiwan in respect of the ethnic groups. The National Immigration Agency of 
the Ministry of the Interior also plays a role in cultural issues for new immigrants. This 
corroborates David Throsby’s (2010) observation that nowadays a range of 
government departments are likely to be involved with cultural policy. Nevertheless, 
the Ministry of Culture is the main body with explicit responsibility for cultural policy 
and affairs in Taiwan. The Ministry’s six main areas of work include: arts & 
humanities, creative industries, cultural heritage, communities, cultural exchanges and 
digital-culture (MOC, 2015).15 The range spans from traditional high culture and 
heritage, to community and popular culture. More recently, it has also taken on digital 
culture, although the MOC does not give details. The content of ‘culture’ has changed 
dramatically under the influence of global trends. 
The creation of the MOC meant that the country’s cultural policy would be 
systematically and progressively made and implemented. However, up to 2017 this 
young Ministry has already had three ministers. After her inauguration, Lung Yin-tai 
(2012) gave interviews with Radio Taiwan International and other media in which she 
                                                          
15 The official areas of the Ministry’s responsibilities are categorised as follows: 1) Arts & 
humanities—performing arts, visual arts, public art, and literature. 2) Creative industries— 
crafts, film, broadcasting & television, pop music, and publishing. 3) Cultural heritages— 
heritage preservation, national memories, and museums. 4) Communities—living art centres, 
local community museums, and community empowerment. 5) Cultural exchanges—cross-
strait exchanges, and international exchanges. 6) Digital-culture (MOC, 2015). 
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emphasised that as the first Minister of Culture her main mission was to decide the 
long-term plan for national cultural development. She was clear that this plan would 
not solely relate to her four-year term. Lung resigned on 7 December 2014 after only 
2 years and 7 months in office. What has happened to cultural policy since she stepped 
down? In January 2015 the Government appointed Hung Meng-chi as the new Minister 
and his term lasted only a little over a year. In the circumstances, little is likely to 
happen to progress cultural policy in the near future and this creates a period of 
stagnation which also extends to the Ministry of Culture itself. Former MOC officer, 
Lin Fang-yi spoke at interview about the frustration and inefficiency that this creates 
and feels that there is an urgent need for the Government to appoint a Minister who 
will be in post long enough to stabilise the administration and continue with steady 
development of the existing long-term policy (Lin, interview of 8 June 2018). 
Regarding the cultural agencies, nowadays, although the MOC is the main 
government department in charge of cultural affairs, the GACC still exists and is 
sometimes very active. There is considerable confusion here because most of the 
GACC’s objectives overlap with what the MOC is charged to do and also because 
money allocated to the GACC may cause the Ministry of Culture’s budget to be 
reduced. According to Geng Yi-wei, Assistant Professor of the Taipei National 
University of Arts: 
It really depends on how much the GACC would like to achieve with their 
objectives. The President of Taiwan is still the President of the GACC. That 
is to say, any national policy advocated by the President can be immediately 
apply to the GACC. The very recent New Southbound Policy16 would be an 
                                                          
16 According to Taiwan’s Executive Yuan (2019), ‘the New Southbound Policy is a major 
element in Taiwan’s external economic strategy that calls for developing comprehensive, 
mutually beneficial relations with countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and 
South Asia, Australia and New Zealand. This policy by pursuing bilateral exchange and 
cooperation in several areas’. 
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example of this. (Geng, interview of 8 June 2018, translated from Mandarin 
by the author)  
Yet another quasi-government body, the NCAF aims to create a healthier environment 
in Taiwan for the development of culture and the arts (NCAF, 2015) by giving 
financial support to individuals and companies in the artistic and cultural fields. This 
also overlaps with what the Ministry of Culture (MOC) is doing as both of them 
directly subsidise cultural projects or organisations. Since the MOC was established 
and given responsibility for new media such as film, television, broadcast, pop music 
and publication, and also new institutions such as museums, as well as the performing 
arts centre, it is essential for it to rationalise responsibilities between itself and the 
other existing national cultural organisations, especially the NCAF. Cheng Li-chun, 
the current Cultural Minister, has paid attention to this issue and has been trying to sort 
out the allocation of subsidies between the MOC and the NCAF. Eventually, ‘the plan 
is for the MOC to focus on cultural policy-making while the NCAF takes charge of 
subsidy’ (Geng, interview of 8 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author). 
Cultural democracy 
Cultural policy during the CCA period started to ensure that everyone would have 
access to cultural and arts activities as a hallmark of cultural democratisation. After 
the MOC was established, the concept of cultural democracy began to be disseminated 
more widely. Lung Ying-tai, the first Minister of the MOC (2012 to 2014), proposed 
cultural policy objectives with four main aims, the first of which was ‘ensuring the 
cultural rights of citizens’. This was a clear move towards cultural democracy in line 
with the MOC’s (2015) statement that: 
Cultural rights, like political, economic and social rights, are basic human 
rights to be enjoyed by every citizen. Administering and allocating resources 
to the cultural sector therefore requires paying attention to ensuring that 
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grassroots organisations and disadvantaged groups are catered for. It also 
requires that resources be divided fairly between urban and rural areas. All 
citizens must be empowered to participate in the cultural life of the nation, as 
inclusion is what creates bonds within communities, society and the nation at 
large. While cultural rights are the property of every citizen, society and the 
nation as a whole become the beneficiaries, as social cohesion is founded on 
having citizens engaged in their country’s cultural life. (MOC, 2015) 
    Lung’s well-publicised four core cultural policy aims gradually introduced the 
concept of cultural democracy across the country as she aimed to ‘to ensure that every 
village and township in this nation, regardless of its geographic remoteness, has an 
equal chance to achieve its full cultural potential’ and ‘to offer the nation’s citizens 
equal accessibility to cultural resources by harnessing the power of cloud computing’ 
(MOC, 2015). In order to achieve the first of these aims, the MOC claims:  
The Ministry will strive to attain the goals through its grassroots policies—
i.e. to assist communities in remote areas with creating a vibrant cultural and 
creative environment tailored to their needs. By evenly distributing financial 
and educational resources among cities, villages and offshore settlements, the 
Ministry hopes to secure equal cultural rights for every citizen in the nation’s 
7,835 registered communities. (MOC, 2015) 
Cheng Li-chiun, the current Minister’s aim to ‘cultivate and enhance cultural strength 
and promote cultural participation’ (MOC, 2016) delivers a similar concept to Lung’s. 
The ideas of the two MOC Ministers demonstrates Taiwanese cultural policy’s shift 
from cultural democratisation towards cultural democracy.  
Broad direction of cultural policy  
The visions and intentions of the MOC tend to be idealistic in setting the international 
standards of democratic states as the ambition of the ministry. The cultural policy 
statements of each Minister along with their associated slogans, missions, objectives, 
and goals look good and are politically correct in trying to attract the attention of the 
138 
 
public but, as with other government references to cultural policy, they are commonly 
set out in a broad and inclusive direction. As Lin Hwai-min, the founder of Cloud Gate 
Dance Theatre of Taiwan observes, when policies are set out in such non-specific 
terms the positive feature is that they do not tie the hands of creative artists, but the 
danger is that ‘many of the clauses in the policy end up by being vacuous rather than 
specifying particular action’ (Lin, interview of 6 May 2016, translated from Mandarin 
by the author). In the same way, former MOC officer, Lin Fang-yi, comments that the 
MOC’s proposed cultural policies look great on paper, but ‘when the content is 
examined in detail, there can be no clues about what those cultural policies want to 
carry out and how they intend to do it’ (Lin, interview of 8 June 2018, translated from 
Mandarin by the author). 
Is it inevitable for cultural policies to be so broadly worded that constructing 
detailed strategies is difficult? According to Jeremy Ahearne (2009: 141), ‘Philippe 
Urflino (2004: 309-393) contrasts the “duty” of contemporary ministers of culture to 
be “grandiloquent” with the meagre and banal reality of their administrative functions’. 
Although ministers’ intentions are probably sincere, this criticism seems to echo the 
comments above in Taiwan’s MOC. However, this thought may be too cynical and 
Wu Jing-jyi, NCKSCC Chairman (2006-2007) and consultant to many cultural 
agencies in Taiwan, is of the opinion that cultural policy at the national level has 
always to be general in its direction and to be set out in basic terms such as ‘enhancing 
people’s cultural life’, ‘developing artistic activities’, ‘supporting local talents’ or 
‘promoting international cultural exchange’. Wu continues: 
Cultural policy is therefore in essence meant to be fundamental and elemental. 
National cultural policy makers do not in practice have the knowledge to spell 
out all the details of policy implementation and it is not the responsibility of 
the Government to give details of cultural policy implementation. That should 
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be left to professionals. (Wu, interview of 3 December 2015, translated from 
Mandarin by the author) 
Jung Shu-hwa, Assistant Professor of the Taipei National University of Arts, agrees 
that cultural policy can only be directional and the more important issues are the 
financial and practical means to carry these policies out by those cultural organisations 
which bear the responsibility of implementing cultural policy. Jung believes that 
creating a better condition and environment for arts troupes is more important (Jung, 
interview of 11 June 2018). 
In a democratic country where the trend is for decentralisation and cultural 
autonomy, less state intervention allows for greater freedom for culture and the arts. 
When the main cultural objectives follow global agendas and deal with universal 
values, slogan-like cultural policies can only provide hints of the main direction for 
development. The significant thing is how the organisations and agencies that 
implement cultural policy are allocated a budget for their work and how they respond 
to cultural policy directions. This is especially important where culture and the arts 
are heavily supported by state sponsorship. Policies may well be presented in a vague 
and grandiloquent manner, but the important issue is how these broad-direction 
cultural policies can be implemented in a sustainable and accountable way to fulfil 
their objectives. Allocation of a large enough budget for the arts and culture, with a 
fair method of distribution is the compelling issue.  
Taiwanese identity 
The formation of the new Ministry of Culture in 2012 initiated a completely new era 
for Taiwan’s cultural development. From the MOC’s 2015 cultural policy document, 
its embrace of the global trend of cultural policy was obvious. Cultural rights, cultural 
democracy, support for artists, and the interest in creative industries were all central 
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features. This also corresponds to Taiwan’s enthusiasm to be recognised as a player 
on the world stage by grasping globalisation as a Taiwanese identity strategy (as 
discussed in Section 2.3.3 in Chapter 2).  
Ever since Taiwan’s political democratisation, the shift of identity to 
‘Taiwaneseness’ (Taiwan shing, 台灣性) has found a firm place in society. Taiwanese 
identity has put down solid roots and the MOC’s agendas have moved on from that 
issue to become focused on the wider global perspective. Although the first MOC 
Minister, Lung Yin-tai was appointed by the KMT government, this seems not to have 
constrained the recognition and celebration of Taiwaneseness by her Ministry. After 
she stepped down in December 2014, her deputy, Hung Meng-chi succeeded her for 
the transitional period before the next presidential election in 2016 and Hung’s policy 
direction has basically followed that of Lung. For the first four years, with two 
Ministers of Culture and under a KMT government, the Ministry of Culture promoted 
a very Taiwanese, and yet also international, blueprint for culture. In order to gain 
consensus among the Taiwanese people, the KMT politicians and government have 
had to accept the overall shift of Taiwanese identity and to sign up to the idea of 
‘Taiwan subjectivity’ (Taiwan jhu ti shing, 台灣主體性). 
In 2016, the Government changed once more from the KMT to DPP and Cheng 
Li-chiun, assumed the position of Minister of Culture in May of that year. Although a 
different party now formed the Government, the essential spirit of democracy and 
citizenship and the pursuit of Taiwanese identity remained the same. There is no doubt 
that a specifically Taiwanese identity has become the norm in Taiwan’s daily cultural 
life. Wei Chun-yin, one of the Board of Directors of the Taiwan Association of 
Cultural Policy Studies who was involved in the 2017 National Cultural Conference 
recalls that it was natural for the focus of cultural policy to be on Taiwan itself during 
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the Conference. ‘That is to say, it was all about this country, this land and the people 
of Taiwan’ (Wei, interview of 7 June 2017, translated from Mandarin by the author). 
Period three has only recently begun since the establishment of the MOC in 2012. 
This means that it is still an era of hopeful expectation rather than one of achievement. 
It is clear, however, that no matter what political changes may occur, concepts of 
cultural policy have reached a steady state and are now unlikely to be substantially 
changed by politicians. Taiwan has now developed a Taiwan-based identity and the 
way that culture is defined is expanding. International cultural exchange has become 
important while community work continues. 
The evidence for this can be seen in all three culture white papers (1998, 2004, 
2018) which have all devoted many chapters to emphasising the importance of local 
communities as well as international society. Taiwanese culture is trying hard to obtain 
international recognition as it increases in confidence, while Taiwan seeks to 
strengthen its identity through local Taiwanese support. The emphasis on local identity 
has coincided with the rise of cultural democracy which pays great attention to local 
communities and their access to and participation in culture. The objectives of cultural 
policy may look splendid, ideal, visionary and correct on paper, but the focus and aims 
are now on how to make them a reality.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter started with a literature review on cultural policy exploring how cultural 
policy is defined as well as the domain of cultural policy. Following the broad-based 
concept of culture, the realm of contemporary cultural policy is regularly being 
extended to new areas of activity such as the hi-tech industries. But it inevitably 
maintains its traditional core of the high arts which always attract special attention 
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within sphere of arts patronage. Jeremy Ahearne observes that there are clear links 
between culture and political power and that in order to gain legitimacy a government 
must institute a cultural policy (Ahearne, 2009: 143) and this view corresponds closely 
to the way in which Taiwan’s culture policy has developed through different 
government regimes since 1949.  
This chapter also demonstrates the roles of democratising culture and cultural 
democracy in the development of Taiwan’s cultural policy. The effect of making the 
arts and culture accessible and available to the public is not exclusive to politically 
democratic regimes, but it is a crucial concept for the democratic Taiwan of today. 
Following its international strategy of being seen to embrace global democratic values, 
Taiwan has fostered cultural democracy by stressing public participation and creative 
pursuits in cultural life. In addition, it emphasises that one of its significant cultural 
policy objectives is to promote national identity and branding, and this then connects 
the evolution of Taiwanese identity with the development of cultural policy. The 
distinction between explicit and implicit cultural policies then offers an approach to 
investigate the domain of cultural policy, which acknowledges that while some 
government ministries have an overt role in setting explicit cultural policies, other 
government organisations that are not specifically responsible for cultural affairs may 
also have influential roles in cultural policy making. 
These concepts then formed an approach through which to examine the 
development of Taiwan’s cultural policy in terms of its formulation, mechanism, 
composition, agencies and delivery from 1949 to 2017, the period during which 
Taiwan transformed from authoritarianism to democracy. Three phases of this period 
have been identified according to the way in which the Government set up its agencies 
of cultural policy. Between 1949 and 1981 the KMT’s committees dominated the 
country’s cultural affairs with both explicit as well as implicit cultural policies. The 
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1981 launch of the Council of Cultural Affairs and its subsequent upgrade to become 
the Ministry of Culture in 2012 are evidence of the Government’s increasing emphasis 
on cultural affairs. With the initiation of the modern Ministry of Culture in Taiwan, 
most of the Government agencies responsible for cultural affairs have, at least in theory, 
now been brought together under a single Ministry. The question now is how that 
Ministry can make sure that other Ministries in the central government, as well as local 
cultural bureaux, follow the national cultural policies that it has set. Contemporary 
cultural policy in Taiwan tends to be set out in broad and comprehensive terms that 
offer the space and autonomy for cultural institutions supervised by the MOC to put 
their objectives into practice under national cultural policy. 
Research shows that political change has influenced the shift in Taiwanese 
identity as well as the development of its cultural policy. Political democracy has 
promoted cultural democracy in the making of cultural policy so that today the mission 
of the MOC is to create equal cultural rights for everyone with the expectation that all 
other Ministries will act to promote MOC policies. Originally, cultural policy was put 
into practice by coercion and censorship while today the Government promotes 
liberalism and freedom. The original KMT policy was to defend the supremacy and 
homogeneity of the ‘great Chinese culture’, while today Taiwan acknowledges its 
cultural diversity and respects minority Taiwanese groups. There has been a 
comprehensive cultural shift in Taiwan from monocultural Chinese to multicultural 
Taiwanese, corresponding to the change of Taiwanese identity under different 
government regimes. This has been a clear demonstration of the interconnection 




Chapter 4: The Performing Arts and Performing Arts 
Centres (PAC) in Taiwan 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter exemplifies how the performing arts can play a significant part in a 
people’s national cultural life. They provide entertainment but at the same time they 
act as a mirror of the cultural state of the nation, and in developing that cultural identity, 
arts policy has a core role to play. Implementation of cultural policy is primarily 
through financial support of chosen activities by grants so, with its programme of 
events, a performing arts centre (PAC) is a venue where artists and companies are able 
to present their creative thoughts to the public, while at the same time passing on the 
messages that their funding organisations are keen to express. And of course, the 
preferences of the potential audience also have an influence on programming.  
    Michael Billig makes a good point in his ‘Banal Nationalism’ when he says that 
we are constantly but unwittingly prompted about our national identity as we lead our 
everyday lives by the ‘flagging’ signs we see around us (Billig, 1995). Institutions 
have a significant role in this and PACs are no exception because they unconsciously 
remind us of the nation we belong to through what they programme and the way they 
present their shows. It is not necessary to play the national anthem or wave a national 
flag for us to be reminded of our nationality when attending a state-owned PAC event, 
even if the PAC is not directly part of the government machine. Because of this, a 
country’s identity, cultural policy and institutional autonomy are all significant factors 
in the life of a performing arts centre.  
Taking these themes, this chapter looks at the context of the performing arts from 
the theoretical point of view with an investigation of definitions, and it then discusses 
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the evolution and development of performing arts centres in Taiwan. Its main focus is 
on the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (NCKSCC), later the National 
Performing Arts Centre (NPAC).  
In carrying out this research, it has been a privilege to interview all the eight 
surviving Directors and Artistic Directors of the NCKSCC between its opening in 1987 
and 2017, as well as the first directors of the two new centres of the NPAC. In addition, 
three of the NCKSCC’s Chairmen and two Executive Secretaries of its Board as well 
as two Programme Managers have been interviewed to give a unique insight into this 
PAC from the point of view of its management and programming, as well as its 
relationship with government ministers and their policy. Three of the NCKSCC’s 
Chairmen and Artistic Directors who agreed to be interviewed also served as Ministers 
of the Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) and were thus able to offer penetrating 
opinions from different angles (see the Appendix 1 on p. 320-322 for the list of 
interviewees).  
This chapter looks at the development of the performing arts in Taiwan, including 
government performing arts policy and the role of performing arts centres, to show 
how Taiwanese identity has transformed in parallel with changes in the political 
climate (see Chapter 2) and cultural development (see Chapter 3). It will also explore 
the organisation and governance of the NCKSCC to see how it acts as an arm’s-length 
independent administrative corporation with cultural autonomy. This leads to an 
examination of whether the Government’s cultural policy has had an influence on the 
work of the NCKSCC, in particular its programming. Finally, it investigates the 
establishment of the NPAC and the Centre’s current situation. It concludes by 
analysing the relationship between the Ministry of Culture and the NPAC and the 




4.2 The Performing Arts and Its Development in Taiwan 
4.2.1 The Definitions of the Performing Arts  
In his renowned series of books Stage By Stage, the writer and theatre historian, Philip 
Freund (2005) illustrates the origins of theatre and of the performing arts in general. 
He traces them back to antiquity from their beginnings in Egyptian and Greek mystical 
cult culture, as well as in other ancient civilizations in the Middle East, India, China 
and South America (Aztec and Inca). In Freund’s view, the history of theatre and the 
performing arts shows an evolution from the primitive rituals and enactments of myths 
of ancient times to today’s contemporary theatre (Freund, 2005: 29-39). A common 
feature of human cultures throughout history has been ritual, and ritual can be seen as 
the original foundation of the performing arts. The performance theorist and theatre 
director Richard Schechner, writes: 
Rituals are collective memories encoded into actions... ritual is also a way for 
people to connect to a collective, to remember or construct a mythic past, to 
build social solidarity and to form or maintain a community. (Schechner, 
2006: 87) 
Schechner cites examples such as kabuki, kathakali, ballet, and the dance-drama of 
indigenous Australians to support his assertion. Even today, ritual elements of events 
or ceremonies can become part of theatre works or performing arts and the sacred 
Balinese Wali dances, church choirs, Taiwanese indigenous ritualised dance or 
Taiwanese opera, are good examples of this. The performing arts may have originated 
in and been influenced by ritual in ancient cultures, but even today, those rituals still 
play a central role in cultural life and therefore cultural identity as the way for people 




From this ancient origin in ritual and cult, the performing arts have, through a long 
process of development, evolved into an ever-widening range of forms that we 
experience today as ‘entertainment’ performed in front of an audience. Thus, the term 
‘performing arts’ refers to all those forms of art in which artists use themselves as the 
medium to convey their thoughts and emotions. UNESCO (2019) attempts to define 
the range of the term as follows: 
The performing arts range from vocal and instrumental music, dance and 
theatre to pantomime, sung verse and beyond. They include numerous 
cultural expressions that reflect human creativity and that are also found, to 
some extent, in many other intangible cultural heritage domains. 
That definition covers what is generally understood to be the majority of the 
performing arts. However, recent times have seen a great diversification of what 
UNESCO calls ‘cultural expressions’ as increasing changes in the nature of 
performance have been explored and exploited by artists. This unstable situation, 
along with increased academic interest, has spawned other related terms such as 
‘performative’, ‘performativity’, ‘performance arts’ and ‘performance theatre’ as 
people have attempted to disentangle the various genres and to create definitions 
that distinguish one kind of event from another. Such a variety of terms can make 
for confusion when talking about the arts since they are often used in different 
ways by different authors.  
    As a response, Richard Schechner has tried to bring order to the confusion of 
terms and to elucidate the concept of performance. He considers that ‘to perform 
can be understood in relation to: Being, Doing, Showing doing, and Explaining’ 
(Schechner, 2006: 28). In this sense, performance is a very broad idea which can 
be related to all kinds of everyday activity, and the performing arts belong to a 
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family of art forms. To take another view, the theatre specialist Marvin Carlson 
(2004: 71) writes that ‘involving the display of skills’ covers what we generally 
regard as the performing arts today, such as theatre, dance, concerts and the like. 
However, he also explains that during the 1970s and 1980s, with the enormous 
development of new performance types, ‘so complex and various has been such 
activity and so popular has it proven with the public and the media, that its very 
ubiquity and popularity have made it difficult to define’ (Carlson, 2004: 110). 
    Traditionally, theatre, dance and music are normally referred to as the 
‘performing arts’. But, as Schechner and Carlson explain, the term ‘performance 
art’ has been introduced to cover a wider range of events than the traditional genres. 
With their long history and tradition, theatre, music and dance always comprise 
the core genres of performance art, but performance is not limited to these genres, 
and at a time when experimentation is frequent, performance art has become a 
very varied phenomenon in its manifestation (ibid.). The designation 
‘performance art’ now includes new approaches to the visual arts, live arts, 
conceptual art, body arts, and contemporary dance17. Not surprisingly, in a rapidly 
changing world the terminology of the various kinds of performance art is still 
controversial and there is little agreement on precise definitions while new 
techniques and kinds of performance continuously appear.  
The lack of agreement on defining and distinguishing the categories of 
performance arts gives rise to confusion when doing research particularly into 
theatre, dance and music because it is not always clear what definitions authors 
                                                          
17 The term ‘conceptual art’ was introduced by Marvin Carlson (2004: 111) who defined the 
conceptual artist as ‘one who selects material or experience for aesthetic consideration rather 
than forming something from the traditional raw materials of arts’. Another term ‘live art’ was 
introduced in 1994 by the Arts Council of Great Britain and seems to have been coined in an 
attempt to bring together an increasing number of forms of modern performance art such as 
installations with live performance, site-specific performance and body art. 
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are using. Part of the reason for this is that there are now more, and more varied, 
cross-border, and multidisciplinary art forms coming under the blanket terms of 
theatre, dance or music. One example of work which is hard to categorise is that 
of the Belgian multidisciplinary artist Jan Fabre, who is playwright, stage director, 
choreographer, visual artist, and designer.      
Taking a pragmatic view, since creativity and freedom are crucial factors in 
all artistic activities, including the performing arts; it may be foolish to attempt to 
generate precise definitions which separate different art forms at a time of constant 
change. The performing arts keep changing and innovating in form and style so 
any literature, study, and research on it must follow the way in which art 
continuously shifts, challenges and converts traditional theory. Nevertheless, in 
order to make things distinct and focused in what follows, the term ‘performance 
art’ is used to refer to the broadest spectrum of performed activities, while 
‘performing arts’ is limited to the kind of activity that is performed in a traditional-
style venue such as Taiwan’s National Performing Arts Centre. 
The situation in Taiwan 
In Taiwan, the Chinese term ‘Biao yen yi shu’(表演藝術) was introduced from the 
Western world to mean ‘performing arts’. Specifically, it refers to the traditional 
concept of theatre, dance and music, and by extension to any kind of performing art so 
long as it is presented and performed on stage, site or venue.  
    According to the Performing Art Group’s Development Foster Plan (2016) 
prepared by Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture (MOC), one of its aims is to ‘ensure the 
performing arts have a long-term stable development’. The performing arts companies 
indicated in the plan present ‘music, dance, traditional theatre and contemporary 
theatre’ (MOC, 2016). In this way, the commonly accepted idea of ‘Biao yen yi shu’ 
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(performing arts) in Taiwan is based on the traditional concept of Western performing 
arts but with the addition of traditional Chinese/Taiwanese theatre forms. This concept 
of ‘Biao yen yi shu’ (performing arts) is widely used by government as well as in 
general cultural discourse in both Taiwan and the broader Chinese-speaking world. 
For example, there are performing arts divisions in government culture departments, 
performing arts departments in universities, and performing arts centres. Once 
activities are organised into categories in this way, it is easier for the Government to 
give grants and subsidies. By contrast, in Taiwan ‘performance arts’, are termed 
‘Hsing wei yi shu’ (行為藝術) which is different from ‘performing arts’ (Biao yen yi 
shu). The distinction is slightly different from that suggested by Western theory, but 
the semantic confusion in English referred to above does not occur in Taiwan. To 
combine the review of the literature on ‘performance arts/performing arts’ and 
Taiwan’s ‘Biao yen yi shu’ (performing arts), the definition of ‘performing arts’ in this 
thesis will be restricted to the concept of theatre (contemporary and traditional), dance 
and music, and by extension to any new kind of performing art so long as it is presented 
on stage/site/venue.  
 
4.2.2 The Development of the Performing Arts 
In an interview with Taiwan’s Central News Agency in 2018, Lin Hwai-min, the 
founder of the iconic Taiwanese contemporary dance company, Cloud Gate Dance 
Theatre of Taiwan, talked about the development of Taiwan’s performing arts over the 
course of his career: 
The performing arts are not just a one-evening show. They are the 
accumulation of the core features of Taiwanese society; they are the 
aggregation of the feelings of Taiwanese people, and they follow the way in 
which people look at things differently generation by generation. 
Achievements, attainments and succession do not emerge out of the void but 
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are a sequence of concatenation and evolvement. (Lin, interview of 2018 by 
the Central News Agency) 
This emphasises that the performing arts are a core part of Taiwanese culture, and that 
they have developed throughout Taiwan’s complex history. As discussed in Chapter 
2, Taiwan today has developed a hybrid culture. The original culture of the indigenous 
people has been comprehensively altered by the effects of immigrant cultures: the 
arrival of early Han Chinese, the short stay of the Dutch and Spanish, Japanese 
colonisation, the influx of mainland Chinese and the recent immigration from south-
east Asia. All these influences have merged to provide the different faces of Taiwan’s 
performing arts under different government regimes with different cultural identities.  
    In addition, cultural policy and the way in which it is formulated plays an 
important part in cultural development, as discussed in Chapter 3. The influence of 
politicians on the development of the performing arts in Taiwan is, in the main, to 
provide finance and to oversee the provision of suitable venues in which their policy 
aims can be brought about. This section will examine Taiwan’s performing arts 
development through a time of shifting Taiwanese identity and cultural policy focusing 
on the development of the traditional genres of performing arts: theatre, dance and 
music.   
 
4.2.2.1 The Performing Arts and Taiwanese Identity  
Traditional Taiwanese performing art forms existed long before that term was 
introduced. According to the Taiwanese historian of theatre Lin He-yi, there were 
historical domestic performing art genres such as ‘Taiwanese opera’ (Ko tsai hsi, 歌
仔戲), puppetry (Bu dai hsi, 布袋戲), Nan guan (南管) and Pei guan (北管) music 
bands which served along with other forms of entertainment and religion, to provide a 
foundation for Taiwanese cultural life (Lin, 2017: 18-22). At the same time, the rituals 
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of indigenous and Han Taiwanese were also important components of daily life (Lin, 
2017: 54-57).  
Japanese Colonial and Western influence 
The modern approach to the performing arts was introduced to Taiwan during the 
Japanese colonial period. The Taiwanese theatre theorist and writer, Ma Sen (2010) 
comments that the modern theatre of Taiwan, China and Japan were all transplanted 
from western theatre. Japan was the earliest recipient of western art forms during its 
Meiji Restoration in the late nineteenth century when western-style realist theatre was 
introduced. China followed in the early twentieth century. Western theatre appeared in 
Shanghai where plays were performed by students of church schools, and Chinese 
students returning from Japan brought new art forms with them. Eventually, western 
theatre found its way to Taiwan which, as a Japanese colony, was inevitably affected 
by the trend of westernisation spreading throughout Japan (Ma, 2010: 5). Nevertheless, 
since it shares a cultural background with China, Taiwan has also been strongly 
influenced by Chinese ideas.  
    Theatre theorist Chiu Kun-liang, a former Chairman of the National Chiang Kai-
shek Cultural Centre (2004-2006) and Minister of Taiwan’s Council of Cultural 
Affairs (2006-2007), explains that when modern theatre was introduced to Taiwan in 
the 1920s during the Japanese colonial period, it became one of many elements of a 
theatre spectrum in Taiwan which influenced traditional Taiwanese theatre (Chiu, 
1997: 14). Through the introduction of a western education system to Taiwan by the 
Japanese colonial government, contemporary disciplines such as modern dance and 
classical music were taught in schools (Lin, 2017: 142-143).  
    The dancer and choreographer Tsai Jui-yueh (1921-2005), one of the pioneers of 
Taiwanese contemporary dance, was born in Japanese colonial Taiwan and studied 
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dance in Japan. Tsai’s 1946 work Song of India is believed to be the first contemporary 
Taiwanese dance piece (Encyclopedia of Taiwan, 2016). Many talented Taiwanese 
music students were encouraged to study western classical music in Japan at this time 
and they then became the first generation of Taiwanese classical musicians. One of 
them was Chiang Wen-yeh (1910-1983) who was the first Taiwanese composer to gain 
an international reputation and whose works established the new face of Taiwanese 
music (Taiwan Music Institute, 2016).  
Thus, although the seeds of the western style contemporary performing arts were 
planted in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period, the national identity of those 
artists at that time could be said to be Japanese because of their training (Chiu, 2019: 
40). One reason why Taiwanese intellectuals partly endorsed the Japanese colonial 
government is because of their eagerness for modern western civilisation (Chen, 2006: 
157-216). However, in reality, these artists had a Taiwanese cultural background 
which was overlaid by their Japanese training and this meant that the work they created 
had influences from both Japan and Taiwan. Their work was clearly Japanese-
influenced, but was distinctly different from purely Japanese work created in mainland 
Japan. The performing art works created by this generation of Taiwanese artists were 
the beginnings of a new, specifically Taiwanese genre of contemporary performing 
arts.  
Chinese identity imposed and reformed 
According to Chiu Kun-liang, another critical period for Taiwanese performing arts 
occurred after World War Two when Japan lost the war (Chiu, 2019: 40), Taiwan 
ceased to be a colony and returned to the Republic of China (ROC). The subsequent 
evolution of Taiwan’s performing arts forms the basis of the research in this thesis. 
Both Ma and Chiu describe the period between 1945 and 1949 as a short era of ‘open 
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and lively’ theatre creation (Ma, 2010: 15-18; Chiu, 1997: 14). Becoming a province 
of the ROC and switching its national language from Japanese to Mandarin 
transformed Taiwan’s cultural identity while the introduction of left-wing ideology 
also had great impact that resulted in the development of a flourishing performing arts 
scene (ibid.).  
However, in 1949 the nationalist Chinese government (KMT) lost the civil war 
to the communists and transferred to Taiwan, along with more than one million 
mainland Chinese. With this shift in the balance of the population, there was also a 
rapid shift in national identity as well as the dominant culture and the social hierarchy. 
Local Taiwanese artists were at the sharp end of these changes, especially those whose 
natural mode of expression was still Japanese. Anybody who created their work in 
Japanese was now suspected of being against the new regime and was under huge 
pressure to fit in with the new ways (Chiu, 2019: 40-41). Taiwanese theatre scholar 
Geng Yi-wei explains that at this time cultural identity in Taiwan was very much led 
by the ‘state apparatus’, in which language policy was an influential component (Geng, 
interview of 8 June 2018). 
As discussed in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3, everything changed after 1949 when 
martial law was implemented. Freedom of creativity was curtailed, censorship was 
introduced and scripts for theatre, film, TV, song lyrics, books and indeed everything 
related to ‘free speech’ was generally restricted. A traditional Chinese cultural identity 
was forced on Taiwan and Taiwanese people, and ‘this priority underpinned the 
KMT’s direction in cultural policy—“sino-lisation”—from 1949 to 1971’ (Wang, 2014: 
36). The Chinese arts forms promoted by the KMT were entitled ‘national’ and the 
Committee for Reviving and Promoting Chinese Culture was founded in 1967 to 
launch a ‘Chinese Culture Renaissance Movement in order to resist the Cultural 
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Revolution in mainland China’ (Wang, 2014: 37). From that date, Chinese culture and 
mainland Chinese artists took the dominant roles in Taiwan’s arts sphere.  
Performing arts at this time were therefore conservative, safe and conformist. One 
significant result was that the army supported/owned traditional and modern theatre 
troupes18 that became an important component of the cultural life of Taiwan and gave 
a practical demonstration of the kind of theatrical performance that the state officially 
supported. It was at this time that the notion of state performing arts companies 
developed in Taiwan, and today’s Guo Guang Opera Company (國光劇團), was 
established in 1995 by a merger of the National Opera troupes from the Air Force, 
Army and Navy under the Ministry of National Defence. This is now Taiwan’s only 
national theatre company and it presents Peking Opera in both traditional and 
contemporary forms under the administration of the Ministry of Culture (Wong, 2014: 
127-128). But significantly, the name ‘National Opera’ was dropped when Guo Guang 
was formed as by 1995 Taiwan was already progressing towards democracy and this 
change had an influence in the arts circle. Ji Huei-ling, a former art journalist and now 
theatre critic and Director of the Online Performing Arts Review Platform, recalls that 
when she reported the launch of Guo Guang she suddenly realised that the term 
‘National Opera’ had disappeared in Taiwan. There was no government proclamation 
that ‘National Opera’ would revert to ‘Peking Opera’, but it seemed quite natural that 
neither the Government nor the public would refer to the ‘National Opera’ any longer. 
Ji felt that ‘there was neither argument nor debate, it just happened. For me, this is a 
good illustration of the way Taiwan’s cultural scene was transformed’ (Ji, interview of 
10 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author).  
                                                          
18  Many traditional theatre (especially Peking Opera) actors followed the KMT military troops 
immigrating to Taiwan. In order to offer appropriate positions for them, the military therefore launched 
their own theatre companies and this became a unique phenomenon of Taiwan’s theatre history. (Lin, 
2017: 232-233). More details see Chapter 5. 
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The name Guo Guang (國光) means ‘the glory of the nation’ in Chinese and is a 
reference to the Company’s national status. But losing the title ‘National Opera’ which 
linked Taiwan with a Chinese identity, and reverting to the Company’s original name 
‘Peking Opera’ is a sign that ‘Peking Opera’ is nowadays a genre of Taiwanese theatre 
and, as Ji (2018) says, ‘it is a traditional theatre form from China, but it now flourishes 
in Taiwan with a local character. It is Taiwanese Peking Opera’ (ibid.). There is no 
such thing as ‘National Opera’ any longer; instead, every theatre genre keeps its 
traditional name in forming part of the Taiwanese theatre family. This is a significant 
example of the way that Taiwanese culture has evolved over the years and, as Ma 
points out, cultural development always runs in parallel with the political situation (Ma, 
2010: 20).  
Influence from international exchange 
Taiwan has always been an enthusiastic participant in international arts. During the 
days of the KMT regime, despite seeing itself as the guardian of traditional Chinese 
culture, it was always open to influences from outside the country. The KMT depended 
heavily on support from the US and it tried hard to cement relationships with many 
other countries. The 1960s were a time of cultural exchange and fluidity in Taiwan 
and while communist China was a sealed society behind an iron curtain, Taiwan was 
absorbing the nutrition of western culture, mainly under the influence of the US.  
It was not easy for Taiwanese people to travel abroad during the martial law 
period (1949-1987), but some determined artists found ways to go to the west and they 
brought new arts ideas back to Taiwan. Ma Sen (2010: 23-25) comments that after the 
1970s, those who studied abroad returned to Taiwan and introduced western concepts 
in the performing arts to Taiwan. The new generation of Taiwanese artists of that time, 
with their background of Chinese identity mixed with a strong western cultural 
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influence, started to create their own cultural identity looking back to the land, the 
people, the arts, and the culture of Taiwan. Wu Jing-jyi, Taiwanese theatre guru and 
former Chairman of the NCKSCC (2006-2007), had worked in the La MaMa 
Experimental Theatre Club in New York City and brought back to Taiwan the concept 
of experimental theatre. He formed the Lanlin Theatre Troupe in Taipei in 1980 (Ma, 
2012: 101) and, in an interview, explained that because of the close relationship 
between the US and Taiwan, the US was the main foreign destination for Taiwanese 
students. The 1960s and 1970s saw vigorous development of ‘experimental theatre’ in 
the US where young people were concerned about socially controversial issues and 
protested against war and social inequality. ‘It was natural that those concepts and 
movements were brought back to Taiwan’s performing arts circle by Taiwanese 
students returning from the US. I am a good example, as is Lin Hwai-min’ (Wu, 
interview of 9 December 2015, translated from Mandarin by the author). 
The theatre sector in Taiwan then entered a new era and, according to Ma Sen 
(2012), this was inspirational for many of its members as it created a fruitful theatre 
milieu in Taiwan with the foundation of many theatre companies that are still very 
active, such as the Performance Workshop Theatre Company, U Theatre, the Ping 
Fong Acting Troupe, and the Godot Theatre Company. In addition, a number of avant-
garde experimental theatres developed in the 1980s, despite the conservative nature of 
Taiwanese society. Young theatre activists challenged political norms of the time and 
dared to tackle forbidden issues, such as homosexuality. Founded in 1988, the Critical 
Point Theatre Troupe is one example. At the same time, traditional theatres felt the 
impact of western theatre theories and tried to find innovative ways of presenting new 
content and attracting new audiences. Founded in 1986 by the Peking Opera artist Wu 
Shin-kuo, the Contemporary Legend Theatre’s debut work opened a new page of 
intercultural performance in Taiwan. The Kingdom of Desire was based on 
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Shakespeare’s Macbeth but was performed in a style based on Peking Opera (Ma, 2012: 
101-103).  
The first person to obtain a doctorate in Dance in Taiwan was Liu Feng-shueh 
who was Director of the NCKSCC from 1988 to 1990. Liu not only introduced the 
labanotation19 system for notating dance movement and thereby codifying modern 
Chinese dance, but also researched and reconstructed the dances of indigenous 
Taiwanese, Confucianist and Tang dynasty people. Her company, Neo-Classic Dance 
Company, was founded in 1976 based on:  
Transforming the body into written annals, and inscribing in it every 
sentiment and sense in the world of men. Liu Feng-shueh’s aim was to create 
modern work which showed a respect for tradition, but was at the same time 
influenced by historical awareness of dance, blending Chinese humanist 
culture and western art. (Neo-Classic Company, 2015: 4) 
Another significant influence in the development of dance in Taiwan was Lin 
Hwai-min and his Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan. Lin was first inspired by José 
Limón and then studied with Martha Graham and Merce Cunningham20. He founded 
Cloud Gate in 1973 using the name of the oldest dance in China, and he ‘adopted this 
classic name for the first contemporary dance company in any Chinese speaking 
community’ using as the basis of his dance training ‘meditation, qi gong (氣功), an 
ancient form of breathing exercise, internal martial arts, modern dance, ballet and 
calligraphy’ (Cloud Gate Dance Theatre, 2016). Lin’s works are mostly related to 
Taiwanese subjects, and in the opinion of Taiwanese cultural study scholar Wang Li-
                                                          
19  According to Ann Hutchinson Guest (2005), the movement and dance researcher, 
‘labanotation or Kinetography Laban, is the system of recording movement originated by 
Rudolf Laban in the 1920s. By this now scientifically based method, all forms of movement, 
ranging from the simplest to the most complex, can be accurately written’ (p.5). 
20 José Limón, Martha Graham and Merce Cunningham are influential figures of the history 
of modern dance. Martha Graham and Merce Cunningham are specially praised as ‘the two 
great pillars of modern dance’ (Sadler’s Wells, 2020).  
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jung (2014: 42), Cloud Gate is the most important example of ‘the rise of Taiwanese 
consciousness from the 1970s to the 1990s’ because of its intention to ‘open dialogue 
with the whole of society to consider self-definition, cultural identity, and collective 
memory in the performing arts’.  
In the same way, increasing numbers of Taiwanese music students who had 
studied overseas returned to Taiwan with what they had learned in the West, but also 
looked back to traditional Taiwanese material in order to develop contemporary 
Taiwanese music. Praised as the godfather of Taiwanese music, Hsu Tsang-houei 
(1929-2001) was educated in western classical music during the Japanese colonial 
period, and then went for further study in France in the 1950s where he was inspired 
to undertake field research into Taiwanese music during the 1960s. As one of the most 
influential musicians in Taiwan, ‘he was a vanguard of modern music in Taiwan and 
also one of the leading proponents of ethnomusicological fieldwork’ (Taiwan Music 
Institute, 2016). Hsu was followed by many other Taiwanese musicians and composers 
who tried to combine east and west, classic and modern to make the new face of 
contemporary music in Taiwan. Among such followers are Ma Shui-long (1939-2015), 
Hsiao Ty-zen (1938-2015), Pan Hwang-long (1945-) and Qian Nan-zhang (1948-). 
This generation of Taiwanese artists in theatre, dance and music created an artistic 
milestone by establishing the new face of the performing arts in Taiwan’s ‘China’ 
(ROC) using knowledge and techniques gained from the western world. But they also 
felt the importance of connecting their work with the land of Taiwan and of trying to 
shape a new image for Chinese/Taiwanese performing arts which epitomised the 





The development of Taiwanese identity 
The lifting of martial law in 1987 and the gradual introduction of democracy was a 
significant event in the development of Taiwanese performing arts. Free expression, 
the abandonment of censorship, frequent changes of government, awareness of native 
Taiwanese matters and re-communication with China (PRC), all made Taiwanese 
artists reconsider who they were as well as the nature of Taiwanese culture (Su, 2003: 
226-236). As a result, the shift of Taiwanese identity is reflected in the development 
of its performing arts. Taiwanese theatre study scholar, Geng Yi-wei observes that the 
new generation of Taiwanese artists who grew up after martial law was lifted 
‘imagines’ the country very differently from its predecessor. Geng explains:  
They realised that the so-called ‘dream of a unified China’ is not realistic. 
That ambition has been relinquished. The young generation will pay more 
attention to local culture and put more effort into Taiwanisation and after a 
few decades, when this generation has taken over as the backbone of society 
and become the decision makers of the country, the Chinese element of 
Taiwanese identity will continue to decline while the Taiwanese element will 
take over as its core. (Geng, interview of 8 June 2018, translated from 
Mandarin by the author)  
The fact is that nowadays cultural diversity is one of the main features of Taiwanese 
culture and this is accepted by the Taiwanese Government. Today’s Taiwanese 
performing arts scene also celebrates its multi-faceted nature with a spectrum of 
diversity.  
The independent Taiwanese producer Sun Ping spoke about her experiences 
working with the new generation of Taiwanese artists. Sun feels that the new 
generation doesn’t really need to care about what their identity is because they were 
born in a democratic state with a confirmed Taiwanese identity. The new generation 
learns tai chi (太極), qi gong (氣功) and martial arts, which are regarded as basic body 
movement methods although they originated in China. They also learn western 
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contemporary dance techniques or Japanese butoh, and again these are regarded as 
basic skills for strengthening the body, and have nothing to do with whether they 
recognise their cultural identity as Chinese, Japanese or American. They are all merely 
approaches to making their dance works unique in just the same way that they might 
use digital technology or new media for their creations. These are all methods which 
artists apply, but they are not the core of their creative work. But Sun also thinks:  
The new generation of artists were born in Taiwan, educated in Taiwan and 
live in Taiwan. They are Taiwanese so they naturally aim to look for 
Taiwanese topics and to make connections between them and the 
international arts world. The most important thing therefore is the innovation 
and quality of their creative work, and that is no longer related to cultural 
identity. (Sun, interview of 11 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by the 
author) 
In the same way, the Music Director of Taipei Philharmonic Chorus, Ku Yu-
chung who was born in 1970s is of the opinion that, although the traditions of chorus 
and symphony are from the West, they are treasures for the whole of humanity and 
have become the foundations and life blood of music. Ku feels that perhaps some 
would complain that the Taipei Philharmonic Chorus performs works of foreign 
classical music which are not Taiwanese, and it is true that Chorus is not able to adapt 
works like Beethoven’s Symphony No. 9 into a ‘Taiwanese version’ in the way that 
western plays can be revised into Taiwanese versions by Taiwanese theatre troupes. 
However, Ku believes those works of classical music are universal and the most 
important thing is that they are performed by the Taiwanese artists.   
When at some stage those foreign music works become familiar and 
meaningful for Taiwan, they evolve into a part of the spectrum of Taiwanese 
culture. They are a collective memory shared by all Taiwanese people 
connected to those works, and therefore they are Taiwanese. (Ku, interview 
of 8 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author). 
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This journey in which Taiwanese artists search for Taiwanisation has coincided exactly 
with the shift in Taiwanese identity. Ji Huei-ling feels that once martial law was lifted, 
the new generation of Taiwanese artists were no longer so enthusiastic about searching 
for Taiwanese identity in the newly democratic country. Their life memories were not 
occupied by the heavy historic shadow of an identity dilemma as was the case for their 
predecessors. As a general observation, Taiwanese artists still have concern for global 
agendas such as the enduring fight against injustice and inequality. They might still 
feel anxious, but if they do it is no longer anxiety about national identity, but more 
about individual concerns (Ji, 2019: 387-388). 
To conclude, there has been an artistic journey from the early era when preserving 
traditional Chinese theatre was the overriding aim, to the creation of a contemporary 
Chinese performing arts scene, and then to the search for a Taiwanese cultural code 
which aims to make Taiwan recognisably different. Today, a casual observer might 
remark that the performing arts scene and artists in Taiwan are not so different from 
the West: their concerns are almost wholly invested in the creative process and 
production of individual art works of high quality. This process of evolution in 
Taiwan’s performing arts scene has run in parallel with Taiwan’s increasing 
liberalisation and epitomises the evolution of Taiwanese identity.  
 
4.2.2.2 Taiwan’s Performing Arts Policy 
According to Derrick Chong (2010: 33), ‘state (public) subsidy for the arts, either 
direct or indirect, remains a major preoccupation regarding public policy and the arts’. 
However, there is always an argument about whether the government should subsidise 
artistic activities or whether subsidy compromises the independence of the arts from 
government intervention. Chong lists some reasons for and against state subsidy. Since 
most people regard the arts as worthwhile and ‘good’, the government might feel it is 
163 
 
obliged to support it and make art accessible to everyone, and not just to an elite sector 
of society. Also, ‘the arts produce positive externalities in the form of public benefits, 
such as civilizing society, enhancing national pride, and engendering a coactive 
identity that overweigh private benefits’ (Chong, 2010: 34). This very much influences 
the way the government respects and manages the arts. Increasingly, countries realise 
that the arts can bring huge economic benefits for tourism, business and jobs through 
what is today referred to as ‘creative and cultural industry’. Nevertheless, Chong also 
identifies disadvantages, such as a ‘high degree of state paternalism’, and how difficult 
it is in reality to create ‘arts for everyone’ (ibid.). All these points are relevant to 
government’s cultural policy in the performing arts in Taiwan, and this section will 
explore how performing arts policy has evolved. 
Baumol’s Cost Disease 
Unlike other components of cultural policy which can create economic benefit, the 
performing arts are commonly subsidised by governments worldwide. In thinking 
about the financial aspects of artistic enterprises, the performing arts are a prime 
example of ‘Baumol’s Cost Disease’ because, as time passes, artists’ wages and the 
cost of productions rise consistently but ‘productivity’ is static. This phenomenon was 
observed and introduced by William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen in 1966 while 
they were conducting research into the performing arts sector, and ‘Baumol’s Cost 
Disease’ nowadays is widely used to describe those professions and services which 
lack growth in productivity (Heilbrun, 2003: 91).  
    There is clearly a distinction here between on the one hand, different kinds of 
artistic performances such as high art western and Chinese (Peking) opera or 
symphony concerts as promoted by most performing arts centres and, on the other, 
strictly commercial productions such as musicals or popular drama. These latter aim 
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at long, and sometimes very long, runs of performances which can recoup production 
costs and, with luck, make a substantial profit. Yet, many high arts organisations do 
not expect their productions to be profitable. Production costs are characteristically 
high, performance runs are short and audience support may be low, especially for 
innovative and experimental work. All this means that income from the box office 
rarely covers the costs and funding has to be sought elsewhere, whether from 
government subsidy or commercial or philanthropic sponsorship. Taiwan is no 
exception to this reality. 
The evolution of performing arts policy 
In 1949 when the KMT government transferred to Taiwan and instituted martial law, 
the central ideology of cultural policy was compatibility with KMT party’s nationalism 
and its project of the ‘rejuvenation of Chinese culture’ (Su, 2003: 37). The 
authoritarian process of policy-making was ‘top-down’ and demonstrated the 
enforcement of the dominant political elite’s preference for Chinese culture (Su, 2003: 
99). As a result, according to Taiwanese theatre scholar Su Kuei-chih, the essence of 
the performing arts during this era was mainly: 
fighting back against Communist China, but somehow ignoring the customs 
and culture of native Taiwanese. It was disconnected from Taiwanese society 
and made no distinction between KMT Party work and government work, i.e. 
politics interfered with culture. (Su, 2003: 100) 
Censorship and prohibition were used as the main tool of performing arts policy. The 
content of performances had to promote traditional Chinese culture; it should be 
evidently anti-communist and should not violate the KMT’s definition of good 
customs and ethics. There were many performing arts policies regarding these agendas, 
such as Regulation of Managing Entertainment and Arts Business (1979) which 
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stipulated that the script of any performance had to be approved by the Government 
authorities (Chiou, 2017: 69-74).   
Gradually, in the late phases of martial law period there was some slackening of 
this dictatorial policy as democracy began to be felt and consideration for Taiwan’s 
cultural diversity emerged (Su, 2003: 215-16). At this time there was some discrepancy 
within government between the cultural policies of such hardline organisations as the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI), the Government Information Office (GIO), Taiwan 
garrison command and others, who continued to censor performing arts content, while 
the policy of some other arms of government such as the Ministry of Education (MOE) 
took a more liberal line (Chiou, 2017: 72-73). Once again, both the brute-force explicit 
policies of hardliners and the softer implicit policies of other, more sympathetic 
operators are simultaneously at work as discussed in Section 3.2.4 of Chapter 3.   
The MOE supervised the performing arts for a considerable time until the Council 
of Cultural Affairs was established in 1981 and then supervision was completely 
transferred when the Ministry of Culture (MOC) was launched in 2012. Thinking that 
the arts are a mechanism for social education, the MOE’s policy for the performing 
arts was included within a ‘cultural and educational policy’. This had ambitions in 
three fields: to support those public performing arts companies which were under the 
supervision of the MOE; to provide financial support for other performing arts 
companies; and to build new performing arts venues (Su, 2003: 44; 158-159). The 
work of the ‘public performing arts companies’ that received funding from the MOE 
or the other arms of government such as the Province of Taiwan, mainly fell within 
the category of National Opera, National Music and Western classical music, giving 
an idea of the Government’s priorities during that period (Su, 2003: 145).  
Hand in hand with this vivid development of Taiwanese artistic society, the 
launch of the Council of Cultural Affairs showed the determination of the Government 
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to progress with its activities in cultural governance. It also illustrates the shift in the 
official way of thinking about the arts from being a component of education to being 
the essence of culture in Taiwan (Su, 2003: 45-6; 226-8). Following the tendency 
towards democracy, the main approach to implementing the CCA’s arts policy was 
through grants and subsidy and the National Culture and Arts Foundation was 
established to support Taiwanese performing arts companies’ international tours, to 
subsidise international cultural exchange projects, and to set up Taiwanese overseas 
cultural centres (Kuo, interview of 28 June 2018). As a result, the CCA set up the 
International Performance Troupe Cultivation Plan in 1992, and it then developed 
into the Performing Arts Group’s Development Foster Plan in 1998 which allocated 
grants to select companies (Tchen, 2013: 36). The grant covers international tours as 
well as the costs of maintaining companies’ daily operations, such as renting office 
and rehearsal space, and paying the salaries of the management team. In return, the 
CCA expected companies to present new productions regularly and to carry out 
periodic evaluation (Su, 2003: 243-4).  
The allocation of government money in support of international tours has been an 
annual practice since 1992 which continued even after the CCA was promoted in status 
and moved to the Ministry of Culture in 2012. In 2013, the MOC initiated a plan with 
an increase in funding of NT$ 100,000,000 (￡2,500,000) for five designated National 
Portfolio Companies: Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan, Min-Hwa Yuan Arts & 
Cultural Group, Ju Percussion Group, Paper Windmill Theatre and U Theatre 
(Performing Arts Review Magazine, 2013). In addition, in 2016, grants were 
advertised under the Performing Arts Group's Development Foster Plan. 142 
companies applied and 81 were selected (music: 16; dance: 22; traditional theatre: 19; 
modern theatre: 24) with a total grant allocation of NT$152,800,000 (￡3,820,000) 
(MOC, 2016).  
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Meanwhile, the NCAF also subsidies arts organisations for different schemes and 
projects. For performing arts, as stated in the NCAF’s 2016 annual report, a total of 
725 projects were funded. Among them, 463 projects belonged to performing arts 
(music: 203; dance: 108; theatre: 152) amounting to 64% of the total. In terms of the 
amount of funding, the NCAF granted a total of NT$116,900,473 (￡2,922,512) in 
2016, of which 62%, NT$72,227,100 (￡1,805,678), went to performing arts (music: 
NT$21,530,800 (￡538,270) ; dance: NT$25,084,000 (￡627,100) ; theatre: 
NT$25,612,300 (￡640,308). These figures are a reflection of the prominent role that 
performing arts have played in Taiwan’s cultural spectrum. In addition, the NCAF has 
initiated projects specifically for the performing arts, such as ‘Pursuit of Excellence in 
Performing Arts’ that aims to reinforce performing arts companies and artists; ‘Young 
Stars, New Vision’ that offers comprehensive resources and platforms for talented 
artists and young practitioners who have just graduated from college; and ‘Glove 
Puppetry Production and Presentation’ that encourages traditional glove puppetry 
companies to collaborate with playwrights and directors in order to reinvigorate the 
traditional theatre form (NCAF, 2019).   
In addition, there are subsidies from local government for individual productions 
or for regular long-term support for performing arts companies (Kuo, 2011: 168). 
Some local governments have proposed their own plans to attract companies to their 
cities or counties. Alternatively, local governments may offer renovated local heritage 
sites or other unused spaces free of charge to accommodate companies. In order to 
encourage arts philanthropy, sponsorship and other forms of support from private 
enterprise, a number of tax inducements have been introduced such as the Cultural 
and Arts Reward Act (2002) (Su, 2003: 245). 
Over the past 70 years, the evolution of Taiwan’s performing arts policy has 
progressed from censorship to assistance and then to grant-support. Do Taiwanese 
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performing arts companies now rely on government financial support so heavily that 
they could not survive in a market-orientated environment and are therefore obliged to 
follow government policy? According to Li Chia-chi who was the NCKSCC’s 
Programme Manager (2012-2014), and is now the Chief Editor of Performing Arts 
Review Magazine, ‘artistic creations should not comply with any policy. They are the 
means to consider and examine policy’ (interview of 27 June 2018, translated from 
Mandarin by the author). However, Ju Tzong-ching, the former Artistic Director of the 
NCKSCC (2001-2004) and the current Chairman of the NPAC, agrees that support 
from the Government is vital to Taiwanese performing arts companies. ‘In other words, 
through following the policy guidelines, what the Government encourages would 
influence what artists produce’ (interview of 3 December 2015, translated from 
Mandarin by the author). 
Of course, since Taiwan became a democratic country, political ideology is, at 
least in theory, no longer an issue and arts policy has been directed in more universal 
and general ways under the MOC. Nevertheless, as the Taiwanese theatre study scholar, 
Geng Yi-wei observes, when martial law was lifted, Taiwanese performing artists dealt 
with many political issues that were critical of the Government as they expressed their 
political ideals. After the 1990s, when support from the CCA and NCAF began, the 
state could ‘influence’ its performing arts policy through subsidy. Geng does not go 
so far as to term this as deliberate state interference, but thinks that it nevertheless 
‘hints at state involvement’ and has the effect of limiting artistic expression. He feels 
that: 
The situation is that performing arts companies not only do not address 
political controversy, but also try to distance themselves from political issues. 
It seems to me that, because change in government between the different 
political parties has become a normality, the more that artists avoid making 
political statements, the more easily they would be able to obtain government 
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support. (Geng, interview of 8 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by the 
author)             
It is a worrying state of affairs when in a democratic society artists feel unable to 
demonstrate political preferences because to do so might prejudice applications for 
state funding. Perhaps it is merely that performing arts companies conduct self-
censorship imagining that in this way they can acquire state funding more smoothly. 
Or perhaps this is because explicit political expressions are unfashionable in a more 
mature democratic society. This is not something they will willingly confess, but there 
is no doubt that Taiwanese performing arts companies rely heavily on government 
financial support for their continued existence and this means that they have to be 
cautious when applying for the Government grants.  
To conclude, Taiwanese performing arts policy has evolved in parallel with the 
political climate to embrace the shift of Taiwan’s identity from Chinese to Taiwanese. 
The establishment of the CCA was a milestone in performing arts policy, and 
democracy at least notionally prevents polices from prohibiting material that the 
authorities dislike, while it encourages liberty of artistic expression. The main feature 
of performing arts policy nowadays is substantial state funding. Although this 
illustrates strong support from the Government, it also hints at potential concern for 
the independence of artistic creation. 
 
4.2.3 The Development of Performing Arts Centres (PACs) 
Academic research into the management of the performing arts tends to focus on 
performing arts companies and their productions rather than performing arts centres 
which present or host such companies (Lambert & Williams, 2017a: 1). But a 
performing arts centre (PAC) is not just a lifeless building and in a press interview 
Taiwan’s current Minister of Culture, Cheng Li-chun, said that ‘the Artistic Director 
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and the team vitalise the PAC and their artistic standpoints invigorate the PAC’s 
character’ (Cheng, 2019). This section therefore will explore the evolution of PACs in 
general and then look at their development in Taiwan.    
PAC evolution  
‘At the core of the missions of most preforming arts centres are the performances that 
appear on their stages, and related artistic and community activities’ (Micocci, 2017: 
63). How can those missions and objectives be achieved? In practice, this is the task 
of the leadership and the programming team of the PAC (Williams, Harrris & Lambert, 
2017: 244) and indeed, all of the Artistic Directors of the NCKSCC interviewed in this 
research project (see Table 4.3 on p.182) claim that they personally are the decision 
makers, supported by their programming teams. Together they make up the heart of 
the Centre. But a PAC often carries out other functions such as contributing to civil 
vitality and arts society as well as encouraging a rich cultural identity (Lambert & 
Williams, 2017a: 1). When government funding is involved, government cultural 
policy inevitably influences a PAC’s vision and mission, along with consideration of 
its local community. As a result, the evolution of a PAC is affected by both cultural 
policy and the country’s identity. 
Based on their core work of programming, PACs have progressed through four 
different generations: 1) a home for the high arts, 2) a place used for performing arts, 
3) a community centre for all, and 4) a nexus with multi-functions (Wolff, 2017: 21). 
In the beginning, PACs were commonly built as iconic landmarks and were normally 
the ‘home’ of the high arts such as ballet, opera, and classical concerts which ‘were 
likely to showcase the programmes and be directed towards elite audiences’ (Wolff: 
2017: 22-24). PACs then were perceived as places that had an increasingly valuable 
influence in the surrounding area, bringing in a wide range of artists, companies and 
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audiences with more connection to their location (Wolff, 2017: 25-30). PACs then 
evolved into ‘community centres’ offering ‘inclusiveness and community-based 
programmes’ with outreach events. The goal then was to make PACs more accessible 
to a broader and more diverse community, so that its audience not only became more 
local but also broader in terms of the social spectrum (Wolff, 2017: 32-34). In the last 
stage, the PAC becomes a multi-function ‘nexus’, not only keeping its traditional roles 
from the previous three generations, but also serving as a creativity and innovation 
centre to create diverse programmes and to ‘enable audiences of all types to participate 
in those programmes’ (Wolff, 2017: 35). They develop into centres with multiple 
functions for artists, the audience, the community and the area (Wolff, 2017: 39-40).  
With different roles and functions during its evolution, the PAC’s relationship 
with the variety of artists and different audience groups accordingly reflects the way 
cultural policy is delivered and the identity of the country is represented and 
constructed. PACs evolve along with society, policy and identity.  
The development of Taiwan’s PACs 
According to the Taiwanese theatre scholar, Chou Yi-ton (2017: 22-24, 37-28), after 
1949, there was a mere handful of performing arts venues in Taiwan, mainly offering 
spaces for performing arts. In the capital Taipei, for instance, the historical Zhong-
shan Hall was built in 1936 by the Japanese colonial government as a multi-function 
convention centre and it is still a venue used for a variety of functions today. After the 
KMT moved to Taiwan, a few additional venues were launched: the Armed Forces 
Cultural Centre was built in 1957 specifically for traditional theatre, and the multi-
functional Shih-chien Hall appeared in 1966. However, they are venues mainly 
designed to put on a variety of types of performance, and because they lack 
programming teams they cannot be counted as true performing arts centres. In 1972, 
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the National Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall was opened, primarily as a professional 
performing arts venue, but this again is a performance space for rent that does not 
create its own programming. These were landmark buildings that provided venues for 
‘high arts’ programming to attract elite audiences (Wolff, 2017: 22). Without 
programming departments, these centres have not progressed beyond acting as 
landlords, although they remain venues for the performing arts in Taiwan. Meanwhile, 
as discussed in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3, the Government launched its Cultural 
Construction Plan and, between 1981 and 1986, it aimed to increase the number of 
local cultural centres so that people could enjoy the arts in every county of the country. 
This was not only the beginning of local PACs, but also of local community centres 
(Tchen 2013: 116-117).  
Taiwan’s first professional PAC was not launched until 1987, but the idea was 
conceived much earlier in 1975 after the death of President Chiang Kai-shek and the 
Executive Yuan decided to build a memorial hall with a theatre and a concert hall to 
commemorate him. The National Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was opened in 1980, 
and the National Theatre and Concert Hall in 1987 (NCKSCC, 2007). Although the 
Memorial Hall, the National Theatre and Concert Hall are all situated in the same 
precinct under the name of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park, they each have their 
own separate governing body. The Government of the time regarded the establishment 
of this national landmark PAC as one of its most momentous cultural decisions 
according to Huang Pi-twan, the NCKSCC’s Artistic Director from 2010 to 2013 
(interview of 4 December 2015). Since then, the most significant event has been the 
legislation for an Act for the Establishment of a National Performing Arts Centre and 
the resulting creation of the National Performing Arts Centre by upgrading the 
NCKSCC in 2014. This new phase of Taiwan’s performing arts centres will be 
discussed in the next section.  
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4.3 Constructing Taiwan’s National Performing Arts Centre  
The essence of performing arts is the process by which artists express their creative 
thoughts and feelings to an audience. Through time, the performances reflect any shift 
in national and cultural identity and, at a more prosaic level, show the way artists can 
receive government support by either conforming with cultural policy or distancing 
themselves from it in their work. Artists are concerned about how they can persuade a 
Performing Arts Centre to programme their work, and how they can collaborate with 
PACs to present it. In this way, the PAC itself gains a character that reflects the 
evolution of both national and cultural identity and how artists interact with cultural 
policy. The character of the PAC springs from the work of the artists it presents, but 
at the same time, for a government to propose the establishment of a PAC is a 
significant part of its cultural policy. Programming at the PAC then has to be sensitive 
to government cultural policy, especially when it is funded by the government. Hence, 
the programming at a government PAC is both a bottom-up process springing from 
the artists and the way their ideas develop, and at the same time, a top-down process 
that responds to changes in government cultural policy.  
The case of the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre and subsequently the 
National Performing Arts Centre provides an excellent demonstration of the way that 
Taiwanese identity and cultural policy are coordinated. Cultural autonomy through the 
arm’s-length principle was introduced to the NCKSCC management system in 2004, 







4.3.1 The Creation of the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre  
That the name of the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre retains its homage to 
Chiang Kai-shek is an expression of the enduring political significance of the 
establishing force behind the new Republic. According to Taiwanese theatre scholar 
Chou Yi-ton (2017: 32), during the authoritarian era the primary objective of 
establishing theatre venues was to serve the state and its political aims, so most were 
named in honour of political figures. Their buildings demonstrate the ideology and 
identity of their period: for example, the National Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall (1972), 
and the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (1987).  
Wu Jing-jyi, the Taiwanese theatre guru and Chairman of the NCKSCC from 
2006 to 2007, was one of the consultants involved in planning the NCKSCC. He recalls 
that it was an imperative feature of national cultural policy to create a professional 
national performing arts centre, but in the beginning, the Government aimed to 
establish a ‘court style’ venue with a presidential VIP lounge and a grand hall (Wu, 
interview of 3 December 2015). This notion gave rise to the spectacular exterior 
architecture. Huang Pi-Twan, Artistic Director of the NCKSCC from 2010 to 2013, 
who was Deputy Director from 1990 to 1992 adds that ‘the NCKSCC is clearly the 
most iconic national cultural construction of that time’ when the country was focusing 
its construction efforts on technology, industry and the economy. It was the first time 
that cultural construction had been raised to the national level and that cultural policy 
had been taken so seriously. She comments that ‘the architectural style is pure Chinese 
which is significant because it reflects the direction of that period when the country 
strongly supported traditional Chinese culture’ (Huang, interview of 4 December 2018, 
translated from Mandarin by the author). 
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The NCKSCC not only displays the ambition of government cultural policy and 
reflects Taiwan’s Chinese identity of that period, it is also an exemplar of PAC 
evolution (Wolff, 2017) which is closely related to changing Taiwanese identity. The 
Centre was originally launched as a typical high-arts PAC to attract an elite audience. 
But it has gradually opened itself up to embrace a wider audience and it has made 
moves to connect with local communities after Ju Tzong-ching, the Artistic Director 
from 2000 to 2004, demolished the wall that surrounded the NCKSCC and began to 
present a series of more widely accessible programmes (Ju, interview of 3 December 
2015). It was then perceived as being more welcoming to the general public and 
progressed into the next stage of Wolff’s series by becoming a ‘nexus with multi-
functions’ with a new governance structure.   
 
4.3.1.1 The Evolution of the Organisation 
According to the NCKSCC (2007: 16), when the Centre was opened in 1987, it was 
operated as a government agency under the Ministry of Education (MOE). Even 
though the Council of Cultural Affairs was formed in 1981 and might have been 
expected to take responsibility for it, the NCKSCC remained under the MOE until 
2014. Lee Huey-mei, who was Artistic Director of the Centre from 2014 to 2018 and 
who has worked there ever since its opening, explains that the NCKSCC was regarded 
as an organisation for arts education in its early period. People at that time saw the 
function of the performing arts in this way and that is why the Centre remained under 
the ‘Department of Social Education’ of the MOE (Lee, interview of 7 December 
2015). Regarding its institutional status, the Centre was transformed into an arm’s-
length public corporation in 2004, although still under the supervision of the MOE. 
176 
 
This continued until the NCKSCC was upgraded in 2014 to become the National 
Performing Arts Centre under the Ministry of Culture (MOC).  
The table below presents the evolution of the name, status and governance model 
of the NCKSCC from its inception to the present day.  
Table 4. 1 The evolution of the NCKSCC organisation 
Year Name Status Authority/Supervisor  
1987-1992 National Chiang Kai-shek 
Cultural Centre (National 
Theatre & Concert Hall) 
Governmental agency 
(Preparatory Office for  
the National Theatre & 
Concert Hall) 
Ministry of Education 
1992-2004 National Chiang Kai-shek 
Cultural Centre 






Ministry of Education 
2004-2014 National Chiang Kai-shek 
Cultural Centre 
(National Theatre & 
Concert Hall) 
Non-departmental 
public body  
(arm’s-length) 
Ministry of Education 
2014- National Performing Arts 
Centre 
(National Theatre & 
Concert Hall) 
Non-departmental 
public body  
(arm’s-length) 
Ministry of Culture 
Compilation from the NCKSCC historical development. 
    Eventually, Chiang Kai-shek’s name was removed when the Centre became a 
component of the National Performing Arts Centre. Its official name is now the 
‘National Theatre & Concert Hall’ of the NPAC. The new NPAC site in Taichung, 
central Taiwan, adds the city name as part of its official name—the ‘National Taichung 
Theatre’—to distinguish it from the National Theatre in the capital, Taipei.  
The key person in upgrading the NCKSCC as Taiwan’s first non-departmental 
public body was Ju Tzong-ching, the Centre’s Director from 2001 to 2004. Ju lobbied 
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for the change and saw it become reality in 2004. He remembers that for a long time, 
the NCSKCC was a kind of provisional organisation with a quasi-government status. 
Ju believed this was unhealthy and disturbing for the management team as the staff of 
the Centre were ‘civil servants and had to follow government regulations’. As a 
management regime, he felt it was inflexible, intractable and unsuitable for a 
performing arts centre. Ju comments that even the MOE thought that it would be better 
to transform the Centre to an arm’s-length organisation, and on that basis, he accepted 
the appointment as Director in 2001, with the task of ‘reforming the organisation’ (Ju, 
interview of 3 December 2015).  
Thus, by 2001, both the cultural policy of the Government and people in the arts 
circle in Taiwan had come to a consensus about assigning the Centre autonomous 
status. As a result, the NCKSCC became not only the first non-departmental public 
body (Hsing cheng fa ren, 行政法人) in Taiwan, but also the original reason for the 
Government’s new law, the Non-Departmental Public Bodies Act, which was enacted 
in 2011 (Laws & Regulations Database of the ROC, 2016). This opened a new chapter 
of cultural autonomy for other future arm’s-length organisations in Taiwan. 
 
4.3.1.2 Institutional Autonomy with the Arm’s-length Principle 
Tension between the state and the arts is always an issue. National cultural policy can 
be seen as a form of hegemony created by the dominant culture which uses the arts, 
among other methods, to make its dominance appear natural to society as a whole 
(Miller & Yudice, 2002: 9). And in practice, the more the government subsidises the 
arts, the more it could be construed that there is government interference (Chong, 2010: 
33). The ability of arts organisations to keep their autonomy while accepting 
government subsidy (intervention) is therefore a critical issue. 
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The arm’s-length principle 
According to Harry Hillman-Cartrand and Claire McCaughey (1989), there are four 
models of the way in which democratic states operate with respect to arts and culture. 
A state may be facilitator, patron, architect, or engineer. In a ‘patron state’ the arts 
may be subsidised through arm’s-length councils, and ‘the government determines 
how much aggregate support to provide, but not which organisations or artists should 
receive support’ (Hillman-Cartrand & McCaughey, 1989). The arm’s-length principle 
is intended to avoid the issue of apparent government control and to ensure that arts 
organisations are independent and immune from undue government influence. As a 
result, the policy dynamic of the patron state tends to be ‘evolutionary, responding to 
changing forms and styles of art as expressed by the artistic community’ (ibid.).  
Roger Blomgren (2012) points out that applying the arm’s-length principle to 
public arts organisations is commonly regarded as the implementation of cultural 
autonomy to institutions. He explains that this places arts affairs, especially their 
funding, at a safe distance from politics and avoids decisions being taken directly by 
politicians. That task should be assigned to professionals, in other words the artists and 
arts organisations. In this way, when implementing cultural policy, arm’s-length 
bodies ‘should have the power to autonomously decide the content of what is to be 
produced’ (Blomgren, 2012: 522).  
Simon Mundy’s opinion is that the arm’s-length principle ‘allows government to 
concentrate on overall policy, not day-to-day operations’, and it also ‘allows cultural 
organisations to demonstrate their independence—as long as the arm is really long’ 
(Mundy, 2000: 33). When an institution is at arm’s-length from government, the fact 
is that the ‘arm’ is a reality and government has not relinquished all control. The key 
question is what ‘length’ of arm is adequate to secure independence? 
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The arm’s-length principle in Taiwan 
In Taiwan, from 1949, the KMT government acted in ‘engineer’ mode where the 
Government ‘supports only art that meets political standards of excellence’ and 
‘funding decisions are made by political commissars’ (Hillman-Cartrand & 
McCaughey, 1989). When the CCA was established in 1981, the Government shifted 
towards the role of ‘architect’ by becoming involved in planning, support, and grant-
giving for arts and culture through its cultural policy. In this mode, Hillman-Cartrand 
& McCaughey indicate that ‘granting decisions concerning artists and arts 
organisations are generally made by bureaucrats’ (ibid.). During this time, the arm’s-
length principle was introduced, of which the National Culture and Arts Foundation, 
founded in 1996, is an example. 
The NCKSCC was the first arts organisation in Taiwan to follow concepts such 
as Japan’s ‘independent administrative corporations’ and the UK’s ‘non-departmental 
public bodies’ (Directorate-General of Personnel Administration, 2017) by operating 
under the arm’s-length principle. Institutional autonomy, according to Geir Vestheim 
(2009: 37), covers the circumstances under which publicly funded or supported 
organisations set up their mission, make their own decisions, achieve their goals and 
produce their own productions, in a way that is ‘immune from the arbitrary exercise of 
the authority by external power holders’. The aim is to encourage independence, 
freedom and effectiveness by distancing the organisation from government restrictions. 
Nevertheless, in practice, the way the arm’s-length principle has been implemented at 
the NCKSCC has been complicated. The NCKSCC Administrative Corporation was 
announced in 2004 based on National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre Establishment 
Law but it was not until the Non-Departmental Body Act of April 2011 (Laws & 
Regulations Database of the ROC, 2016) was enacted that the NCKSCC’s status was 
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officially changed. In effect, the NCKSCC was used as an experimental project to test 
whether or not the system would work.  
The NCKSCC’s institutional autonomy 
Ju Tzong-ching, Director of the NCKSCC between 2001 and 2004, who was the key 
person in forming the NCKSCC administrative corporation during his term, said in his 
interview that two of the main benefits of arm’s-length operation are in personnel and 
budgeting because the NCKSCC is able to hire professional arts management staff 
without worrying about government budget restrictions. In Ju’s opinion, the arm’s-
length principle enables the NCKSCC ‘to bring professionalism, competitiveness, 
flexibility, and effectiveness to the vision to the Centre as a truly performing arts centre 
with the intention of freeing it from the burden of bureaucracy’ (Ju, interview of 3 
December 2015, translated from Mandarin by the author).  
Table 4.2 below demonstrates the Centre’s financial position and shows the origins 
of its income along with the proportion of box office and other service revenue, rental 
revenue, and government subsidy. Government subsidy has been the main element of 
the annual operating budget, and more than half has been from the Government since 
the Centre transferred to non-departmental body status in 2004. As a result, one might 
ask whether it is really independent of government intervention since Mundy (2000: 
33) has warned ‘in reality it (the arm’s-length principle) rarely protects the cultural 
sector from the political climate. At its worst it can further complicate the means of 







Table 4.2 2004-2017 NCKSCC annual operational budget with income origins 
* In 2006 the NCKSCC presented the musical The Phantom of the Opera, which substantially increased 
the total box office income.  
** Exchange rate:￡1= NTD 40. 































































































































































According to the founding legislation of National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural 
Centre Establishment Law, the Centre has a Board of Directors consisting of between 
eleven and fifteen members, who appoint the Artistic Director, approve the work 
policy, discuss operational plans, objectives and important regulations, and raise funds. 
The Artistic Director manages all the affairs of the Centre and has responsibility for 
the preparation of annual plans. Members of the Board of Directors are selected and 
recommended by the Ministry of Education (MOE) but appointed by the Premier of 
the Executive Yuan. Apart from scholars, experts in the performing arts, education and 
cultural academics, and professional operators and managers, who comprise the 
majority of the Board, the Government appoints three of its own representatives as 
Board members. The number of Board members in each of the first three categories is 
no more than four (MOE, 2016). By convention, between 2004 and 2014, the three 
government representatives were the Deputy Minister of the MOE, the Minister 
without Portfolio (culture and education) and the Minister of the CCA (2004-2012; 
from 2013 to 2014, the Deputy Minister MOC sat on the Board).          
After upgrading to the NPAC in 2014, with the new Act for Establishment of 
National Performing Arts Centre, the seat of the Minister without Portfolio was 
changed to the Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This demonstrates the 
intention of the Government to make a connection between government policies 
(diplomatic as well as cultural and educational) and the Centre, so it made sense to 
engage Ministers of relevant Departments to represent their policies. Nevertheless, 
appointment of Board members by the Government potentially compromises the 
arm’s-length principle and there is a need to investigate whether there has been any 
influence from government on the NCKSCC, even though it is supposedly an 
independent organisation.   
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From 2004 to 2017, the list of Chairmen and Artistic Directors can be seen in 
Table 4.3. Although their backgrounds range from scholars and academics to artists 
and managers, as many as four former Ministers of the CCA appear on the list, 
emphasising the close connection between the CCA/MOC and the NCKSCC, even 
though it was not the supervisory Ministry until 2014. 
Table 4.3 Board Chairmen and Artistic Directors of the NCKSCC (2004-2017) 
 (Individuals interviewed in 2015 and 2018 are marked *) 
Chairman Tenure Background Note Artistic 
Director 
































































































Source: own compilation from the NCKSCC historical development.  
Concerning the Centre’s autonomy, during interviews, everyone claimed that 
there has never been intervention from the Government in the work of the NCKSCC, 
and that they all had power to take decisions for the NCKSCC, according to their duties. 
All of the Chairmen and Artistic Directors interviewed see the Centre’s autonomy as 
a professional independent performing arts centre as a very precious asset. 
Tchen Yu-chiou, NCKSCC Chairwoman (2007-2010), asserts that she did not 
feel that anyone from the Government gave indications to the Board on how to operate 
the Centre during her term. In her opinion, ‘if the Artistic Director has a point of view 
and knows what he or she wants to achieve, the Government would not intervene’ 
(Tchen, interview of 27 November 2015, translated from Mandarin by the author). 
Kuo Wei-fan, Tchen’s successor as NCKSCC Chairman (2010-2013), agrees with that 




























































































between it and the Ministry concerned budgeting rather than the Centre’s operation 
(Kuo, interview of 28 June 2018). In the opinion of Ju Tzong-ching, the first Artistic 
Director (2004) of the NCKSCC, politicians hardly influenced the operation of the 
NCKSCC. With the agreement of the MOE, he proposed the Centre’s goals and 
objectives himself after much discussion and consultation with the performing arts 
realm. ‘It is autonomous and self-regulating, and the responsibility for its activities is 
vested in the Artistic Directors’ (Ju, interview of 3 December 2015, translated from 
Mandarin by the author). Liu Chiung-shu, another former Artistic Director (2008-
2010), adds that the Centre essentially had its own objectives, such as ‘advance local 
development’ and ‘enhance international association’, she carries on:   
Fundamentally, the Centre set up its own mission with the Board. As far as 
changes to the political party in government were concerned, I didn’t feel any 
impact. In 2008, the KMT party returned to government, but the Centre still 
kept its own direction with regular programming pace without intervention. 
(Liu, interview of 25 May 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author) 
In terms of the relationship with the supervisory ministry, most Artistic Directors, 
such as Ping Heng, (2004-2007) and Yang Chi-wen, (2007-2008) pointed out that the 
Centre’s supervisory ministry was the MOE and the budget of the Centre only occupied 
a tiny percentage of the whole budget of the MOE. The MOE therefore paid more 
attention to the larger parts of its remit and ‘was quite supportive in endorsing the 
Centre’s plans most of time’ (Ping, interview of 29 November 2015, translated from 
Mandarin by the author) and ‘was happy to respect the artistic professionalism of the 
Centre’s team allowing it to get on with its work without interference’ (Yang, interview 
of 14 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author). Thus, the Centre is 
autonomous and independent from the Ministries, although Ju Tzong-ching, Artistic 
Director from 2001 to 2004, emphasises that in order to make sure the administration 
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ran smoothly, ‘good collaboration with the MOE and other government departments is 
crucial’ (Ju, interview of 3 December 2015, translated from Mandarin by the author). 
The Board, the Evaluation Committee and KPIs 
The Board plays a prominent role in the relationship between the Government and the 
NCKSCC. Because the Centre is an arm’s-length organisation, the MOE and MOC are 
not legally in a position to issue instructions to the Centre, but the Board, standing 
between the Ministry and the Centre, makes sure that the Ministry’s views are taken 
into account. The Board has authority over the Centre’s operation and management. 
Ju Tzong-ching explains: 
Board members are appointed by the Government and are therefore the 
Government’s representatives to some degree. But as such, they have to be 
careful not to be denounced for meddling in the Centre’s work, so the arm’s-
length principle was introduced to demonstrate that the Government is in 
touch with the Centre and yet stands at a distance from it. The Board’s task is 
to oversee the direction of the Centre while being conscious of government 
cultural policy. (Ju, interview of 3 December 2015, translated from Mandarin 
by the author) 
That is to say, the Government has not so far been prescriptive in telling the Centre 
what to do, and relies on the individuals it has appointed to the Board, along with the 
Artistic Director, to manage the Centre’s affairs in such a way that its objectives and 
annual activities follow the Government policy aspirations in general terms. 
However, one issue raised its head at the NCKSCC when it became a non-
departmental public body in 2004. After just six months, the first Artistic Director, Ju 
Tzong-ching, who was the key person in achieving this institutional change, resigned 
and Ping Heng became his successor. Ju did not explain at the interview why he 
resigned so quickly, but Ping spoke about how difficult and frustrating it was to deal 
with the newly instituted Board and the Evaluation Committee, an assessment 
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mechanism imposed by the MOE. Ping explained that most of the experts and 
professionals on both the Board and the MOE’s Evaluation Committee were keen to 
deliver their own ideas of how the NCKSCC should be properly managed and in doing 
so they exceeded the scope of their duties by becoming involved in management 
operations and programming. This was frustrating for the NCKSCC management team 
who spent much time responding to Board members’ requests. She recalls:  
It seems to me that there was no problem with the Ministry, but the problem 
was with individual members of the Board or the Evaluation Committee who 
wanted to influence the way the NCKSCC was administered. (Ping, interview 
of 29 November 2015, translated from Mandarin by the author) 
Ping admits that this is probably inevitable when a new institution is set up, and it was 
more than a decade before both the Board and the Evaluation Committee properly 
acknowledged their responsibilities.  
Interestingly, it seems that conflicts with the Board in the early period seldom 
arose through those Board members who were government representatives; it was the 
independent members who gave trouble. Another former Artistic Director (2007-
2008), Yang Chi-wen remembers that the Board members from the MOE were 
normally very humble in claiming that they were not performing arts professionals and 
would respect the experts. Yang recalls that they came to Board meetings because they 
were obliged to do so. The Board member representing the CCA was supposed to be 
the Minister, but he or she was often too busy to attend in person and sent a substitute 
to the meeting. This meant that the delegates were normally silent in the meetings, 
merely taking notes so they could report back to the CCA. Yang further observes that: 
All of the Board members, and especially those from the Government, tended 
to be very careful what they said at meetings in case the press got to hear 
about their comments. They also kept emphasising that they had to follow the 
regulations of arm’s-length principle. So basically, the Centre is quite 
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autonomous and independent from other institutions. (Yang, interview of 14 
June 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author) 
Liu Chiung-shu, former Artistic Director (2008-2010), agrees that at Board 
meetings during her term, the members who served as government representatives did 
not normally express opinions, but the rest often gave advice according to their 
professional management and finance backgrounds. However, ‘neither paid much 
attention to the NCKSCC’s programming’ (Liu, interview of 25 May 2018, translated 
from Mandarin by the author). Confirming this, Wang Wei-ling, the Executive 
Secretary of the Board (2014-2016), comments that the MOC did not really get 
involved with the management of the Centre as they were conscious that they have to 
follow the arm’s-length principle. That is to say, the MOC did not ask the Centre to 
pursue the Ministry’s cultural policy. Instead, they would announce that some 
particular cultural policies would be supported by extra funding and grants and in this 
way, they would encourage rather than enforce (Wang, interview of 9 June 2018). 
Clearly, the Government is very circumspect with respect to their role on the Board 
and very cautious about how the public views government action there.  
Ping Heng, the Artistic Director (2004-2007) also reveals that, when the Centre 
was instituted as an arm’s-length organisation, ‘Key Performance Indicators’ (KPIs) 
were introduced by the Evaluation Committee, based on the goals approved by the 
MOE. The KPI figures related to income, box office, the number of performances, the 
size of audiences and so on. The most difficult part was the initial bargaining over 
setting the target numbers with the MOE’s Evaluation Committee. (Ping, interview of 
29 November 2015). Corroborating this, Wang Yun-yu, Executive Secretary of the 
Board (2004-2014) adds that, in the beginning, no one actually knew how to set up the 
system, and as a result, the content of the evaluation scheme and the KPI target figures 
were proposed by the Centre itself, and then the Committee revised them based on the 
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Centre’s original plan (Wang, interview of 14 June 2018). From this it is clear that the 
MOE wanted to agree numerical KPIs with which to assess the Centre’s performance 
across a range of goals, so that the results could be used in planning the annual budget 
and subsidies for the next year. However, it also exposes the weakness of assessing 
cultural performance in numerical terms, thereby potentially missing the intention of 
the cultural policy. 
To conclude, there is constant concern to maintain institutional autonomy without 
government intervention. Chairmen and Artistic Directors of the NCKSCC have been 
clear that there has been no direct government interference in the work of the Centre. 
This might give the impression that the Centre is completely autonomous and that 
government has no part to play in deciding what happens there. However, the Board 
and the Ministry’s Evaluation Committee play influential roles in the Centre’s 
operation and any conflict or influences are likely to come from them, as several of 
the NCKSCC’s Artistic Directors have mentioned. It depends on who is on the Board 
and, as the Centre’s former Chairman (2006-2007) Wu Jing-jyi points out, when the 
ruling party of the Government changes, the core policies of the Government also 
change. This naturally affects the NCKSCC at least in an indirect way. Wu explains: 
All the directors of the Board are appointed by the Government, which pays 
attention to the balance of cultural diversity and ethnic backgrounds. The 
Government doesn’t intervene in the NCKSCC’s operation, but the 
composition of the Board reflects the political and social atmosphere, which 
therefore has a clearly moderating influence. (Wu, interview of 3 December 
2015, translated from Mandarin by the author)  
According to Table 4.3, the overlapping membership between the CCA, NCAF, 
arts universities and the Centre is a sign that the circle of arts and culture professionals 
in Taiwan is a rather small ‘old boy’s network’. There is close personal contact within 
that sphere with the result that everybody on the Board, or the Evaluation Committee 
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and the senior staff at the Centre are likely to know one another well. They are all well 
aware of government intentions and are able to act sensitively with respect to the 
political situation. Wang Wen-yi, the first Artistic Director of the National Taichung 
Theatre (2014-2018), explains that there are many occasions, events or meetings that 
give opportunities to communicate with Ministers or government officials, so cultural 
issues were frequently discussed. In this situation the Ministers would ‘unofficially’ 
appraise the Centre’s goals and update the Centre on what kind of support the Ministry 
would offer (Wang, interview of 5 July 2018). What is more, since the Centre’s own 
objectives had been framed to be compatible with cultural policy, it was not difficult 
to ensure that its activities remained acceptable to government. 
It follows that if Artistic Directors claim that they are independent, they must also 
take responsibility for what happens at the Centre. Thus, accountability becomes their 
main concern. The Centre is allocated grant-in-aid each year by the Government, and 
the Ministers of the MOE and then the MOC are in turn themselves accountable to 
Taiwan’s parliament (the Legislative Yuan) for the way in which the money is spent. 
The MOE/MOC’s activities are related to cultural policy which sets out its objectives 
and forms the basis for the distribution of the money that the Executive Yuan has 
allocated. In order to demonstrate how the MOE/MOC is accounting for the money it 
has spent, it sets its sponsored bodies a series of KPIs via the Evaluation Committee, 
and recipients of MOE/MOC finance are expected to achieve the targets they have 
been set. 
So, is the NCKSCC autonomous? Given that it has to account for the money it 
has been allocated each year, and given that such money is allocated on the 
understanding that certain KPI targets are met, the Centre is clearly not entirely 
autonomous. Its activities are dictated within certain limits by its Ministry, as set out 
in the Ministry’s policy. Nevertheless, within those limits, according to the comments 
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by NCKSCC’s Artistic Directors referred to above, the Centres are insistent that the 
Ministry does not interfere in their work. 
 
4.3.1.3 The Programming Process 
Programming for a mixed-programme organisation is a process involving a series of 
choices: selecting work for the proper audience; deciding programme types and 
frequencies; and setting ticket prices for the programmes (Pick & Anderton, 1996: 89).  
Programming approaches, factors and types 
Hilppa Sorjonen (2011) introduces three different programming approaches: 
creativity-based, resource-based and mission-based, relating to research on market 
orientation in arts organisations. She explains that ‘in the creativity-based approach, 
the repertoire is an artwork created by one person based on a creative planning process’ 
whereas ‘in the resource-based approach, programming is guided by the available 
resource, both tangible and intangible’, and ‘in the mission-based approach, the 
organisation is guided by its mission’(Sorjonen, 2011: 9). The result is: 
There is a challenge for arts organisations to take customer needs into account 
in programming while at the same time responding to the needs of artists and 
media, not to mention to the need of the artistic director. This makes 
programming even more challenging (Sorjonen, 2011: 16).  
This implies that various factors influence a PAC’s programming, and also that the 
programming department is the core team of a PAC.  
When a PAC is a state or arm’s-length institution, the factors that affect its 
programming are likely to include the government’s cultural policy. A PAC’s mission, 
objectives and vision, especially a state PAC, indicates its programming direction, 
which through its choices creates an identity for the house in its taste, style and trends. 
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It also presents a collective identity through its artists and audience. In this way, it is 
possible for a PAC not only to establish its own character, but also to shape the cultural 
environment within the area and community in which it is located. Figure 4.1 
illustrates the relationship of three roles of a PAC. Each point of the tringle in this 
model interacts with the other two in determining the formulation of the programmes. 
Figure 4.1 Triangular interactive relationship of a PAC 
                   The government: cultural policy 
 
                
 
 The audience: the community               The PAC: programming 
Source: own compilation.  
As a national performing art centre with more than 50% of its income provided 
by the Government, the NCKSCC not only has to consider all these factors but it also 
needs to be aware of its social responsibility when creating its programmes. At the 
same time, the Government operates, in effect, as an audience in its own right by 
setting KPIs that are related to its cultural policy and instruct specific lines of 
programming for their achievement. This must also influence programming and is an 
example of Sorjonen’s ‘mission-based’ programming approach. 
In terms of a PAC’s performance, the triangle model of influences presented 
above indicates the relationship between Tony Micocci’s (2017: 63) three methods of 
generating programmes: produce, present and rent 21 . A PAC can create its own 
                                                          
21 Tony Micocci defines three ways in which PAC programmers provide shows for their 
audiences: ‘(1) they produce new shows for their stage; (2) they present shows produced by 
outside entities, based locally or elsewhere; (3) they rent their stages to third-party producers 
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productions by commissioning or collaborating with artists or companies and, if it has 
its own resident companies, it can also generate productions through them. Equally, a 
PAC may present shows through inviting or buying-in productions or repertoire from 
outside bodies. Rental, on the other hand, implies letting out the PAC as a space for 
outside artists or companies to show their own work. In this case, the PAC has little 
influence over the creative component of the shows that appear at its premises beyond 
selecting artists whose work it trusts and holding a potential veto over what is shown. 
These are not always mutually exclusive, there may be a degree of cross-over between 
the modes Mococci (2017: 64-65) illustrates the hybrid and varied methods of 
collaboration applied to those three programme types. This programming operating 
model is also used by the NCKSCC. 
Programming at the NCKSCC 
In order to understand the programming process of the NCKSCC Li Chia-chi and 
Huang Pen-ting, two former Programme Managers, were interviewed. Li (interviewed 
on 27 June 2018) was in post from 2012 to 2014 while Huang (interviewed on 3 July 
2018) was in post from 2014 to 2016. For each calendar year, there are a maximum of 
52 week-long programme slots to fill at the National Theatre (including the Grand 
Theatre and the Experimental Theatre) and there are up to 365 daily slots to fill at the 
National Concert Hall (including the main Concert Hall and the Recital Hall). There 
has been a Department in charge of programming since the Centre was launched.      
According to Liu Feng-shueh, the NCKSCC’s Director from 1988 to 1990, there 
was at one time a proposal to establish the NCKSCC’s own performing companies, 
such as a symphony orchestra, a choir, a theatre and a dance company, but this proposal 
                                                          
and presenters’ (2017: 63). These three core ways can be expanded with variations as (a) 
hybrid producing: co-producing, commissioning or co-commissioning; (b) hybrid presenting: 
co-presenting, block booking, opportunity booking; (c) renting variations: resident company 
rental relationships, exclusive programming relationships (2017: 64-65).   
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only resulted in a single resident company, the National Symphony Orchestra (Liu, 
interview of 27 November 2015). Lee Huey-mei, the Artistic Director between 2014 
and 2018, and who has worked at the Centre ever since it opened, points out that the 
NCKSCC did not originally consider itself to be a venue open for rent. However, the 
reality was that the Centre didn’t have the capacity to fill its calendar with productions 
because of insufficient budget. She further explains that during the early years, the arts 
environment in Taiwan was very vigorous and professional venues were in high 
demand. As a result, the Centre was opened up to rental in the second year after its 
launch (Lee, interview of 7 December 2015). 
Thus since 1988, the venues have been open to outside applicants and there is a 
Rental Programming Committee that operates the NCKSCC’s Management 
Regulations for Programme Quality to evaluate the quality of proposed rental 
programmes and to make sure they are suitable for presentation. Liu Feng-shueh, 
Director from 1988 to 1990, who introduced regulated rental programmes during her 
term of office, was clear that the supply of venues cannot meet the demand for them. 
She also explained that in practice, the rental fee charged does not cover the costs to 
the Centre of mounting programmes that are brought in and this means that the 
Government indirectly subsidises the private presenters. In Liu’s view, this is not a 
free market mechanism, but rather a system that has been selected by the Centre itself 
in which the Artistic Director is in a position to decide the types of rental programmes 
to be staged and to select artistic companies when constructing a balanced annual 
programme (Liu, interview of 27 November 2015). 
    The proportion of rental to the Centre’s own programmes has varied from time to 
time during the regime of different Directors. Liu claims that the percentage of rental 
programmes is decided by the Director who considers all the aspects and conditions 
(Liu, interview of 27 November 2015). Ju Tzong-ching, another former Director 
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(2001-2004), who is the current Chairman of the NPAC, comments that when he was 
appointed to his post by the MOE, the NCKSCC was at the lowest ebb of its history 
in terms of programming. Only 17% of the programmes staged there were created by 
the Centre and all the rest were brought in by companies who rented the venues. 
However, looking on the positive side, he regarded this as a good time to begin a new 
regime since the political climate had been newly energised in 2000 with the first 
change in government from the KMT to DPP, and the cultural environment was 
changing towards the creation of a Taiwanese identity. With support from the MOE as 
well as the artistic community, he took decisive action and increased the proportion of 
the Centre’s own programmes to more than 30% and had a target of 50%, although 
this would have required a larger budget from the MOE (Ju, interview of 3 December 
2015). 
    Table 4.4 shows the annual number of performances given and the number of 
audience members attending the performances, along with the ratio of the Centre’s 
own programmes and their box office income against rental programmes and rental 
income from 2004 to 2017. The Centre charges the venue rental fee from the private 
presenters who receive their own box office income from their programmes. 
Approximately two thirds of the NCKSCC’s performances were rental. Although both 
proportions of box office income form the Centre’s own programmes and venue rental 
income are relatively lower (which shows the main income of the Centre is from the 
Government), the proportion of income from venue rental is only half, or even less 
than half, of the box office income from the Centre’s own programmes. This is why 
the rental charged does not reflect the actual cost of hosting rented shows, and why the 




Table 4.4 The annual total of performances and audience at the NCKSCC (2004-2017)   
Source: own compilation from the NCKSCC annual report 2004-2017. 
Although one could argue that the NCKSCC’s rental programmes are in some 
sense ‘programmed’ by the Centre, the Centre’s own programmes are the essence of 
the NCKSCC’s offer which represents its character, and that is the main focus of this 
thesis. Following Mocicci’s (2017) programme classification, the NCKSCC’s own 
programmes cover those produced and presented by the Centre. Also, due to various 
circumstances, there are not only produced/co-produced programmes, but also 
commissioned/co-commissioned programmes under the ‘produce’ category as well as 
purely invited or co-presented programmes under the ‘present’ category. Any of these 
programmes are commonly planned at least two years ahead and they take priority for 
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(% of total 
income) 
No. of rental 
performances 







2004 965 633,068 322 (33%) 34% 643 (67%) 15% 
2005 996 624,131 307 (31%) 16% 689 (69%) 8% 
2006 1022 700,668 383 (37%) 41% 639 (63%) 5% 
2007 964 623,823 229 (24%) 18% 727 (76%) 8% 
2008 979 625,974 286 (29%) 17% 693 (71%) 8% 
2009 968 642,576 279 (29%) 21% 689 (71%) 9% 
2010 981 653,856 260 (27%) 22% 721 (73%) 11% 
2011 1,030 688,427 265 (26%) 26% 765 (74%) 11% 
2012 1,052 675,891 254 (24%) 28% 798 (76%) 11% 
2013 1,072 689,161 242 (24%) 28% 830 (76%) 13% 
2014 1,093 710,952 264 (24%) 29% 829 (76%) 12% 
2015 823 518,162 233(28%) 28% 595 (72%) 14% 
2016 861 562,602 174 (20%) 29% 687 (80%) 15% 
2017 1,049 682,676 276 (26%) 32% 773 (74%) 16% 
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each venue, whereas rental programmes are selected only one year ahead, if and when 
space is free. The Programming Department, working to the Director collects and 
provides programme materials, and its executive team, under the Artistic Director is 
responsible for preparing the programmes which are submitted to the Board for 
approval.  
According to Huang Pen-ting, the NCKSCC’s Programme Manager from 2014 
to 2016, (interview of 3 July 2018), before detailed programming begins, the Centre 
has normally made plans for the future of different lengths: long-term (5 years), mid-
term (3 years) and short-term (annual) plans which are submitted to both the Ministry 
and the Board. These plans commonly outline broad directions, such as ‘consolidate a 
Taiwanese arts environment’, ‘promote international exchange’, ‘create classics’ and 
‘build accessibility for diversity’. After setting down the goals above, every 
department at the NCKSCC then has to prepare detailed plans showing how those 
goals would be achieved. For the Programming Department, this means designing a 
plan of programmes for at least two years in advance, following the goals set and 
addressing any comments offered. For example, according to Huang Pen-ting, in the 
overview of the annual programmes from 2010 to 2015, the aims of the Programming 
Department were: 
1. Introduce further outstanding international programmes and further 
promote talented Taiwanese programmes to expand the horizon of 
Taiwanese audiences. 
2. Strengthen international and cross-border collaborations. 
3. Maintain the focus on Taiwanese artists by offering comprehensive 
support and assistance. 
4. Explore new Taiwanese talent, encouraging new productions, and 
assisting their international promotion.  
(Huang, interview of 3 July 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author) 
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The Programming Department proposes its detailed programme to the Artistic 
Director who, after discussion, submits it to the Programming Committee. The Board 
is then asked to comment on the overall direction of the programme. According to Li 
Chia-chi, the NCKSCC’s Programme Manager from 2012 to 2014, (interview of 27 
June 2018), since this programme plan is formulated according to the goals approved 
by the Board, the detailed programme is normally accepted without further discussion 
because the Board is mainly concerned with major issues such as strategic planning 
and budgets. Although government representatives sit on the Board, in practice they 
have played little part in meetings and have often been represented by deputies. This 
may be because of time pressures but perhaps also because they perceive cultural 
affairs to be of lower priority than other responsibilities in their portfolio. The time 
scale of programming is dictated by the need to generate contracts with artists 18 
months or 2 years in advance, so the programming timetable is regular, slow, done in 
yearly blocks and long in advance of actual performances. In other words, the 
mechanism of programming is stable, continuing, and longstanding.  
Lee Huey-mei (interview of 7 December 2015) comments that during her 30 years’ 
experience at the NCKSCC, overall shifts in programming, followed the tastes and 
preferences of different Directors but also changes in society in general. As Micocci 
(2019:81-82) suggests, ‘programming involves both wise choices in show selection 
and contextualisation of the performance as an appealing educational and lifestyle 
experience for the patron’. The ‘patron’ in the case of the NCKSCC is the sponsoring 







4.3.1.4 The Correlation between Programming and Cultural Policy 
This section concentrates on the correlation between the NCKSCC’s system of 
programming and government cultural policy to see whether the reality of 
programming remains autonomous and immune from undue government influence. 
Government policy with respect to Taiwan’s cultural life is expressed in general 
terms without specifying details of implementation (see Chapter 3 above). Policy 
makers may seek specialist advice when they set national policies because they are 
politicians and not artists and are unlikely to have experience of arts programming, or 
even to be aware of the potential activities that might be commissioned in order to 
fulfil their policy aims. According to Lin Fang-Yi, a former official of the Ministry of 
Culture: 
Officials in the MOC regard themselves as professional civil servants and rely 
on professional arts experts to offer ideas and take decisions when making 
detailed policy under the Ministry of Culture’s mission. Such things are left 
to artistic directors whose task is to provide a mechanism by which arts 
policies can be realised. Thus, policies are set in general terms without 
reference to specific activities. (Lin, interview of 8 June 2018, translated from 
Mandarin by the author) 
The influence of politicians on the development of the performing arts in Taiwan is, 
in the main, to provide finance and to oversee the provision of suitable venues in which 
their policy aims can be brought about. This means that the development of the 
performing arts in Taiwan has largely been the result of activity by artists and arts 
administrators under the umbrella of government policy, rather than being deliberate 





The NCKSCC as a government agency 
Before the NCKSCC was made an arm’s-length non-departmental public body in 2004, 
it was under the administration of the Ministry of Education and had no direct 
relationship with the Council for Cultural Affairs. All the Directors still living who 
were interviewed for this thesis (Liu Feng-shueh (1988-1990), Hu Yao-heng (1992-
1993), and Ju Tzong-ching (2001-2004)) insisted that while the NCKSCC was under 
the MOE they were the decision makers on programming with no intervention from 
the Government 
Liu Feng-shueh, believes that the MOE never gave orders or instructions during 
her term, because the NCKSCC’s high reputation with the public meant that it could 
be left to its own devices without interference. On the other hand, the CCA, although 
it had no direct administrative relationship with the NCKSCC, had a substantial budget 
for presenting programmes and needed a professional arts management team and, most 
importantly, a venue. Because the annual budget from the MOE mainly covered 
building maintenance, equipment, and management expenses (about £4,000,000 per 
year in 1988-1990) not enough remained for presenting programmes. The best course 
of action was therefore to co-present programmes in collaboration with the CCA. 
According to Liu, ‘the co-presented programmes needed to be approved by both sides, 
but the MOE had no objection to this type of collaboration’ (Liu, interview of 27 
November 2015, translated from Mandarin by the author). Hu Yao-heng, Liu’s 
successor as NCKSCC Director, says that once a Director was appointed, the MOE 
gave its full trust and authority, but the CCA, because they were not experts in the 
performing arts, often asked the professional opinion of the NCSKCC’s Directors if it 
needed to present works to fulfil its cultural policy, and that is why the NCKSCC and 
CCA co-presented programmes. According to Hu, this kind of collaboration meant 
that it saved a large amount of money and allowed the Centre to present more 
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programmes that took into account the interest of the audience because box office 
income is critical (Hu, interview of 25 May 2018).  
Lee Huey-mei, the Centre’s Artistic Director from 2014 to 2018, says that the 
MOE naturally gave an educational slant to its thinking about policies and its 
interpretation of the three main directions: ‘art education extension’, ‘social education 
supplement’ and ‘international exchange encouragement’ that were set up at the 
Centre’s launch (interview of 7 December 2015). Nevertheless, having begun work at 
the Centre from its opening:  
Ever since I started to work there, the ‘three directions’ already existed. Over 
the years, we have set up the Centre’s mission, goals and objectives according 
to these three directions, even if they appeared in different wording. Those 
directions have been present consistently. (Lee, interview of 7 December 
2015, translated from Mandarin by the author) 
The MOE has therefore consistently preferred the Centre to create its own policies and 
then to refer them back to the MOE, within the very broad framework that stresses the 
link between education and the arts and the need for international exchange.  
Although the CCA was given responsibility for implementing national cultural 
policy at its foundation in 1981, there is a difficulty in considering the correlation 
between its policies and the NCKSCC because the NCKSCC was under the MOE 
rather than the CCA between 1987 and 2014. As a result, the CCA did not at that time 
have the political power to oversee the NCKSCC’s work on cultural policy 
implementation, even though it was nominally in charge of performing arts affairs. On 
appointment, CCA Ministers regularly prepare a new policy statement, but the 
evidence is that the NCKSCC carried on with its existing plans without apparently 
making changes in line with any new cultural policy statements. Thus, although there 
have been rapid changes of CCA Minister, the NCKSCC’s goals have remained 
largely unchanging. Naturally, the NCKSCC was delighted to collaborate with the 
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CCA if it meant that the Centre could save money and also diversify its programmes. 
Nevertheless, according to Hu Yao-heng, ‘it was the Centre’s right to decide if it was 
appropriate to collaborate with the CCA’ (interview of 25 May 2018, translated from 
Mandarin by the author), and Liu Feng-shueh emphasises that ‘the CCA had many 
policies, but the Centre also had its own intentions and its own momentum. It all 
depends whether they could coordinate with our situation’ (interview of 27 November 
2015, translated from Mandarin by the author).  
After becoming an arm’s-length organisation 
The year 2004 was a crucial point in the NCKSCC’s development because it was then 
set up as a non-departmental public body with an arm’s-length relationship with the 
MOE. Because of this, as pointed out above, the NCKSCC’s Artistic Directors 
themselves took on responsibility for planning decisions and their background, 
political orientation and artistic preferences shaped the programming direction for the 
Centre. Nevertheless, Lee Huey-mei also points out ‘these people are also well aware 
of, and sensitive to the political climate of the day, as well as the social milieu in which 
the Centre operated’ (Lee, interview of 7 December 2015, translated from Mandarin 
by the author). This indicates the subtle and nuanced situation for the Centre’s 
autonomy as discussed in Section 4.3.1.2 above.  
From 2004, the NCKSCC became more independent and autonomous under its 
newly established Board which played a crucial role in the Centre’s programming. 
Wang Yun-yu, Executive Secretary of the Board (2004-2014) reveals that when the 
Centre’s programming plan was proposed to the Board, the Artistic Director was asked 
to convince the Board members that the plan connected to the core mission of the 
Centre. Each Artistic Director would have different views and preferences which 
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needed their own form of words to tell the story and make connections with the 
Centre’s objectives. However, over the years, Wang recalls: 
The main goals of the Centre have been remarkably consistent, and it seems 
that these main goals can always apply to the national cultural policy whether 
the Ministers of the CCA/MOC changed frequently or not because national 
cultural policies are worded so widely; this is not hard to do. (Wang, interview 
of 14 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author) 
That is to say, the direction of cultural policy has remained essentially the same and is 
widely recognised. The NCKSCC’s annual aims are a guide to the direction of its 
programming and, according to Programme Manager, Huang Pen-ting, since 2005, 
they have been remarkably consistent: 
1. To produce good quality programmes sourced in Taiwan. 
2. To represent the world outside Taiwan by empowering an international 
performing arts platform. 
3. To build up the reputation of the NCKSCC’s production brand.  
4. To develop the precinct of National Theatre & Concert Hall into an area 
where everyone can enjoy the arts.  
(Huang, interview of 3 July 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author) 
The only change has been the addition in 2011 of a fifth goal ‘To pass on experiences 
gained in the NCKSCC’s work to other upcoming performing arts centres’ (ibid.). This 
addition was made at the time when the new NPAC complexes were in planning. These 
aims are very similar to those set out in the Government cultural policy (see Chapter 
3) and would not be difficult to be satisfied by the detailed projects or programmes of 
the Centre’s programming department. Nor would it be difficult to make connections 
with the national cultural policy through carefully chosen words.  
Yet former Artistic Director (2007-2008) Yang Chi-wen argues that this 
similarity is the result of both the Ministry and the Centre following a universal path, 
rather than the Centre following the Ministry’s direction. He explains:  
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National cultural policy and the NCKSCC’s policy are analogous because 
they are both focused on ‘general’ and ‘positive’ approaches. The result is 
that they follow a similar direction by, for example, encouraging international 
exchange and supporting Taiwanese companies and artists. But the policies 
are so generally vague and non-specific that it is hard to say that the NCKSCC 
is affected by national cultural policy. (Yang, interview of 14 June 2018, 
translated from Mandarin by the author)  
Huang Pi-twan, another NCKSCC Artistic Director (2010-2013) who was also 
Minister of the CCA (2008-2009) again emphasises that the process of programming 
at the NCKSCC is based on the mission and goals of the Centre, but does not have 
much to do with national cultural policy. If it sometimes appears that programmes 
follow government cultural policy that is because the NCKSCC spontaneously realises 
or senses the needs of society which have also given rise to the current cultural policy 
(Huang, interview of 12 December 2015). In other words, programming happens in 
parallel with the formulation of national cultural policy rather than following it. 
The main thrust of national policy as set by the President of the country is very 
comprehensive with non-specific aspirations such as ‘promoting arts from a 
Taiwanese perspective’. All ministries, as the second level in the Government 
hierarchy, interpret the President’s top-level priority by setting policies for their own 
area of responsibility, but they tend to remain equally non-specific and general in 
nature. So, for the CCA/MOC, policy priorities would be, for example, ‘support 
Taiwanese companies’ or ‘develop young Taiwanese artistic talents’ which would 
correspond to the three main directions set by the MOE, and then these were 
dovetailed into the objectives of the NCKSCC.  
This kind of relationship between the NCKSCC and national cultural policy 
carried on even after 2004 when the Board of the Centre was brought into being and 
the Minister of the CCA officially became one of the Board Directors, representing 
the Government. All the Chairmen or Artistic Directors spoken to in the interviews 
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listed in Table 4.3 in section 4.3.1.2 claimed that there has never been specific policy 
instructions from the Government dictating how the NCKSCC should work. However, 
both the Artistic Director and the Board of the NCKSCC need to be sufficiently 
sensitive to the reality of government policies and ambitions that when the Centre’s 
objectives and programmes are created and agreed they are attuned to government 
policy in a general rather than in any specific way.  
The Programme Managers’ views  
    Turning to a different angle to investigate this issue, two of the NCKSCC’s 
Programme Managers: Li Chia-chi, Programme Manager (2012-2014) and Huang 
Pen-ting, Programme Manager (2014-2016) have offered their personal perspective 
concerning programming. Li emphasises that as Programme Manager, what he needs 
to keep in mind are the goals and objectives of the Centre, rather than government 
cultural policy’. Li continues: 
The factors that influence programming decisions are the artistic preferences 
and professional judgement of the Artistic Director, with the assistance of the 
Programme Manager, rather than the concerns of cultural policy. And of 
course, the Programme Manager also has preferences and judgement. 
Consistently, the core of our programming is always the quality and creativity 
of the programmes themselves. (Li, interview of 27 June 2018, translated 
from Mandarin by the author) 
Li’s successor, Huang Pen-ting, agrees and adds that as the NCKSCC was the only 
national PAC when she was Programme Manager, the public expected its programmes 
to represent every aspect of Taiwanese society. As a result, the Centre’s programmes 
tended to be diverse and comprehensive. However, ‘this is an approach that the Centre 
has set for itself because the Artistic Director and the programming team are sensitive 
to public opinion. It is not a government requirement’ (Huang, interview of 3 July 
2018, translated from Mandarin by the author).  
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To summarise the interviews, there is no evidence of government interference 
with the NCKSCC’s programming. However, there is a sophisticated collaborative 
relationship in presenting programmes and an implicit influence from the 
Government’s cultural policy that takes two forms. In the first place the Government 
has broad policy directives which the NCKSCC is obliged to follow, but there is in 
addition a more subtle consequence that is exerted by Ministers in conversation behind 
the scenes rather than by formal and public direct orders.  
The MOE, the Government department that for many years had authority over 
the NCKSCC, behaved like a messenger by communicating policy based on the 
current laws, but it involved itself very little with the NCKSCC’s operations, especially 
programming, as long as conditions remained stable and ran safely. The MOC has only 
been the supervisory authority since 2014 but it has scrupulously abided by the arm’s-
length principle and there is no reason to doubt that it will continue to do so in the 
future. Wu Jing-jyi, the Chairman (2006-2007) and consultant to many governmental 
cultural agencies, emphasises that national cultural policy makers would not in practice 
have the knowledge to spell out all the details of policy implementation because that 
is the task of the NCKSCC. Wu stresses: 
It is the responsibility of the Artistic Director and programming team to 
comply with the basic elements of the cultural policy, which they do 
implicitly and naturally. Decisions about what kind of programmes and 
events should be presented at the NCKSCC are the responsibility of 
NCKSCC itself. (Wu, interview of 3 December 2015, translated from 
Mandarin by the author) 
Interestingly, the term of office of the Centre’s Board members and of the Artistic 
Director ends one or two years after Taiwan’s presidential election, which takes place 
every four years. This means that there is an overlap between the arrival of a new 
government and the final years of the NCKSCC’s top level management team. For 
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example, in 2008 the Government was KMT, but the NCKSCC management had been 
appointed by the previous DPP government. And in 2016 the Government was DPP 
but the NPAC management was appointed by the previous KMT administration.  
Nevertheless, Liu Chiung-shu, NCKSCC Artistic Director (2008-2010), observes 
that mutual respect between governments and the NCKSCC/NPAC top management 
means that the programmes keep running as they were planned. There is general 
agreement that the arm’s-length principle is well conducted and that artistic 
considerations always override politics. (Liu, interview of 25 May 2018). So, for the 
NCKSCC, the programme of work presented must be exciting, innovative and popular, 
but at the same time fall within the limits set by MOE/MOC policy KPIs. Exceeding 
those limits in some way would break the trust between the Minister and the Director. 
It would risk a reprimand from the Minister and call into question future funding.  
 
4.3.2 The Launch of the National Performing Arts Centre 
On 9 January 2014, the Legislative Yuan approved the Act for Establishment of the 
National Performing Arts Centre, a new Board of Directors was set up in March that 
year and the new Centre was officially opened on 2 April 2014 when the NCKSCC 
became the basis of the new National Performing Arts Centre, an umbrella 
organisation consisting of the Taipei-based National Theatre & Concert Hall (NTCH) 
along with two new venues. The Centre was later transferred to the MOC from the 
MOE. Both the new centres were delayed in their opening, but the National Taichung 
Theatre (NTT) in central Taiwan opened in September 2016, and the National 
Kaohsiung Center for the Arts (Weiwuying)22 in south Taiwan opened in October 
                                                          
22 ‘Weiwuying’ was originally the name of a military camp which had served as an army 
recruitment base in the 1950s but later fell into disuse. The land was re-purposed as a park and 
arts space, and was chosen by the CCA to establish the new national performing arts centre in 
2003 (The Preparatory Office of Weiwuying, 2016). Although the new centre’s official name 
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2018. The original NCKSCC resident company, the National Symphony Orchestra 
also became an affiliated performance company of the NPAC. These initiatives have 
been heralded as a milestone in the development of Taiwan’s performing arts because 
there had been no new professional national performing arts venue created since the 
NCKSCC was launched in 1987 (NPAC, 2019).  
The NPAC’s aims are ‘to enhance the level of national performing arts’, ‘to 
strengthen the capability for international competition’ and thereby ‘to start the 
cultural innovation construction for the new era of Taiwan’s performing arts 
development’ (NPAC, 2019). This thesis looks at the NPAC’s programming from 
1987 to 2017 shortly after the NTT had opened, and Weiwuying was about to open. 
However, programming data for the two new centres is insufficient for useful analysis 
so the research reported here focuses on the NCKSCC/NTCH’s programming.  
 
4.3.2.1 The Idea  
According to Huang Pi-twan, CCA Minister from 2008 to 2009, who initiated the 
design of the NPAC, the original idea of establishing arts and cultural venues in north, 
central, south and east Taiwan was one of ‘The New Ten Projects’ proposed by the 
central government in 2003. The aim was to make a more equal balance in the cultural 
life of the different regions of Taiwan. This plan later changed dramatically and, as far 
as the performing arts are concerned, Weiwuying was the only survivor of it. At that 
time, the idea of changing the NCKSCC into the National Performing Arts Centre had 
not emerged (Huang, interview of 4 December 2015). The Preparatory Office of the 
Weiwuying Centre for the Arts was established in 2006 under the CCA. With the 
                                                          




NCKSCC existing in the north of Taiwan, Weiwuying was intended to create a balance 
between the north and the south (The Preparatory Office of Weiwuying, 2016). 
However, the original vision of making a similar balance across every region of 
Taiwan was forgotten.  
Institutionally, the NCKSCC was under the MOE as a ‘social educational’ venue 
when it was planned, but by contrast, Weiwuying was directly under the CCA (later 
the MOC) as a professional performing centre from the start. By that time, the 
NCKSCC had become Taiwan’s first non-departmental public body and in order to 
cover both it and the new centre, the CCA created an umbrella organisation for the two 
centres instead of creating a second separate non-departmental body. Huang Pi-twan 
confirms that she proposed the structure of the umbrella organisation NPAC. She felt 
that since the NCKSCC had nearly 30 years rich experience in how to operate a 
performing arts centre in all aspects such as programming, stage management, front of 
house management, international exchange and ticketing systems, there was great 
benefit in making the new performing arts centre a partner so that it could to learn all 
of those skills. More importantly, Huang saw the advantage of the NCKSCC’s 
intuitional status: 
The NCKSCC had been a non-departmental public body for a decade. It was 
experienced in how to function in that mode and it would be ideal for the new 
centre become part of it, so that time and manpower could be saved. Besides, 
I did not think we had enough arts professionals in Taiwan to form a separate 
Board for the Weiwuying. (Huang, interview of 4 December 2015, translated 
from Mandarin by the author)  
Since NDPBs were a novelty in Taiwan there was little experience of how best to 
operate them at that time, but Taiwanese society seemed to believe that this arm’s-
length principle was an effective way to operate arts organisations.  
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According to Wang Wen-yi, the first Artistic Director (2014-2018) of the 
National Taichung Theatre, when the members of the Legislative Yuan deliberated the 
Act of Establishment for the National Performing Arts Centre, the representatives from 
central Taiwan argued for an additional venue in central Taiwan in order to create a 
proper regional balance. Actually, in the Government’s 2003 ‘New Ten Projects’, the 
arts organisation planned for Taichung was a ‘Guggenheim Museum’. However, the 
cost was so huge that the plan was never realised and it was then deleted from the 
national project. Instead of a museum, the city of Taichung took the land it had 
earmarked to create a performing arts centre, authorised at the municipal level. 
However, the Taichung city government soon realised that it could not itself afford to 
run the centre that they had planned, so they decided to ‘donate’ the venue to the central 
government (Wang, interview of 5 July 2018).       
This would mean that the NPAC would have three complexes in Taiwan. This 
‘perfect idea’ was supported by all members of the Legislative Yuan and the MOC 
was obliged to agree to expand the scale of the NPAC’s umbrella to three complexes. 
The MOC was reluctant to accept this new responsibility as it would not be in 
accordance with the national plan and it would lead to a complex pattern of ownership. 
Moreover, it would add to the Ministry’s financial burden. Wang Wen-yi, comments:  
This meant that there was a lack of vision on national cultural policy. The fact 
that there are now three centres in three regional cities sounds sensible, but 
this is not the result of deliberate planning through a cultural policy. It is more 
a question of political convenience. (Wang, interview of 5 July 2018, 
translated from Mandarin by the author)  
In reality, while it may now sound logical to have three NPAC venues in north, central 
and south Taiwan to make a good nationwide balance, it is reasonable to ask why the 
Government did not start with a comprehensive plan or follow the original ‘New Ten 
Projects’ idea to make a proper geographical balance across Taiwan. What is more, 
211 
 
Taiwan is traditionally divided into four parts, north, central, south and east, so the 
three-centre scheme which omits east Taiwan still leaves an unbalanced plan. 
Geographically, the NPAC cannot be seen as truly national until there is also a venue 
in east Taiwan.  
This is a reflection of Taiwan’s cultural hierarchy and also a hegemony that exists 
in the Government’s performing arts policy which continues to be perpetuated, perhaps 
unthinkingly. In addition, although the idea to establish new national performing arts 
centres had been proposed many years ago, there was a long gap between the opening 
of the NCKSCC in 1987 and any action to make other national performing centres a 
reality. This is good evidence that performing arts policy takes a low priority for the 
Government. Even though performing arts companies are lively and well developed in 
Taiwan, government attention has been elsewhere.  
 
4.3.2.2 A New Picture with Two New Venues 
Both the National Taichung Theatre and the National Kaohsiung Center for the Arts 
(Weiwuying) were planned after Taiwan’s move to democracy, indicating that 
Taiwanese society had then become more open-minded, liberal and confident in its 
Taiwanese identity. The two new venues skip Wolff’s (2019) first three generations of 
PAC development and leap directly into generation 4 as a ‘multi-functional nexus with 
strong connections to the local community’. The functions and focus of these two 
centres are now totally different from the time when the NCKSCC was opened 30 
years ago. At that time the NCKSCC was a high arts venue for the elite that gave 
prestige to the capital and even to the whole country. But both new centres show their 
commitment to local connections and are keen to inject a local perspective into the arts.  
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Institutionally, before opening, both new centres were under the non-
departmental public body NPAC so they were conscious of their independence and 
autonomy. They were also aware of the NCKSCC’s evolutionary history and were 
determined to learn from that experience and not to spend time in repeating the journey 
that the NCKSCC had already travelled. The Board of the NPAC has the same number 
of members as that of the NCKSCC and still includes representatives from the 
Government (Laws & Regulations Database of the ROC, 2016). Nevertheless, the 
Board’s responsibilities now cover three centres rather than one, which is likely to 
concentrate their minds on issues of broad policy rather than on detailed programmes. 
In other words, the contribution from governmental representatives is diminishing. 
Wang Wen-yi, the first Artistic Director of the NTT (2014-2018), recalls: 
The Board members from the Ministry of Education and Foreign Affairs 
seldom comment at Board meetings. I felt that they attended meetings 
because they had to. The Board member from the Ministry of Culture would 
‘remind’ meetings of the general policy direction, which was not a problem 
since the Ministry’s policy directions normally matched the NPAC’s 
objectives. I believe both the MOC and NPAC are on the same page as far as 
the performing arts are concerned, and the MOC is really helpful in allocating 
budgets. All in all, the MOC is very cautious and respectful of the arm’s-
length principle. (Wang, interview of 5 July 2018, translated from Mandarin 
by the author)  
Chien Wen-ping, the first Artistic Director of Weiwuying, agrees with this and adds 
that sometimes Board members who are government representatives explained what 
their ministries were currently promoting and that there were grants available. 
However, how Weiwuying responded this information was entirely its own decision 
(Chien, interview of 1 June 2018). 
It is also notable that the NPAC’s board members requested a seat on the Board 
for Hakka and indigenous people, and also representatives from the regions where the 
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Centre is located (MOC, 2018). This enthusiasm for broad representation on the Board 
was not evident when the NCKSCC’s Board was originally set up and it demonstrates 
how cultural diversity and localism have become important for Taiwanese society 
today. 
Significantly, Wang Wen-yi, pointed out that even though the MOC respects the 
arm’s-length principle, other government departments are not used to working in this 
way and are not properly aware that the NPAC is not a government institution. This 
means that departments such as the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, the Executive Yuan and the National Audit Office, still scrutinise the NPAC 
as though it were a government organisation. They habitually ask detailed questions 
and attempt to impose bureaucratic requirements when, for example, wanting to apply 
government financial regulations to the NPAC. This is very frustrating for the NPAC 
team and, according to Wang, ‘the MOC should spend more time communicating with 
other government departments rather than leaving the NPAC to deal with issues 
brought up by them’ (Wang, interview of 5 July 2018, translated from Mandarin by the 
author). 
These two new centres have developed programme plans which are closely 
connected to their local communities and this again reflects current thoughts about 
Taiwanese identity and liberal status. This is a very different approach from that of the 
NCKSCC which, when it was launched in 1987, naturally followed the Chinese 
identity and political climate of that time. The compatibility in cultural policy between 
the Government and the NCKSCC meant that there was no pressure for the arm’s-
length principle to be disregarded and that situation remains today since the policies 
of the Government and the NPAC are still on the same page. Wang Wen-yi, the first 
Artistic Director of the NTT (2014-2018), explains that ‘the similarity between the 
MOC’s cultural policy and NPAC’s objectives, which meant that they do not conflict 
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with one another, is the result of great minds thinking alike’ (Wang, interview of 5 
July 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author). Chien Wen-ping, the first Artistic 
Director of Weiwuying agrees: 
Honestly speaking, we did not take account of the MOC’s cultural policy. 
Nevertheless, at the end of day, you would find that their cultural policy and 
our objectives all point towards the same goals, such as localisation and 
cultural equality. We are actually doing the same thing in aiming at how to 
make the performing arts rooted in the community and how to promote them 
to everyone effectively. All in all, what we do and what the MOC cultural 
policy sets out are just the same. (Chien, interview of 1 June 2018, translated 
from Mandarin by the author) 
Influences on programming from politics and from national or cultural identity 
are not an issue for the two centres. Wang Wen-yi emphasises:  
When doing the programming I don’t feel any political or identity factors 
influence us because I think Taiwan’s most important value is diversity and 
resilience. People nowadays clearly acknowledge it, highly appreciate it and 
are very proud of it in Taiwan. It becomes second nature as part of our life 
and people no longer need to underscore it all the time. For us, the most 
important thing is the quality of the programmes. (Wang, interview of 5 July 
2018, translated from Mandarin by the author)   
Chien Wen-ping of Weiwuying agrees with this and adds that the are many challenges 
for programming, but ideology and identity are not are not among them. Chien explains 
that originally when the structure of the NPAC was limited to the current National 
Theatre & Concert Hall (NTCH) in Taipei and a new centre in Kaohsiung, the position 
of Weiwuying was thought of as ‘NTCH southern version’, as if it were a branch. 
However, this is not the way it is seen today as the Weiwuying is a unique individual 
performing arts centre with its own character. He stresses: 
For a long time, Taiwan only had a single performing arts centre, the NTCH, 
and everything was measured against the NTCH standard. I feel it is a new 
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start now. This is not just creating a balance for the different regions of 
Taiwan; it is time to turn Taiwan’s performing arts axis upside down and 
establish a new environment. (Chien, interview of 1 June 2018, translated 
from Mandarin by the author) 
The reality is that, although the three component members of the NPAC share a 
common mission of cultivating talent (creativity, curation, administration, technician, 
production and global advancement); international collaboration (joint collaboration 
with global organisations, collaboration in international productions, connecting with 
other theatres); and local development (professional theatre management, outstanding 
programmes, joint collaboration, education and community) (NTT, 2016), they do not 
duplicate each other; they have different tasks and objectives with different characters 
based on the region where they are located. As a result, they develop their own 
strategies and identities.  
Even the original member, the NTCH, feels this clear distinction although Lee 
Huey-mei, Artistic Director from 2014 to 2018, worries that the size of NPAC has now 
tripled from its original single centre but the Government budget has not kept pace. 
Nevertheless, in Lee’s opinion it has been a very positive start for Taiwan’s performing 
arts scene because the three centres can collaborate, co-commission, co-produce and 
co-invite programmes. Also, more centres means more opportunities for Taiwanese 
artists and companies. The market has expanded both internally and internationally 
and Taiwan has become more appealing for international artists to visit. The result is 
that the performing arts are more accessible for audiences nation-wide and the NPAC’s 






4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has investigated the development of the performing arts and of 
performing arts centres in Taiwan. Its aim has been to show how the Government 
supports them and to reveal the relationship between the Government and the 
NCKSCC/NPAC. It begins with the discussion on the definition of ‘performing arts’, 
and makes a distinction between ‘performance arts’ and ‘performing arts’ in the 
Taiwanese context. For practical reasons this thesis restricts the definition of 
performing arts to theatre (contemporary and traditional), dance and music, and by 
extension to any new kind of performing art presented on stage. The chapter continues 
by exploring the evolution of Taiwan’s performing arts in relation to Taiwanese 
identity and performing arts policy as well as the development of its performing arts 
centres. It then concentrates on the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (later 
the National Performing Arts Centre) to examine the correlation between cultural 
policy and cultural autonomy. 
    The research shows that the development of Taiwan’s performing arts since 1949 
reflects the change of the political system from authoritarianism to democracy. It is 
also closely associated with the related change in Taiwanese identity from an era 
dominated by the supremacy of Chinese culture to a commitment to creating a 
contemporary Chinese performing arts landscape in Taiwan which is conscious of 
Western influences. Recent emphasis has been on searching out Taiwanese roots and 
creating work that reflects the diversity of Taiwaneseness (Taiwan shing, 台灣性).  
The establishment of the CCA in 1981 raised culture to Cabinet-level in the 
Government and the formation of the NCAF in 1996, along with government subsidy 
for the arts, acknowledged that financial support can benefit both the public and the 
Government. Before the establishment of the NCKSCC in 1987, the Government had 
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established performing arts ‘venues’ rather than true performing arts centres with 
functioning programming departments. For decades after its opening, the NCKSCC 
remained the only national professional PAC in Taiwan until the formation of the 
NPAC in 2014.      
Until recently, the style of the NCKSCC’s buildings and the way it operated 
demonstrated its political agenda in a way that was likely to have alienated many artists 
and members of the general public. Today by contrast, the Centre aims for accessibility 
to artists and the public as a multi-functional centre. The programming department of 
the Centre generates its identity by deciding what appears there and drives the Centre’s 
development. Programmers are responsible for the application of government cultural 
policy while at the same time reflecting Taiwanese identity. The NCKSCC’s history 
follows the historical development of politics and society in Taiwan as a whole.  
The Centre began life as the Government’s flagship cultural agency with specific 
responsibility for promoting the Government’s political agenda. But with the coming 
of democracy and its reinvention as a non-departmental autonomous public body the 
Centre’s Directors have broadened the programming according to their own ideas and 
to the cultural and social environment of their time. However, because of its state 
funding, it has to remain aware of government policy.  
The Centre’s programming has a slow momentum because programmes are 
commissioned up to two years in advance. This means that the NCKSCC appears to 
develop its objectives independently because they are set in advance of rapidly 
changing political thinking. Nevertheless, all the significant players in this field report 
that there is strong rapport and collaboration between the Centre and the Government 
so that the Centre is well aware of government thinking. Government policy is in the 
minds of the Centre’s Board members as they oversee its work so the NCKSCC’s 
objectives dovetail with those of the Government and cultural policy is worded in such 
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a general way that the Centre can make almost anything it wants to do appear to comply 
with it. Political influence is maintained in an implicit and informal way.  
The NCKSCC’s legal status as a non-departmental public body has been of great 
significance in its operation since 2004. Even though more than 50% of its operational 
income is government subsidy, it is a fundamental principle that the Centre is 
autonomous without government intervention. This requires trust, openness and 
mutual support from both sides of a relationship that is at arm’s length but not totally 
independent. Making the relationship operate smoothly requires an appropriate 
distance between the Centre and its Ministry. The NCKSCC is only autonomous 
within set limits. 
The NPAC now has three venues in north, central and south Taiwan to make a 
better nationwide balance. It continues to be a non-governmental body, and the 
relationship between it and the MOC remains unchanged. Nevertheless, the dynamic 
between the organisations is now different because the NCKSCC is no longer the sole 
focus of the Board. The new NTT and Weiwuying, need to establish themselves within 
their local communities, to create their own identity, and to avoid appearing to be 
merely local branches of the NCKSCC.  
Since it transferred to the MOC, the NPAC has become a large proportion of that 
Ministry’s responsibility, so it could receive closer ministerial attention and scrutiny 
than in the past. Also, since the NPAC is now closer to the heart of cultural policy-
making personal relationships between the two bodies are especially important. There 
may be closer scrutiny, but there is also more opportunity for the Centre to have an 
influence over cultural policy. With the MOC’s Evaluation Committee and its KPIs, 
the NPAC cannot act too far out of line with Ministry thinking. How to harmonise 
programming, the audience and cultural policy is therefore the critical crucial task for 
the NPAC in the future. Both the MOC and NPAC are still young, so continued 
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observation and data collection to see how the relationship develops would provide 


























Chapter 5: The NCKSCC’s Programmes                            
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the relationship between the historical changes in programming 
at the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre (NCKSCC) and the evolution of 
Taiwanese identity. Although the main research concern of this thesis is the newly 
formed National Performing Arts Centre (NPAC), the chapter focuses on the 
NCKSCC’s programmes because its programme data accumulated over more than 30 
years gives a large enough body of data for meaningful analysis. The other two venues 
of the NPAC (the National Taichung Theatre that opened in September 2016 and the 
National Kaohsiung Centre for the Arts which was launched in October 2018) are too 
new so their programming has not been included here.  
Programming gives a performing arts centre its character and identity. As a 
national PAC, the programmes that the NCKSCC chooses to show epitomise the 
development of Taiwanese society and reflect the zeitgeist of the country.  
The strategy for analysis of the data is to start by collating the statistics of 
produced and presented programmes organised at the NCKSCC from its opening in 
1987 until the end of its 30th anniversary year in 2017. A total of 4,067 programmes 
have been categorised according to their Taiwanese, Chinese and international 
elements. The next step is to discover whether there is any connection or relationship 
between the Centre’s programming and shifts in Taiwanese identity from 
monocultural Chinese to multicultural Taiwanese.  
After the general analysis of the programmes, three case studies are used to 
investigate in more detail: (1) the NCKSCC’s series of ‘Flagship Productions’; (2) the 
productions of the NCKSCC’s associate company, Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of 
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Taiwan; and (3) the productions of another NCKSCC associate company, Guo Guang 
Opera Company, to discover whether their programmes can be correlated with the 
development of Taiwanese identity through the way that their programmers, artists and 
companies have seen it through the years. 
 
5.2 Programmes at the NCKSCC between 1987 and 2017 
5.2.1 Statistics and Analysis 
Background 
Programmes are the core activity of PACs and the way they set about generating their 
programmes depends on both internal and external factors. External considerations 
include the mission that the PAC has been given by its funding body and relationship 
that it has with its local community. Internally, much depends on the Centre’s staff: 
their roles, responsibilities and personal enthusiasms. Both these considerations may 
be subject to change. Missions may change with new political masters, while new 
internal staff, particularly at senior level, bring with them new ideas and new 
experience and all this means that programming evolves with time (Micocci, 2017: 82-
83). Section 4.3.1.3 outlined three main modes of programming that are characteristic 
of performing arts centres and through which they reach their audiences: producing, 
presenting and renting (Micocci, 2017: 63). 
The NCKSCC fits neatly into the picture that Micocci describes in its modes of 
programming and the Centre’s programmes include those it produces itself as well as 
productions presented in collaboration with others. As a resident company, the 
National Symphony Orchestra (NSO) held a special relationship with the Centre with 
respect to its use of the venues and, according to Huang Pen-ting, NCKSCC 
Programme Manager (2014-2016), the NSO has advance participation in planning by 
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the Programming Department and is given priority commitments for a certain number 
of dates at the venues. Its programmes are included within the Centre’s own 
programmes (Huang, interview of 3 June 2018).  
Table 4.4 (p.195) shows the ratio of number of the Centre’s own programmes to 
rented performances was approximately 30% to 70%. In spite of rented programmes 
form the majority of the NCKSCC’s offer to the public year by year, Li Chia-chi, 
Programme Manager (2012-2014), insists that ‘the Centre sees the programmes it 
presents itself as its core work because they represent its own response to its mission 
as defined by its political masters’ (Li, interview of 27 June 2018, translated from 
Mandarin by the author). Because of this, the analysis here focuses on the programmes 
it either produces or presents despite the fact that in reality the general public is 
probably unaware of the origins of the shows they attend and have little concern about 
who has produced them (Mocicci, 2017: 63). Although the NCKSCC is charged with 
playing a central and influential part in the cultural life of Taiwan, it has been 
comparatively indifferent to the content of the programmes that it rents as long as they 
are of sufficient artistic quality. Huang Pen-ting, NCKSCC Programme Manager 
(2014-2016), explains that the Centre concerns itself mainly with their genres and how 
they are arranged and scheduled (Huang, interview of 3 July 2018).  
The venues 
The NCKSCC has a range of venues where it can present programmes. It has two 
buildings, the National Theatre and the National Concert Hall, with four indoor venues 
and also outdoor plazas all of which are available for the presentation of programmes. 
The National Theatre has a ‘grand theatre’ and an ‘experimental theatre’, while the 
National Concert Hall contains both a ‘main concert hall’ and a ‘recital hall’. The 
NCKSCC’s programmes therefore cover a range of theatre, music and dance. 
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Generally speaking, programmes at the National Theatre take place on a weekly basis 
with three to five performances, whereas performances at the National Concert Hall 
are normally one-night stands.  
Programming 
The NCKSCC has been the country’s busiest and most sought-after performing arts 
centre for many years, and programming for a mixed-programme performing arts 
centre is a process of making a series of choices: matching the works to the relevant 
audience; deciding programme genres and frequencies; fulfilling responsibilities to its 
society and community. For each calendar year, there are a maximum of 52 
programme slots to fill at the National Theatre and the Experimental Theatre, and as 
many as 365 slots to fill at the Concert Hall and the Recital Hall.  
Collection of data 
The Performing Arts Library of the NCKSCC holds details of the programmes at the 
Centre from its opening in 1987. Data collected from this source include: programme 
titles; company and artist names; performers; programme contents; dates. There was a 
total of 4,067 programmes over this period; they are listed in the tables of Appendix 3 
(p. 323-333) in chronological order and have been categorised into different ‘genres’: 
music/opera; dance/physical theatre/new circus; theatre/traditional theatre. At the 
NCKSCC, artistic ‘genres’ remain important categories of classification for its 
programmes, and the categories used here are those that the Centre uses for its annual 
reports.  
Genre definitions 
 Music/Opera: the types of Music recognised here refer to those normally given 
in concerts or performances, such as classical music, e.g. the Cleveland Orchestra 
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(1987) and Alicia de Larrocha’s piano recital (1989); traditional music, e.g. the 
Nan guan concert by the Tainan Nan guan Ensemble (1987) and the National 
Experimental Chinese Orchestra’s concert (1996); contemporary music, e.g. the 
Ensemble Modern concert (2004) and Ensemble Intercontemporain’s concert 
(2016); jazz, e.g. the Joe Lovano & Bill Mays Trio (2004) and the Stacey Kent 
concert (2005), and (very rarely) popular music. Opera refers to programmes 
from the Western classical opera tradition such as La Traviata by New York City 
Opera (1987) and Tosca by NSO Opera (2002). New opera productions, such as 
the NCKSCC’s Flagship Production The Black Bearded Bible Man and NSO 
Opera’s La Peintre are also included in this category. ‘Chinese opera’ and 
‘Taiwanese opera’ are listed separately under the ‘theatre/traditional theatre’ 
genre. 
 Dance/Physical Theatre/New Circus: this genre is all about ‘movement’. 
Dance includes ballet, e.g. Giselle by Dutch National Ballet (1988) and Romeo 
& Juliet by the UK’s Royal Ballet; folk dance, e.g. the Bongsan Mask Dance 
Company (1989) and the Taipei Folk Dance Theatre (2012); dance theatre e.g. 
Körper by Sasha Waltz & Guests and Masurca Fogo by Tanztheater Wuppertal 
Pina Bausch (2007) and contemporary dance, e.g. the Trisha Brown Dance 
Company (1988) and Dream Illusion Bubble Shadow by Dance Forum Taipei 
(2014). Physical Theatre focuses on the physical motion of performers, such as 
Just for Show by DV8 Physical Theatre (2004). New Circus (or contemporary 
circus) is similar to physical theatre, and differs from traditional circus in that 
animals are not involved. Instead, it consists of acrobatics, trapeze, juggling, 
comedy, magic, martial arts and so on. Some examples are The 7 Fingers by Les 
7 Doigts de la Main (2006) and Ningen by Cirque Baroque (2006).   
 Theatre/Traditional Theatre: Theatre here refers to drama, musical theatre, 
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comedy and mime based on Western theatre traditions e.g. Hamlet by 
Contemporary Legend Theatre (1990), Six Characters in Search of an Author by 
American Repertory Theatre (1995), A Dream Like a Dream by Performance 
Workshop (2005). Traditional Theatre refers to theatre forms from non-
Western cultures, such as Japanese Noh theatre, Chinese opera, Taiwanese opera, 
and so on. The events that are referred to in the English language as Chinese or 
Taiwanese ‘operas’ are in reality, more akin to ‘music theatre’ as they include a 
significant component of spoken text. In the Chinese languages they are regarded 
as ‘theatre’.     
Content analysis  
The analysis of the produced and presented programmes at the NCKSCC aims to 
discover whether there has been a shift in the NCKSCC’s programming with respect 
to Taiwanese content over the last 31 years. The first task is to score the programmes 
according to the country of origin of the performers. They have been divided into three 
categories: (a) Taiwanese artists and companies; (b) international collaboration; and 
(c) international artists and companies. Companies and artists from China (PRC) are 
considered ‘international’ in this analysis. The next stage is to subdivide the 
programmes involving the Taiwanese artists and companies in category (a) according 
to whether they contain Taiwanese elements, Chinese elements or international 
elements. These three elements need some explanation: 
 Taiwanese element: refers to programme contents which are native Taiwanese, 
such as Taiwanese opera, Taiwanese composers or indigenous dance, e.g. The 
Evening of Hakka Bayin Music (1988), Returning to the Past: The Evening of 
Taiwanese Folk Songs (1989), Taiwanese Indigenous Dance Series: Amis (1990), 
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Miroirs de Vie by Legend Lin Dance Theatre (1995), and A Dizzy Woman, I Do 
I Do! by Greenray Theatre Company (1997).  
 Chinese element: refers to programme by Taiwanese artists and companies that 
consist of traditional or classical Chinese components, such as myths, music 
compositions, traditional theatre repertoire and any programmes including 
‘Chinese’ in the title, e.g. An Evening of Chinese Arts Songs by The Taipei 
Chinese Orchestra (1987), General Yang’s Escape by Lu Guang Chinese Opera 
Company (Army Chinese Opera Company) (1988), The Phoenix Hairpin by Guo 
Guang Opera Company (1997), Tang Grand Piece, Liquidambar Orientalis by 
Neo-Classic Dance Company (2002), Journey to Shaolin: A Touch of Zen by U 
Theatre (2005), The Feast of Han Xizai by Han Tang Yuefu Music and Dance 
Ensemble (2007), Along the River During the Qingming Festival by National 
Chinese Orchestra Taiwan (2009), The Legend of Peach Blossom Fan by 1/2 Q 
Theatre (2012), and A Vow to The Underworld Spring by Taipei Opera Theatre 
(2016).  
 International element: refers to programmes by Taiwanese companies or artists 
in which the contents or concepts can be considered international, e.g. in Chen 
Pi-hsien’s Piano Recital (1988), the programme is Western classical music; 
Offenbach’s Orpheus in the Underworld by Taipei Opera Theatre (1991), Death 
of a Salesman by Performance Workshop (1992), Ave Maria by the Taiwan 
National Choir (1996), A Russian Tableaux Concert by the NSO (2000), The 
Goodbye Girl by the Godot Theatre Company (2002), and Mozart’s Cosi fan tutte 






Table 5.1 lists all the programmes shown at the NCKSCC from its opening in October 
in 1987 up to the end of 2017. It lists firstly, the number of Taiwanese, international 
and international collaborated programmes; and secondly the three subdivisions of the 
Taiwanese programmes. The average number of programmes each year is between 
120 and 130. (NB the National Concert Hall was closed for some months in 2015 for 
renovation, and the National Theatre was closed for nine months in 2016/2017.)  
Appendix 3 (p. 323-333) gives the annual details of the three genres (music, dance, 
and theatre), using the same categories as Table 5.1, which are summarised in this 
Table. 
Table 5.1 Programmes produced and presented by the NCKSCC (1987-2017) 
   
Year  














1987 2 22 19 43 2 14 59 
1988 13 61 53 127 8 31 166 
1989 13 51 88 152 19 47 218 
1990 19 46 115 180 19 70 269 
1991 15 52 70 137 14 28 179 
1992 21 35 62 118 9 22 149 
1993 20 24 44 88 16 18 (PRC 1) 122 
1994 23 20 54 97 8 28 133 
1995 17 18 53 88 6 15 (PRC 1) 109 
1996 19 15 52 86 15 15 116 
1997 28 16 34 78 16 21 (PRC 4) 115 
1998 26 12 46 84 22 12 (PRC 3) 118 
1999 14 16 39 69 22 11 (PRC 2) 102 
2000 15 17 39 71 19 9 (PRC 3) 99 
2001 24 10 37 71 18 16 (PRC 2) 105 
2002 43 19 28 90 31 20 (PRC 4) 141 
2003 38 19 51 108 16 22 (PRC 2) 146  
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2004 37 14 45 96 15 36 (PRC 2) 147 
2005 33 15 28 76 23 34 (PRC 5) 133 
2006 26 10 30 66 29 35 (PRC2) 130 
2007 34 18 30 82 24 20 126 
2008 40 4 49 93 15 21 129 
2009 35 9 48 92 17 23 132 
2010 28 9 41 78 19 23 120 
2011 33 5 41 79 22 24 (PRC1) 125 
2012 18 6 39 63 26 30 (PRC1) 119 
2013 21 0 40 61 26 32 119 
2014 25 5 30 60 31 26 (PRC1) 117 
2015 24 3 36 63 15 23 101 
2016 21 1 33 55 21 25 101 
2017 38 0 31 69 25 28 (PRC 1) 122 
Total 763 552 1,406 2,721 568 778 4,067 
*PRC: People’s Republic of China. Companies/Artists from the PRC is in the category of international 
companies/artists.    
Source: own compilation from the programme data of the NCKSCC Performing Arts Library. 
The initial findings 
As the samples of the NCKSCC’s past 31 years are large enough, statistical analysis 
of programme data carried out here is able to identify fundamental trends and to show 
how the programmes at the NCKSCC have evolved over the years. Because the slots 
at the National Theatre (per week) and Concert Hall (per day) are different, music 
programmes, including those of the resident National Symphony Orchestra occupy a 
large proportion of the data in Table 5.1. This influences the analysis of the data by 
increasing the representation of both the music programme category and the 
international element/international collaboration programmes.  
Based on the statistics of Table 5.1, Chart 5.1 gives an overview of the 
programmes produced and presented by the NCKSCC, indicating the numbers for each 
of three groups: Taiwanese companies and artists, international collaboration, and 
international companies and artists.  
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Chart 5.1 The NCKSCC/NPAC produced and presented programmes (1987-2017) 
Source: own compilation from Table 5.1. 
Chart 5.1 shows that throughout the study period programmes by Taiwanese 
companies and artists are consistently the overwhelming majority. This is consistent 
with the main mission of the NCKSCC which is to support Taiwanese companies and 
artists. Chart 5.1 also illustrates the overall decline in the number of programmes that 
the NCKSCC produced or presented over time. The reason for this, according to Lee 
Huey-mei (Artistic Director 2014-2018) is that there was a limited budget for the 
Centre to create events and there was pressure from private companies to hire the 
venues (interview of 7 December 2015). This meant that the initial six years were the 
high point of programmes produced or presented by the NCKSCC, after which there 
was more emphasis on venue rental.   
Chart 5.2 focuses on those programmes from Chart 5.1 that only involve 
Taiwanese companies and artists. It then analyses the programmes according to three 








































































































































The NCKSCC/NPAC produced and presented programmes




Chart 5.2 The NCKSCC/NPAC programmes presented by Taiwanese 
companies/artists (1987-2017) 
Source: own compilation from Table 5.1. 
Chart 5.2 shows not only that Taiwanese performing arts have been deeply influenced 
by Western culture, especially in the early years, but also that there has been a 
progressive increase over the past 31 years of the Taiwanese element in the 
programmes which eventually surpassed the declining Chinese element. This 
corresponds with the change of cultural policy and the shift of Taiwanese identity, 
which will be discussed below in Section 5.2.2.  
The Taiwanese programmes that have a Chinese element are mostly Chinese 
Opera and concerts of Chinese Music. Subdividing these programmes involves an 
element of judgement. As discussed in Chapter 2, Min-nan Taiwanese and Hakka 
Taiwanese cultures have developed since the start of Chinese migration to Taiwan 
some centuries ago. This means that the difference between the Taiwanese culture of 





































































































































The NCKSCC/NPAC programmes presented by 
Taiwanese companies/artists
Taiwanese element Chinese element International element
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uninfluenced by migration is a question of the timing of people’s arrival in Taiwan. 
The distinction is real, but not clear-cut. 
For this reason, the traditional Chinese Guo Guang Opera Company and the 
National Chinese Orchestra Taiwan found themselves in a difficult position after the 
start of democracy in Taiwan because the public began to favour Taiwanese cultural 
elements over traditional Chinese. Wong An-chi, Artistic Director of Guo Guang 
Opera Company, claims that after reconnecting with mainland China in 1987, and 
having seen the exquisite traditional Chinese Opera performances from China, the 
Taiwanese Chinese Opera was faced with the problem of how to position themselves 
(Wong, 2002). The newly-launched Guo Guang Opera Company had to find its own 
position by ‘localising Chinese Opera’ and trying to find a new approach for Taiwan’s 
Chinese Opera. Their response to this dilemma was to create the Taiwan Trilogy (Mazu 
in 1998, Cheng Ch’eng-kung and Taiwan in 1999, and Liao Tien Ting in 1999). The 
Trilogy is based on the idea that ‘Taiwanese Chinese Opera would escape from the 
perspective of mainland China, and officially recognise the land where it is based and 
thus embrace native Taiwan’ (Wong, 2002: 13).  
Even the National Symphony Orchestra of Taiwan, which normally plays 
Western classical music, tries to create new productions or programmes with a greater 
representation of Taiwanese elements in order to attract Taiwanese audiences. Chien 
Wen-ping, who was Music Director of the NSO from 2001-2007, outlines its 
responsibility: 
As soon as I was on board as the Music Director, I felt I had the responsibility 
for our own land to encourage Taiwanese composers, especially young talent. 
It is important to develop the ability of Taiwanese composers to compose 
symphonic works and to create our own works. That is why I started the 
‘commission works’ project and each year there were at least two works by 
Taiwanese composers. Those works were not only played by the NSO but 
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also recorded and then published by the NCKSCC. We need to try our best to 
raise the level of Taiwan’s symphonic composing. (Chien, interview of 1 June 
2018, translated from Mandarin by the author)  
Chart 5.3 combines all the information in Charts 5.1 and 5.2 to give an overview 
of the programmes produced and presented by the NCKSCC in all five categories. 
Chart 5.3 The overview of the NCKSCC/NPAC produced and presented 
programmes (1987-2017) 
Source: own compilation from Table 5.1. 
In this overall picture, Taiwanese programmes are in the majority at the NCKSCC, 
and within this category, despite the fluctuations in both Chinese and Taiwanese 
elements, Taiwanese programmes with an international element always predominate. 
It is inevitable for Taiwanese symphony orchestras and music ensembles to play 
Western classical music in their programmes, and it is also common for Taiwanese 
theatre companies, and even traditional theatre troupes, to interpret works by Western 
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Metamorphosis (Franz Kafka) by Contemporary Legend Theatre (2013), and Oedipus 
Tyrannus (Sophocles) by Golden Bough Theatre (2016). Wu Ching-jyi, a performing 
arts pioneer of Taiwan and NCKSCC Chairman, 2006-2007, claims that ‘this is all 
very natural because performing arts is a concept originating in Western culture, as 
indeed is the very idea of a Performing Arts Centre (PAC)’ (Wu, interview of 3 
December 2015, translated from Mandarin by the author). 
 
5.2.2 Programming and Taiwanese Identity Shift 
The official opening of Taiwan’s first national performing arts centre on 31 October 
1987 was the most important cultural event in the country’s history. For a building 
project of such prestige and political significance, it is not surprising that there was 
considerable political involvement in the planning stages of the new national 
performing arts centre by the KMT government. Its aim was to create a building that 
would be a fitting home for Chinese culture, for which it was keen to act as guardian 
(Hu, interview of 25 May 2018). It also demonstrated its prominence in political culture 
when the then Vice-Present, Lee Teng-hui beat a gong to launch the National Theatre 
with an updated version of the traditional Chinese Opera Lady Wen-Chi’s Captivity and 
Return (Wen Chi kuei han, 新文姬歸漢). Premier Yu Guo-hua beat another gong at 
the National Concert Hall to introduce a choral symphonic work Chinese Carol: in 
memory of President Chiang Kai-shek (Zhonghua sung ke, 中華頌歌) (NCKSCC, 
2007: 22). The evening was an extraordinary milestone in the development of the 
performing arts in Taiwan; both programmes had a strong Chinese element and were 




Although martial law was lifted in the same year in 1987, the Preparatory Office 
of the National Theatre & Concert Hall began work on 1 February 1985 (Yu, 2007: 
15) and, as programmes are normally planned two years in advance, this meant that 
the NCKSCC’s early programming took place during the closing years of the martial 
law period. These iconic Chinese programmes performed in evidently Chinese-style 
venues epitomise the social atmosphere and Taiwan’s Chinese identity of the time and 
deliver a clear message from the Government that ‘this is the home of Chinese 
performing arts’ (NCKSCC, 2007: 14, 22). At this time, the mainland Chinese 
immigrants of the KMT formed the dominant ethnie in Smith’s sense (Smith, 1991) 
and they decided the national identity. Thus, Chinese culture dominated the ideology 
of the time.  
    Looking at the figures for the Centre’s own programmes, after the grand opening 
in October 1987, only two months remained until the end of the year and, as Table 5.1 
(p. 226-227) shows, during those months, 73% of the programmes were Taiwanese, 
3% were international collaboration programmes and 24% were foreign programmes. 
Within the Taiwanese programmes, 51% had a Chinese element whereas only 5% were 
exclusively Taiwanese. The remainder had international elements.  
During the first six years from 1987 to 1992, the programmes with Chinese 
elements clearly outweighed those with Taiwanese. But from 1993 onwards, the 
proportion of Chinese to Taiwanese elements decreased. In 1993 it was 26% Chinese 
against 22% Taiwanese and in 1994, the number of Taiwanese element programmes 
outstripped those with a Chinese element for the first time (Taiwanese 24%: Chinese 
21%), but except for 1997 and 1998. The difference remained small until 2001 when 
there were more than twice as many Taiwanese element programmes (34%) than 
Chinese element programmes (14%). Since 2001, Taiwanese have greatly surpassed 
Chinese, which eventually diminished to single figure or even zero in 2013 and 2017.  
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There are also a couple of features in Table 5.1 (p. 226-227) between 1987 until 
about 1997 that are worth attention: 
(1) The military-owned Chinese opera troupes including army (Lu Guang, 陸光), 
air force (Da Peng, 大 鵬 ), and navy (Hai Guang, 海 光 ) 23  presented 
productions of mostly traditional Chinese element at a time when Chinese opera 
was still referred to as ‘National Opera’ (Guo chu, 國劇 ). Lee Huey-mei, 
NCKSCC Artistic Director from 2014 to 2018, suggests that during this period, 
in the performing arts, especially traditional theatre, most of the mainstream 
groups of virtuosi were 1949 immigrants from China who still yearned for their 
homeland. They, by definition, had Chinese identity (Lee, interview of 7 
December 2015).     
(2) Many programmes were entitled ‘Chinese Series’, especially the concerts by the 
National Experimental Chinese Orchestra and other such private Chinese music 
ensembles. The use of the word ‘Chinese’ is interesting here because it refers 
more to the genre of the performance, rather than to the nationality of the 
performers. Often, names have been changed so that, for example, performances 
once known as ‘National Opera’ became ‘Chinese/Peking Opera’ (Ching chu, 
京劇). However, Chinese music is still referred to as ‘National Music’ (Guo yue, 
國樂). Examples of ‘Chinese’ series would include the Chinese Contemporary 
Composer Series concerts (1987), An Evening of Chinese Folk Song (1988), 
Modern Chinese Opera: A Night of Thunderstorms by the NSO (1991), 
                                                          
23 According to Wong An-chi (2002: 22-23), the 1960s to 1970s was the flourishing period 
for Taiwan’s Chinese Opera development. After transferring to Taiwan in 1949, many military 
organisations set up their own Chinese Opera troupes. Also, many Chinese Opera artists 
arrived in Taiwan with the KMT government. They were recruited by the Chinese Opera 
troupes organised by the military, and formed three main Chinese Opera troupes owned by the 
army (Lu Guang, 陸光), air force (Da Peng, 大鵬), and navy (Hai Guang, 海光). In 1995, 
these three troupes were merged as the Guo Guang Opera Company and were joined in 1996 
by the Marine Corps’s Flying Horse Bangzi Opera Team (Fei Ma Yujiuduei, 飛馬豫劇隊). 
The Guo Guang Opera Company was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Education. 
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Orchestral Music with a Chinese Mood by the Taipei Symphony Orchestra 
(1992). This last concert brought together mainland Chinese, overseas Chinese, 
and Taiwanese composers.  
In Table 5.1 (p. 226-227), Taiwanese opera or Taiwanese element traditional 
programmes have been included in the ‘traditional theatre’ category along with 
Chinese Opera and Bangzi Opera in the Chinese opera family. For example, in 1987 
the opening Traditional Theatre Series included three Chinese Opera troupes organised 
by the military (Lu Guang, Da Peng and Hai Guang), as well as the Fu Hsing (復興) 
Chinese Opera troupe, the Flying Horse Bangzi Opera Team and the Ming Hwa Yuan 
(明華園) Taiwanese Opera Company. These groups were selected to demonstrate 
Taiwan’s flourishing Chinese traditional theatre scene at the grand opening of the 
NCSKCC. Another example is the Chinese Choral History Series Concerts given by 
the Taiwan National Choir between 1992 and 1994, which comprised three concerts 
that showed their composers’ origins: Taiwanese (1992), mainland Chinese (1993), 
and overseas Chinese (1994). The description ‘Chinese’ was used here in its ethnic 
sense to cover everybody living in Taiwan and China, as well as overseas people of 
Chinese origin (Zhonghua identity). Hu Yao-heng, the NCKSCC’s Director from 1990 
to 1992, claimed that during his period of office, he wanted to show that ‘Chinese 
(Zhonghua) culture is wide-ranging and profound, and it includes Taiwan’ (Hu, 
interview of 25 May 2018, translated from Mandarin by the author). Views such as 
this evidently had an influence on the NCKSCC’s programming by reflecting an 
imagined Chinese community (Anderson, 2016) along with its invented Zhonghua 
traditions (Hobsbawm, 1983).   
After the far-reaching political changes in Taiwan’s development to democracy 
with direct presidential elections in 1996 and the first change in the ruling party in 
2000 (see Chapter 2), the distinct shift in Taiwanese identity had a general effect on 
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the performing arts in Taiwan that included the direction of the programmes at the 
NCKSCC. A report of work at this time highlighted enthusiasm for ‘localisation’ and 
a passion for exchange with mainland China. These became a preoccupation for 
Taiwanese performing arts groups which resulted in attracting more audiences from 
1996 onwards. Thereafter, the Taiwanese performing arts scene became more vivid 
and lively as more acclaimed international companies and artists were brought in and 
there was increasing international collaboration (NCKSCC 2007: 31).  
Records of the programmes at the NCKSCC show that mainland Chinese (PRC) 
companies and artists started to be invited in 1993 with the performance of Madam 
White Snake by the Sichuan Opera Troupe. Every year since then up to five PRC 
companies have been invited to perform at the NCKSCC (see Table 5.1 in the 
‘international companies/artists’ column marked as PRC). However, most of the PRC 
companies ‘co-presented’ with other private arts organisations or foundations in 
Taiwan such as the New Aspect Cultural Foundation or the Arts Formosa Company. 
It is also worth noting that rental programmes may introduce PRC artists and 
companies to the NCKSCC through private promoters. Lee Huey-mei, NCKSCC 
Artistic Director (2014-2018), who has been in charge of programming since the 
Centre’s opening, explains that when Taiwan (ROC) and China (PRC) started cultural 
exchanges, people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were very inquisitive about 
each other. Many Chinese performing arts companies were keen to visit Taiwan and 
Taiwanese audiences were interested to see traditional Chinese theatre troupes such as 
Peking Opera and Kun Opera. At the beginning, the box office was very good and that 
encouraged private arts agencies to introduce increasing numbers of Chinese 
companies to Taiwan. However: 
As a ROC national organisation, it was awkward for the NCKSCC to invite 
PRC companies directly, and that is why there were very few PRC 
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programmes (see Table 5.1) and nearly all of them were co-invited with 
private agencies. The initial upsurge declined once curiosity was satisfied and 
the novelty of PRC companies for the Taiwanese audience wore off. (Lee, 
interview of 7 December 2015, translated from Mandarin by the author) 
On the other hand, during the peak time of cultural exchange, exploration of PRC 
companies and artists naturally had an impact on the Taiwanese performing arts scene. 
Creativity was stimulated, especially for companies who worked with traditional 
Chinese genres, but it also prompted awareness of the differences between Taiwanese 
Chineseness and PRC Chineseness and this encouraged a pursuit of Taiwaneseness 
(Taiwan shing, 台灣性) which is apparent on Chart 5.2. Between 1993 and 1995, the 
numbers of Taiwanese element programmes and Chinese element programmes were 
nearly the same with Chinese element programmes in a slight majority. However, the 
situation started to change in 1996, when Taiwanese element programmes became the 
majority. A slight Taiwanese predominance continued until 2008 (with the exception 
of 1999 and 2000), since when Taiwanese element programmes have outnumbered 
Chinese element programmes very substantially.  
Artists and performing arts companies also sensed the transformation of Taiwan’s 
social and political atmosphere. The Democratic Progressive Party first came to power 
in 2000 with a new policy direction of ‘Taiwan subjectivity’ (Taiwan jhu ti shing, 台
灣主體性) (Tchen, 2013). Meanwhile, more programmes that focused on Taiwan 
started to appear. For example, The Beauty of Taiwanese by the Taipei Philharmonic 
Youth Orchestra, the Taipei Philharmonic Chorus and Difang Duana (Kuo Ying-nan, 
郭英男) & Amis Singers (1997). The Guo Guang Opera Company’s Taiwan Trilogy 
(1998-1999) featured a local version of Peking Opera and Taiwan, Our Mother by the 
Holo Taiwanese Opera Troupe (2000) had a newly-created script. Works by 
Taiwanese composers began to be included in the programmes of Taiwan’s National 
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Symphony Orchestra, the National Chinese Orchestra Taiwan and the Centre’s Young 
Star Series of classical and Chinese music.  
At the climax of this urge to focus on local talent between 2008 and 2011, the 
NCKSCC promoted its ‘Images of Taiwan’ series which selected the best programmes 
from its majority Taiwanese programmes with the aim of encouraging Taiwanese 
artists, developing Taiwanese works and building up Taiwan’s cultural strength. The 
three guidelines for selection were: 
(1) The content of the show should be related to Taiwan or based on 
Taiwanese stories showing awareness of Taiwan’s land, history, cultural 
diversity and experimental innovation.  
(2) The core value is the ‘native trend’ concerning all the elements and 
materials of Taiwan. 
(3) To promote the brand of Taiwan by supporting Taiwanese artists, 
performers, creators and companies with works rooted in Taiwanese 
Chinese culture and Taiwanese culture (NCKSCC, 2010: 68-69).  
The ‘Images of Taiwan’ series lasted for four years and, according to Huang Pen-ting, 
NCKSCC Programme Manager (2014-2016), when a new Artistic Director Huang Pi-
twan was appointed in 2010, she decided that ‘Taiwaneseness’ (Taiwan shing, 台灣
性) was already well established and the country’s multiculturalism sufficiently firmly 
embedded that there was no longer any need to emphasise Taiwanese elements in the 
programming. From that date, all programmes by Taiwanese artists or companies have 
been considered ‘Taiwanese’, regardless of the elements they contained. As far as 
presenting programmes was concerned, Taiwanese Chineseness should be considered 
just one of the cultures comprising overall Taiwanese culture, along with Min-nan, 
Hakka, indigenous and new migration cultures. In addition, she believed that it would 
create a hierarchy within Taiwanese programmes if programmes that were not selected 
for the ‘Images of Taiwan’ series were perceived as inferior to those selected (Huang, 
interview of 3 July 2018).  
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Commenting on this phenomenon, Huang Pi-twan, the Artistic Director, says that 
‘Taiwanese identity is formed naturally when the ideology of localisation increases. 
Such an identity shift is inevitable as new generations are born and grow up in Taiwan’ 
(Huang, interview of 12 April 2015, translated from Mandarin by the author). As the 
new Artistic Director appointed by the returning KMT government’s Board, Huang’s 
comments represent not only the way the direction in which the Centre’s programming 
headed, but also new ideas on how to understand Taiwaneseness. 
Chart 5.4 has been compiled from a survey carried out by the Election Study 
Centre of Taiwan’s National Cheng-Chi University (2018). Taiwanese people were 
asked whether they felt themselves to be Taiwanese or Chinese and Chart 5.4 tracks 
the changes in their responses between 1992 and 2018.  
Chart 5.4 Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of Taiwanese (1992-2018) 
Source: The Election Study Centre of National Cheng-Chi University. 
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In 1992, 46.4% of Taiwanese people regarded themselves to be both Taiwanese and 
Chinese, while 25.5% regarded themselves to be Chinese and 17.6 % regarded 
themselves to be Taiwanese. By 1995 the situation had changed and now 25% regarded 
themselves to be Taiwanese, 20.7% regarded themselves to be Chinese and as many 
as 47% regarded themselves to be both Taiwanese and Chinese. By 2008, it had 
dramatically changed again and now 48.4 % regarded themselves to be Taiwanese, 
43.1% regarded themselves to be both Taiwanese and Chinese, and the figure for 
solely Chinese identity was down to 4%.  
Is this change in Taiwanese people’s view of themselves reflected in the 
programmes at the NCKSCC? Chart 5.5 extracts the Taiwanese and Chinese element 
programmes from Table 5.1 for comparison with Chart 5.4.  
Chart 5.5 Programmes by Taiwanese companies/artists at the NCKSCC/NPAC   
(1987-2017) 
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As discussed above (p.238), there was a crossing point in 1993 when Taiwanese 
element programmes began to form the majority following the decline in Chinese 
element programmes that started in 1991. Between 1993 and 1995 there was little 
difference between the two categories, but thereafter, Taiwanese element programmes 
have consistently and increasingly outstripped Chinese. This correlates with Chart 5.4 
which also shows 1995 as the year when Taiwanese and Chinese identity crossed over. 
There is a remarkable similarity between the way the graphs in the two charts have 
subsequently moved. 
To conclude, the shift from Chinese to Taiwanese outlined above is striking. But 
it is a broad-brush analysis which masks interesting smaller-scale issues. One such is 
the precise distinction between Taiwanese and Chinese elements. If Chinese music 
(national music, Guo yue, 國樂) is counted as ‘Chinese’ in the analysis, it can be 
distinguished from ‘Taiwanese’ music which is a term that normally refers to Min-nan 
and Hakka folk songs, and Nan guan and Bei guan music. But such music was also 
originally Chinese having been taken to Taiwan from China in one of the earlier waves 
of immigration some centuries in the past.  
In the same way, some forms of Taiwanese theatre such as glove puppetry 
and shadow puppetry, that are nowadays seen as traditional, were also introduced 
to Taiwan from China, the only difference between them and Chinese element 
Peking Opera and Bangzi Opera is the date of their arrival. So, are they Taiwanese 
or Chinese? These days, when Taiwanese performing arts companies tour China 
with programmes that include Chinese (Peking) opera and Chinese music they are 
regarded as ‘Taiwanese’ companies and this is reinforced by the fact that they 
display Taiwanese characters (Li, interview of 27 June 2018). In the opinion of 
Lin Hwai-min, the founder of the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan and a 
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national cultural icon in Taiwan, such ‘Chinese elements’ should be considered 
part of Taiwanese culture: 
Chinese opera and the National Palace Museum are both part of Taiwan! Over 
the years, they have become native Taiwanese. This is what it is! It would be 
very foolish to push them away. (Lin, interview of 25 May 2016, translated 
from Mandarin by the author)  
Chien Wen-pin, former National Symphony Orchestra Music Director (2001-
2007) and current Artistic Director to the NPAC’s Weiwuying says that it is important 
to consider the connection between the programmes and the ‘land of Taiwan’ where 
the performers or artists were born and grew up. In defining ‘Taiwanese programmes’, 
he stresses: 
As long as the productions and programmes are created by Taiwanese, then 
they can be called Taiwanese programmes, even if their genre is Western (e.g. 
symphony, play) or Chinese (e.g. Chinese opera, Chinese music). The way 
that Taiwanese artists create, interpret or perform is instinctively different 
from that of artists of different nationalities and that is why they are 
‘Taiwanese’. (Chien, interview of 1 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by 
the author) 
This dilemma is one of definition and pigeon-holing rather than anything to do with 
the programmes themselves. These are constant, and any inconsistency is in the minds 
of the people who are attempting to interpret them.  
Taiwanese culture and indigenous culture used to be regarded as part of a single 
large ‘invented’ family of cultures under the umbrella term Chinese culture (see 
Section 2.3.1.2). But nowadays this ‘imagination’ has shifted and Chinese (Zhonghua) 
culture is regarded as just one component, albeit a dominant one, of Taiwan’s diverse 
culture. Jung Shu-hwa, an Assistant Professor at the Taipei National University of the 
Arts, and also a theatre scholar and regular consultant to government cultural 
organisations, articulates a more nuanced view: 
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Taiwanese deals with a broad area which shows huge diversity. Politics, 
especially political parties, play a vital role. The differing ideologies of the 
KMT and DPP each influence Taiwanese identity in their own distinct way. 
Although disadvantaged groups such as indigenous people and new migrants 
are well recognised, they still need more attention from the Government. 
Every culture of Taiwan should be identified as a cultural identity rather than 
being lumped together into a single cultural identity. Toleration of and respect 
for difference is both essential and crucial. (Jung, interview of 11 June 2018, 
translated from Mandarin by the author) 
Taiwanese identity is therefore, in Hall’s (1996) sense ‘becoming’ in a striking 
way that is based on its radical historicisation and constant transformation. 
 
5.3 Case Studies of the NCKSCC’s Programmes 
The NCKSCC has in the past created some of its own theatre productions, such as Red 
Nose (1989), but since it had only a single resident company until 2005 (the National 
Symphony Orchestra), it mainly produced classical music programmes. As part of the 
investigation into whether there has been a shift in identity in the NCKSCC’s produced 
and presented programmes during the 31 years of its existence, this section takes a 
series of case studies to explore in more detail the relationship between programming 
and the shift in Taiwanese identity, and the response of the people responsible for 
programming to the task they have been set. Three case studies are chosen to exemplify 
the way in which the ‘becoming’ of Taiwanese identity is expressed differently and 
distinctively, depending on the type of performing arts organisations. This qualitative 
approach contributes supplementary information to reinforce the research findings 
from the quantitative analysis in Section 5.2. 
The first case study looks at NCKSCC’s own series of ‘Flagship Productions’ of 
dance, theatre and music created either by Taiwanese companies or through 
international collaboration. These productions give a direct reflection of the way the 
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Centre’s programming developed, including its interaction concerning the 
transformation of Taiwan’s social environment, along with its changing identity. 
The second case study examines one of the programmes that the NCKSCC co-
presented with a privately-owned associate company. It explores the work of the 
contemporary dance company, Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan which was 
founded in 1973 by choreographer Lin Hwai-min and has been an associate company 
of the NCKSCC since the Centre’s launch in 1987. Observing and analysing Cloud 
Gate’s work at the NCKSCC gives an opportunity to show how changes in Taiwanese 
identity are evident in co-commissioned programming.  
The third case study looks at programmes that the NCKSCC co-presented with a 
government-owned associate company. Taiwan’s Chinese Opera company, the Guo 
Guang Opera Company, was established in 1995 when several military Chinese Opera 
troupes merged. Since the NCKSCC’s opening, performances by military Chinese 
Opera troupes have played an important part in its programmes, and when the Guo 
Guang Opera Company was formed, it became an associate company to the NCKSCC 
with annual productions. Through analysing Guo Guang’s programmes at the 
NCKSCC, it is possible to probe the unique situation of Chinese Opera in Taiwan and 
also to correlate variations in Guo Guang’s programmes with changes in Taiwanese 
identity 
 
5.3.1 Case Study One: the NCKSCC’s Flagship Productions 
The NCKSCC’s programme of ‘Flagship Productions’ ran from 2008 until 2014, 
although the name was changed to ‘Annual Productions’ in 2012. During that time a 
total of nine productions appeared. 
When the DPP came to power in Taiwan in 2000 it appointed Tchen Yu-chiou as 
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its first Minister of the Council of Cultural Affairs. She was responsible for the 
publication of the second culture white paper (2004) which set out government cultural 
policy for Taiwanese identity and, in particular, celebrated the cultural diversity of the 
country (Cultural White Paper, 2004). Tchen’s term of office as Minister ended in 
2004 and some years later in 2007, she was appointed to the Chair of the NCKSCC’s 
Board, a post she held until 2010. Tchen was the key person in the initiation of the 
Flagship Productions series, as she explains: 
On my arrival at the NCKSCC, I felt that the programme of events produced 
by any performing arts centre should be its ‘soul’. But at that time, the 
NCKSCC’s only resident company was the NSO; there were no resident 
theatre or dance companies. In my opinion, it was vital for the NCKSCC to 
be able to present its own productions that displayed a strong Taiwanese 
identity and provided events suitable for every sector of Taiwanese society. 
The programme should be inclusive as regards age, gender, ethnicity, and 
social status. (Tchen, interview of 27 November 2015, translated from 
Mandarin by the author) 
Tchen saw it as her task to help establish a Taiwanese identity through the work of the 
NCKSCC and that the best way to encourage such an identity is to make people feel 
proud of their national culture. This, then, would be the work of the Centre. This is 
also evidence of how government cultural policy affects the Centre’s programming 
through artistic decisions and the vision of the Chairman of the Centre, which was 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
Huang Pen-ting, NCKSCC Programme Manager (2014-2016), was the Assistant 
Manager of Programming in 2008 and was involved with the set-up of the Flagship 
Production series. She explains that the series aimed to demonstrate to the world at 
large Taiwan’s ability to be recognised as a cultural centre of excellence of 
international standing. Extrapolating from the core value of ‘native fashion’, the 
project focused on cross-border arts disciplines, international collaboration and the 
247 
 
creation of pioneering work in directing Taiwan’s performing arts development 
(Huang, interview of 3 July 2018). The Centre was allocated substantial finance and 
manpower to allow it to produce exemplary productions. Objectives of the programme 
included: 
(1) Long term planning that allowed enough time for the development of 
excellent productions. 
(2) The concept of international collaboration that went beyond merely inviting 
international companies to perform in Taiwan by enabling discussion, 
communication, collaboration, and innovation between Taiwanese and 
international artists and this encouraging genuine international exchange. 
(3) The development of a concept of ‘Taiwaneseness’ (Taiwan shing, 台灣性) 
that celebrated the cultural diversity of the people of Taiwan and promoted 
the creation of productions at a level of sophistication that would allow 
international recognition and promotion on the world stage. 
(4) The establishment of a Taiwanese brand that has an evident core of 
traditional Taiwanese culture but nevertheless is of its own modern time. 
The ultimate aim is to develop an internationally recognised presence in 
arts and culture for Taiwan, and thereby to set up milestones for Taiwan’s 
new generation. (NCKSCC, 2010: 54) 
These ambitious objectives are similar to those of another initiative launched by Tchen, 
the ‘Image of Taiwan’ series (see Section 5.2.1) but with an added international 
emphasis.  
The aim of the project was thus to make ‘Taiwaneseness’ the predominant motif 
in the NCKSCC’s programme planning. The key features are generous finance, 
international collaboration and a strong presence of Taiwanese elements, reflecting 
Taiwan’s realisation that its diplomatic isolation made ‘global and international’ an 
essential strategy for Taiwan’s survival. Tchen’s understanding of this political 
strategy led to the creation of the Flagship Productions series and demonstrates that by 
2008 ‘Taiwaneseness’ was to be seen as broad and internationalised rather than 
defensive and isolated.  
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Table 5.2. The NCKSCC’s Flagship Productions 









Taiwanese story of a 





2 Orlando 2009 Theatre Taiwanese team 
with American 
director, set design 
and lighting design.  
Adapted from Virginia 
Woolf’s work, played 
by a Taiwanese 
Chinese Opera diva in 
a contemporary way. 
 
3 Song of Pensive 
Beholding 





inspired by Taiwanese 
ritual culture. 
 
4 The Grand 
Voyage 
 




The story of a Chinese 
adventurer played by a 
Taiwanese theatre 
company, a Taiwanese 




5 On the Road 2010 Musical Taiwanese team.  Taiwanese indigenous 
story. 
 
6 La Dame aux 
Camélias 
 
2011 Musical Taiwanese and 
Japanese team with 
Japanese director. 
Based on the work of 
Alexandre Dumas fils 
and played by 
Taiwanese and 
Japanese actors with 
Taiwanese pop songs. 
 
7 YogeeTi 2012 Dance Taiwanese and 
French team with 
French 
choreographer. 
New creation with field 
research in Taiwan. 
Title is the Taiwanese 





8 Fall for 
Eileen Chang 
2013 Musical Taiwanese team 
with German and 
Adapted from work of 
overseas Chinese 









9 Crystal Boys 2014 Theatre Taiwanese team. Based on 
Chinese/Taiwanese 






Source: own compilation from the NCKSCC programmes data 
Table 5. 2 shows the nine Flagship Productions and the range of cooperation modes that 
were used in the Project. Based on the type of cooperation, the Flagship Productions can 
be divided into two groups: 
(1) International collaboration:  
 Mackay—The Black Bearded Bible Man (2008) was a new opera by Taiwanese 
composer, Chin Shi-wen with elements of Taiwanese folksong and indigenous 
music. The first flagship production was a three-hour opera directed by German 
director Lukas Hemleb, telling the story of the Canadian missionary George 
Leslie Mackay (1844-1901) who arrived in Taiwan in 1871 and died there in 1901. 
The production is about his time in Taiwan, and is immediately recognisable as 
Taiwanese in character (NCKSCC, 2010: 56), which means that it would not have 
been staged during the period of authoritarian rule. It was a huge production in 
terms of the stage set and the number of performers, including the National 
Symphony Orchestra and a chorus. It is claimed to be the ‘first opera in the world 
to be sung in Taiwanese and English’ (NCKSCC, 2008). The world premiere 
staging ran for four performances at the National Theatre in Taipei. 
 Orlando (2009) was a play based on Virginia Woolf’s novel in a version by 
playwright Darryl Pinckney. This production is an Asian version by the noted 
‘image of theatre’ American director, Robert Wilson featuring his trademark 
theatre style. Orlando had German (Jutta Lampe, 1989), French (Isabelle Huppert, 
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1993) and English (Miranda Richardson, 1996) versions before the Taiwanese 
version was staged (Hsieh, 2012: 145). It was a solo performance under Wilson’s 
dominating direction played in a contemporary way featuring Chinese Opera 
chant by Taiwanese Chinese Opera diva Wei Hai-min. Orlando was a 
collaboration with Guo Guang Opera Company and had eight performances at 
the National Theatre in Taipei. 
 The Grand Voyage (2010) was also directed by Robert Wilson, but co-created 
with U Theatre’s Artistic Director, Liu Ruo-yu. The story concerns the Chinese 
Ming dynasty court eunuch, Zheng He (1371–1433) who was well known as a 
marine explorer who undertook seven voyages to Southeast Asia, South Asia, and 
East Africa. U Theatre players made up the main component of the production 
along with a narration by the Taiwanese Opera diva, Tang Mei-yun and the 
American jazz musician, Dickie Landry (NCKSCC, 2010: 62). The Grand 
Voyage had eight performances at the National Theatre in Taipei. 
 La Dame aux Camélias (2011) was directed by the renowned Japanese director, 
Suzuki Tadashi and featured Taiwanese performers along with some of Suzuki’s 
actors. Suzuki was responsible for the script, lighting and set design in 
collaboration with a Taiwanese team. Taiwanese songs formed the main part of 
the production which was played at the National Theatre in Taipei and then toured 
to Kaohsiung. However, the artistic interpretation of La Dame aux Camélias 
aroused controversy at its premiere because of potential intercultural 
misconceptions
24
 and the NCKSCC had to hold an official symposium at which 
                                                          
24 According to the report by journalist, Wang Yi-ru of the China Times, the controversy arose 
from differing views about musicals, opera and drama between Japanese Director Suzuki 
Tadashi and the Taiwanese performing arts circle in terms of how the director combined 
elements of this French story with Taiwanese pop songs under his signature ‘Suzuki Method 
of Actor Training’. The Taiwanese performing arts circle also questioned whether the 
NCKSCC should spend a substantial amount of money on this kind of production by inviting 
renowned international directors (China Times, 2011). 
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the issues were debated with prominent individuals from the Taiwanese arts 
world to settle the dispute. As a result, the name ‘Flagship Production’ was 
changed to ‘Annual Production’ from 2012. 
 YogeeTi (2012): this dance production has a Taiwanese name that translates as 
‘organism’. It was choregraphed by Mourad Merzouki, the Artistic Director of 
the French dance company, Compagnie Kafig and combined contemporary and 
street dance. It was inspired by the Taiwanese fashion designer, Johan Ku, who 
was also the costume designer for the production. The dancers were from 
Compagnie Kafig along with local Taiwanese dancers. YogeeTi played in Taipei 
and Kaohsiung, but then also toured internationally for more than 100 
performances. However, according to the NCKSCC’s former Programme 
Manager, Huang Pen-ting who was in charge of YogeeTi, the international tours 
were arranged by Compagnie Kafig rather than by the NCKSCC (Huang, 
interview of 3 July 2018).  
 Fall for Eileen Chang (2013): this production was initiated by the NCKSCC’s 
Artistic Director, Huang Pi-twan. It was inspired by the work of the overseas 
Chinese writer Eileen Chang, and involved German composer Christian Jost, as 
well as the Taiwanese composer Chung Yao-kuang. It was directed by Taiwanese 
Director Li Huan-hsiun and performed by Taiwanese artists with the National 
Symphony Orchestra. It only played a single performance at the National Concert 
Hall in Taipei (Huang, interview of 3 July 2018). 
(2) Taiwanese team:  
 Song of Pensive Beholding (2009) was choregraphed by Lin Li-chen in her 
signature theatre style inspired by Taiwanese ritual culture, and performed by her 
Legend Lin Dance Theatre. Song of Pensive Beholding has toured to France, 
Russia, Mexico, and Japan (NCKSCC, 2010: 60).  
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 On the Road (2010) was a musical inspired by Taiwanese indigenous music, 
mostly from the Puyuma tribe. It is a multi-media musical performed by the 
National Symphony Orchestra along with indigenous singers. On the Road has 
toured to Kaohsiung and Taitung in Taiwan and also to Hong Kong (NCKSCC, 
2010: 64).  
 Crystal Boys (2014): this production was based on a work by the 
Chinese/Taiwanese writer Pai Hsien-yung and tells of the lives of homosexual 
men in Taipei in the 1970s. It was directed by the Taiwanese director, Tsai Ruei-
yuan and performed by Taiwanese actors. The production was staged in Taipei 
and Kaohsiung (Huang, interview of 3 July 2018). 
Observations 
At the 2008 initiation of the NCKSCC’s Flagship Production Project, Taiwaneseness 
was already a recognised characteristic of Taiwanese identity and it therefore aimed at 
international recognition by inviting acclaimed international directors and artists to 
work with Taiwanese artists, and thereby enhance the brand of Taiwan. Interestingly, 
any enhancement gained was appreciated mainly by the Taiwanese population itself, 
rather than more general acknowledgement by people outside Taiwan, apart from the 
invited artists. 
Between 2008 and 2014, as Assistant Manager in the Programming Department, 
the author of this thesis was personally involved in all the Flagship Productions 
mentioned above and was able to see at first-hand how working with international 
artists influenced the awareness and creative results of local staff. A colleague of the 
author of this thesis, Huang Pen-ting, another Assistant Programme Manager during 
this period, was in overall charge of all nine productions and recalls that when new 
projects were initiated at the NCKSCC they were normally conceived at the highest 
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level by the Chairman/Chairwoman and Artistic Directors along with their personal 
artistic networks. The result, as shown in Table 5.2, is that ‘the choice of programmes 
regularly reflected the individual preferences of those senior people in terms of their 
artistic tastes and their social or political sensitivity’ (Huang, interview of 3 July 2018, 
translated from Mandarin by the author). This is how Mackay—The Black Bearded 
Bible Man and On the Road were chosen to represent Taiwanese contemporary opera 
and indigenous music.  
Initiation through the individual choice of senior managers was one significant 
programming approach for the Flagship Productions. According to Huang, the other 
approach was for artists to make proposals which were then evaluated by the NCKSCC. 
Examples of this are Song of Pensive Beholding by Legend Lin Dance Theatre and 
The Grand Voyage by U Theatre. Regarding international collaboration, Huang Pen-
ting explains that when international directors were invited to work on NCKSCC 
projects, the Centre always asked them to come to Taiwan in advance of their work so 
that they had time to undertake field research. The hope was that they would 
familiarise themselves with Taiwanese life and culture, and then use that appreciation 
to inspire their work for the NCKSCC. Nevertheless, the directors’ artistic decisions 
were always respected, and that is how Orlando and La Dame aux Camélias were born. 
Huang described the working process as ‘complicated yet organic’, and the eventual 
results quite often differed from the original expectations. Working with respected 
international artists allowed the Taiwanese collaborators to absorb new influences that 
would form the basis of a new cultural awareness within the Taiwanese arts world 
(Huang, interview of 3 July 2018). 
    Liu Chiung-shu, NCKSCC Artistic Director (2008-2010), when asked about the 
source materials for the programme, commented that the mission was to bring 
international strength to Taiwanese productions based on Taiwanese elements. In her 
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view, it is important to showcase every aspect of the ability of the performing arts in 
Taiwan so it should not make any difference whether the subject chosen is Taiwanese 
or not. For example, Zhang He, the main character of the story of The Grand Voyage, 
is Chinese; Orlando is based on the English writer Virginia Woolf’s work, and La 
Dame aux Camélias is originally written by the French author, Alexandre Dumas fils. 
None of these are Taiwanese subjects, but they were selected because their realisation 
for the stage involved Taiwanese creativity. Liu claims that if programming was 
restricted to exclusively Taiwanese work or subjects it would be limited and narrow-
minded, and would encourage an isolationist approach to creative work. In addition, 
from a practical point of view, if international touring is an objective then it is 
imperative that the subjects of the Flagship Productions are recognised worldwide so 
that international presenters are keen to invite the productions to their theatres or 
festivals. It is vital to have well recognised subjects on offer if the idea is to attract co-
production with international theatre companies. For example, The Grand Voyage 
drew attention from Singapore’s Esplanade Theatre on the Bay which was interested 
in making a co-production because Zhang He’s story is well known in Singapore (Liu, 
interview of 25 May 2018).  
Programme Manager, Huang Pen-ting agreed with this and stressed that the 
source materials must fit closely with Taiwanese people’s life, reflect their stories and 
remind them of their memories so that the productions can evoke the audience’s 
interest. That is how Fall for Eileen Chang and Crystal Boys were planned, despite the 
fact that they were based on the works of overseas Chinese and mainlander Taiwanese 
writers. Both are familiar and well-loved writers in Taiwan, and this is more important 
than where they happen to be living. These productions were popular in Taiwan but 
had limited international appeal, probably restricted to Chinese-speaking areas (Huang, 
interview of 3 July 2018).  
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    Another production worthy of note in the Annual Production series was Crystal 
Boys which focused on homosexuality. The NCKSCC, its Board and Artistic Directors 
were clearly open to themes related to the contemporary understanding of Taiwan as 
a diverse society and demonstrated that Taiwanese identity nowadays embraces 
elements of cultural diversity apart from ethnicity. Thus indigenous, Western or new 
immigrant cultures are represented, but also gender, sexuality, religion, disability, age, 
and economic background. This aspect of the NCKSCC’s programming is a good 
example of how today’s multicultural Taiwanese identity can show the ‘differences’ 
within the ‘similarities’ in the imagined Taiwanese society (Hall, 1998) and in the 
process of the new Taiwanese identity’s ‘becoming’, integration plays a vital role 
(Wintle, 1996). 
Outcomes 
Analysis of the NCKSCC’s Flagship Productions series shows that enormous amounts 
of money and energy were expended, but that results did not live up to expectations, 
especially in terms of international touring, enhancing the Taiwan brand, or developing 
cross-border relationships. For example, six out of the nine Flagship Productions only 
toured within Taiwan or ended after a world premiere at the NCKSCC. Yang Chi-wen, 
NCKSCC Artistic Director (2007-2008), commented that in responding to government 
policy, it is not enough for the NCKSCC to take the leading role in the performing arts 
in Taiwan, even though this is one of its functions. It must also take a leading role in 
international promotion of Taiwanese productions, and by extension its culture. Yang 
adds that the Flagship Production series was allocated a very large budget, but in 
hindsight needed more detailed, sounder advance planning carried out by professionals 
with expertise in this field if it was to achieve its aim of providing an international 
showcase for Taiwanese culture. Because it was a new venture, the Flagship 
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Production series was something of an experiment which had targets that were hard to 
achieve. People were aware that the series might fail in its early stages, but that if 
failure was repeated, it would be necessary to investigate the reasons and propose 
solutions (Yang, interview of 14 June 2018). 
    This may explain the negative reaction of the arts circle to La Dame aux Camélias 
in 2011 when the NCKSCC was asked to justify the large amount of money it spent 
on grandiose international projects that enhanced the reputation of internationally 
renowned directors, but did not look after the interests of local companies and artists.  
Did the Flagship Production series boost the reputation and pockets of 
international directors and artists as it promoted ‘intercultural theatre’25 works, while 
at the same time developing a specifically Taiwanese identity? Did the international 
directors spend enough time to gain a proper understanding of Taiwanese culture or 
did they misunderstand and misinterpret it? In the opinion of Taiwanese theatre scholar, 
Tuan Hsin-chun, in both Orlando and The Grand Voyage, the results of ‘cross-borders’ 
and ‘representation’ were superficial, with the dominant impression still being of 
Robert Wilson’s trade mark ‘theatre of image’. The other elements such as Chinese 
Opera in Orlando or oriental legendry in The Grand Voyage all appeared to be 
secondary (Tuan, 2012: 40). This argument then carried on in La Dame aux Camélias. 
However, there is always a hierarchy in the theatre and in the production of flagship 
shows. If renowned artists such as Robert Wilson or Suzuki Tadashi play a central role 
in a production, their charisma and authority will always result in a show that appears 
to be ‘their’ creation. The NCKSCC may have claimed that it was the producer in these 
                                                          
25 Patrice Pavis in his The Intercultural Performance Reader defines 5 modes of intercultural 
theatre: (1) Denial of Cultural Anchoring; (2) Rapprochement; (3) Seduction, imitation, 
exchange; (4) Renewed betrayal or productive misinterpretation; and (5) Appropriation (cited 
in Tuan, 2012: 41-43). 
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productions, but they themselves admitted that they would always ‘respect the artistic 
decision’ in the end. Theatre scholar, Daphne P. Lei, referred to such an arrangement 
as ‘hegemonic intercultural theatre’26 (Lei, 2011:571).   
If the concept of Taiwaneseness had been accepted and taken into the national 
awareness by 2008, it followed that seeking international recognition for Taiwanese 
cultural achievements became the new subject for programming. Although it was not 
necessary for every Flagship Production to achieve this aim, Yang Chi-wen, NCKSCC 
Artistic Director (2007-2008) stresses: 
It was seen as important to stimulate Taiwan’s performing arts by bringing in 
new ideas, concepts and imagination. Introducing international virtuosi to 
Taiwan not only provides the opportunity to observe and emulate, but also 
inspires Taiwanese artists. This may not be a speedy process, but in time the 
influence would gradually take root. (Yang, interview of 14 June 2018, 
translated from Mandarin by the author)  
Yet although bringing producers and artists to Taiwan may enhance Taiwan’s cultural 
life and show its creative people what is happening internationally, gaining 
international recognition for Taiwan in the field of artistic achievement is another 
matter that depends on taking Taiwanese creations abroad to demonstrate what it can 
do. The Flagship Production series had little success in this regard. 
As mentioned above, the Artistic Director is the key person in programming. 
After the era of the Flagship Production series, a new Artistic Director had different 
thoughts about how to support Taiwanese companies and artists by using the budget 
to commission a wider range of productions rather than focusing on one or two flagship 
                                                          
26 According to Lei (2011: 571), hegemonic intercultural theatre is ‘a specific artistic genre 
and state of mind that combines First World capital and brainpower with Third World raw 
material and labour, also Western classical texts with Eastern performance traditions. Well-
known practitioners of ‘Hegemonic Intercultural Theatre’ include Peter Brook, Ariane 
Mnouchkine, and Richard Schechner, as well as their Eastern counterparts Suzuki Tadashi of 
Japan, and the Contemporary Legend Theatre of Taiwan’.  
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productions. The Flagship Project finally ended in 2014.      
 
5.3.2 Case Study Two: the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan  
Founded by writer and choreographer, Lin Hwai-min in 1973, the Cloud Gate Dance 
Theatre of Taiwan was named after ‘the oldest known dance in China’ (Yun men, 雲
門). The company is the ‘first contemporary dance company in the greater Chinese-
speaking community’ and probably the most internationally toured Taiwanese 
performing arts company (Cloud Gate Dance Theatre, 2016). The founder and Artistic 
Director, Lin Hwai-min is one of the most influential cultural figures in Taiwan, and 
the evolution of Cloud Gate’s works ‘essentially follow the trace of Lin Hwai-min’s 
pursuance of cultural identity reflecting Taiwan’s cultural identity shift from Chinese 
to multi-cultural Taiwanese’ (Encyclopedia of Taiwan, 2019).  
In his book Bright Eyes on the Heights, Lin describes how he started his career 
by learning contemporary dance in New York and at the same time formulating the 
idea of a specifically ‘Chinese’ contemporary dance. At that time, because the official 
name of Taiwan was the Republic of China, rather than thinking in terms of 
‘Taiwaneseness’ as we might do today, Lin automatically thought in terms of 
‘Chineseness’. Lin was as shocked and angry as the rest of the Taiwanese population 
when in 1971, the United Nations voted to replace Taiwan’s ROC government as the 
representative of China with mainland China’s PRC. Lin recalled how he suddenly 
had to figure out ‘who I am’ with a great feeling of nostalgia. He decided to return to 
Taiwan, where he founded Cloud Gate with the ambition of presenting works 
‘composed by Chinese, choreographed by Chinese, danced by Chinese, and for a 
Chinese audience’ (Lin, 2010: 26; Encyclopedia of Taiwan, 2019). 
The development of Cloud Gate is also closely linked with Taiwan’s cultural 
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policy of supporting the performing arts. Kuo Wei-fan, CCA Minister (1988-1993), 
recalled that when the Government subsidy system was initiated, Cloud Gate was the 
key factor. He remembered how Lin Hwai-min, after many years of running the 
company with very little financial or other support, became so disenchanted that in 
1988 he decided to disband Cloud Gate. Kuo was CCA Minister at that time, and was 
instrumental in rescuing Cloud Gate by setting up a scheme to offer substantial 
financial support to Taiwanese performing arts companies. After further discussion at 
the National Cultural Conference in 1991, the CCA constructed the International 
Performance Troupe Cultivation Plan in 1992, which evolved into the influential 
Performing Arts Group’s Development Foster Plan in 1998 (see Section 4.2.2.2 of 
Chapter 4). Subsidising Taiwanese performing arts companies in this way was 
eventually extended and became part of the national cultural policy. Cloud Gate still 
receives an annual grant from the Government (Kuo, interview of 28 June 2018). 
    Lin’s work with Cloud Gate was at a low ebb in 1987, the year that the NCKSCC 
opened and this meant that it did not appear at the Centre until 1991, when it staged a 
come-back with its 1986 work My Nostalgia, My Songs and premiered the 1989 work 
Requiem at the National Theatre. According to Lee Huey-mei (NCKSCC Artistic 
Director 2014-2018), since 1991 the Centre and Cloud Gate have built up a close 
partnership and the world premiere of every new work by Cloud Gate has taken place 
at the Centre ever since (Lee, interview of 7 December 2015). This special relationship 
between the national performing arts centre and a renowned subsidised performing arts 
company makes Cloud Gate a useful candidate for a case study in the relationship 
between programming and Taiwanese identity, starting from the beginning of that 





Table 5.3 Chronological list of works by the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan  
(1973-2017) 
No Year Name  Choreographer Content NCKSCC involvement  Note 
1 1973 Landscape Lin Hwai-min Inspired by American Chinese 
composer, Chou Wen-chung’s 
work of Chinese poems. 
 Created during Lin’s 
study in the US and 




2 1973 Blind Lin Hwai-min Inspired by Taiwanese Composer, 
Hsu Tsang-houi’s Taipei 
impression of a blind masseur.  




3 1974 Revenge of A 
Lonely Ghost 
Lin Hwai-min Based on the Chinese Opera, The 
Case of the Black Basin. 
  
4 1974 Han Shih Lin Hwai-min Based on a story about the 
Warring States Period in Chinese 
history. 
  
5 1975 The Tale of 
White Serpent 
Lin Hwai-min Based on a Chinese folktale 
Madam White Snake. 
Programmed in 1992.  
6 1978 Legacy Lin Hwai-min Describing how Taiwanese 
ancestors crossed the Taiwan 
Strait to settle in Taiwan. 
Programmed in 2003 as 
30th anniversary work. 
 
7 1979 Liao Tien 
Ting 
Lin Hwai-min Based on a Taiwanese folktale 
about the Japanese colonial 
period. 
  
8 1982 Nirvana Lin Hwai-min Inspired by a Buddhist text. Programmed in 2000.  
9 1982 Street Game Lin Hwai-min Inspired by the city of concrete 
buildings and the people who live 
there. 
  
10 1983 The Dream of 
Red Chamber 
Lin Hwai-min Inspired by Chinese writer Cao 
Xue-qin’s work The Dream of the 
Red Chamber.  
Programmed in 1994, 
1997 and 2005. 
10th anniversary 
work. 
11 1984 Rite of 
Spring, 
Taipei, 1984 
Lin Hwai-min Inspired by the chaos during the 
process of Taiwan’s 
modernisation.  
  
12 1984 Adagietto Lin Hwai-min Using music from Gustav 




13 1985 Dreamscape Lin Hwai-min Showing artist’s courage to face 
the desolation and complexity. 
  
14 1986 My Nostalgia,  
My Songs 
Lin Hwai-min Using Taiwanese pop songs to 
describe the life of Taiwanese 
young men who come to Taipei 
to pursue their dreams.  
Programmed in 1991 for 
Cloud Gate’s  
come-back. 
 
15 1989 Requiem Lin Hwai-min Created after the Tiananmen 
Square massacre in Beijing, 
China on 4 June 1989. 




16 1993 Nine Songs Lin Hwai-min Inspired by ancient Chinese poet, 
Qu Yuan’s work Nine Songs, 
with Taiwanese indigenous and 
other Asian music. 
Commissioned and 
premiered. Programmed 




17 1994 Rice Grains Lin Hwai-min Inspired by the features of rice, 
and this work became the 
predecessor of Song of 
Wanderers in the same year.  
  
18 1994 The Rite of 
Spring 
Helen Lai Inviting Hong Kong 
Choreographer to create the work 
for the Company and inspired by 
Russian composer Igor 
Stravinsky’s same name work. 
  
19 1994 Songs of 
Wanderers 
Lin Hwai-min Based on Hermann Hesse’s work 
Siddhartha with music of 
Georgian folk songs. 
Commissioned and 
premiered. Programmed 
in 2002, 2010, and 2013. 
 
 
20 1994 Cocoon Lo Man-fei Using Phillip Glass’s music  Originally created in 
1987 and programmed in 
1994. 
Lo Man-fei was a 
dancer of the Cloud 
Gate and became the 
Artistic Director of 
the Cloud Gate 2 in 
1999. 
21 1995 Invisible City Helen Lei Inviting Hong Kong 
Choreographer to create the work 
for the Company and inspired by 
Mexican painter Frida Kahlo’s 
life. 
  
22 1996 Frida Helen Lei Inviting Hong Kong 
Choreographer to create the work 
Presented in 1996.  
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for the Company and inspired by 
Italian writer Italo Calvino’s 
same name novel. 
23 1996 Le Vie en rose Helen Lei Inviting Hong Kong 
Choreographer to create the work 
for the Company and inspired by 
French singer Edith Piaf’s songs 
and life. 
Presented in 1996.  
24 1997 Portrait of the 
Families 
Lin Hwai-min Using old Taiwanese photos and 




in 2000 and 2011. 
 






26 1999 Burning the 
Juniper 
Branches 




27 2001 Bamboo 
Dream 
Lin Hwai-min Expressing the dreamy and 




28 2001 Cursive Lin Hwai-min Inspired by calligraphy exploring 
the oriental aesthetic and 
traditional movement. The first 
piece of the Cursive Trilogy. 
Commissioned and 
premiered. Programmed 
in 2009 as Cursive：A 
Trilogy. 
 
29 2002 Smoke Lin Hwai-min Inspired by Marcel Proust’s work 





30 2003 Cursive II Lin Hwai-min Inspired by calligraphy exploring 
the beauty of Song Dynasty china. 
Music by John Cage. The second 
piece of the Cursive: A Trilogy.  
Commissioned and 
premiered. Programmed 
in 2009 as Cursive：A 
Trilogy. 
 
31 2004 On the 
Heights 
Wu kuo-chu Expressing deep loneliness. Commissioned and 
premiered. 
 
32 2004 The Road to 
the Mountain 





33 2005 Wild Cursive Lin Hwai-min Inspired by calligraphy. The last 
piece of the Cursive: A Trilogy.  
Commissioned and 
premiered. Programmed 





34 2006 White Lin Hwai-min Consisting of three pieces with 




35 2006 Wind Shadow Lin Hwai-min Collaboration with overseas 




36 2007 Lost Shadows Akram Khan 
(British 
choreographer) 
The concept is about ending  Presented. With Cloud Gate 2. 
37 2007 Oculus Wu kuo-chu Oculus means ‘eye’ in Latin. The 
piece is about light and hope 
Presented. With Cloud Gate 2. 
38 2008 Whispers of 
Flowers 
Lin Hwai-min Inspired by the company’s tour in 
Portugal, seeing a great flowering 
tree and recalling the image in the 







39 2010 Listening to 
the River 
Lin Hwai-min Inspired by Taiwan’s Tam-sui 
River, also concerning the 




40 2010 Water Stains 
on the Wall 
Lin Hwai-min Inspired by calligraphy. Commissioned and 
premiered. 
 
41 2011 How Can I 
Live on 
Without You 
Lin Hwai-min Inspired by Taiwanese pop songs. Commissioned and 
premiered. 
 
42 2013 Rice Lin Hwai-min Inspired by the life cycle of rice in 





43 2014 White 
Water/Dust 
Lin Hwai-min Inspired by Taiwan’s Li-wu River. Commissioned and 
premiered. 
 
44 2017 Formosa Lin Hwai-min Inspired by the island of Taiwan. Commissioned and 
premiered. 
 
Source: own compilation from Cloud Gate’s chronological work and NCKSCC programme data.  
Table 5.3 lists the programmes of the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan since the 
company’s first performance in 1973, showing when its association with the NCKSCC 
began in 1991. Although the main focus is the Company’s work at the National Theatre, 
it is instructive to list the Company’s early works as some were later programmed at 




As Lin Hwai-min was the founder and artistic director of Cloud Gate, it is not 
surprising that Table 5.3 emphasises his key role there. He choregraphed 37 out of the 
44 works listed.  
In 2005, the Council of Cultural Affairs hosted the ‘Lin Hwai-min International 
Dance Conference’ where the dance scholar Chao Yu-ling presented a paper that 
analysed Cloud Gate/Lin Hwai-min’s works from 1973 to 1997 in relation to 
Taiwanese identity and demonstrated how Cloud Gate’s concept and style have 
evolved during that time and how Taiwanese dance scholars and critics, such as Chan 
Hung-chi, Hang Chi and Lu Ching-yi have identified three periods of development in 
Cloud Gate’s work between 1973 and 1985. Based on Chan Hung-chi’s classification27 
there was a Chinese period, a Taiwanese period and a period with diverse 
characteristics (Chao, 2005: 7). However, Cloud Gate’s work is not all mono-cultural 
so that, for example, Nine Songs (1993) was inspired by ancient Chinese poet Qu 
Yuan’s work, while the music is from indigenous Taiwanese and other Asian cultures. 
Although it is possible to identify three kinds of work in Cloud Gate’s oeuvre, they do 
not follow a strictly chronological sequence. For example, Blind (1973), inspired by 
Taiwanese Composer Hsu Tsang-houi’s Taipei impression of a blind masseur, was 
created during Chan’s ‘Chinese period’ whereas The Dream of Red Chamber (1983), 
inspired by Chinese writer Cao Xue-qin’s (曹雪芹) work of the same name, was 
created in the ‘various’ period. Moreover, Chao (2005) also pointed out that Taiwanese 
theatre pioneer Wu Jing-jyi questioned the vagueness and ambiguity of the distinction 
                                                          
27 Chan Hung-chi divided Cloud Gate’s works between 1973 and 1985 into three periods: first, 
a Chinese period (1973-1976) that integrates Chinese cultural tradition into contemporary 
dance; second, a Taiwanese period (1976-1982) where dances have Taiwanese vernacular 
themes; and third, the ‘various’ period (1982-1985) in which works of foreign composers and 
choreographers were performed without an insistence that they should relate to Chinese 
traditions (Chao, 2005: 7).   
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between Chinese and Taiwanese cultural elements, a difficulty which has also been 
apparent in the research reported in this thesis. This emphasises how important it is 
not to draw detailed conclusions from data that do not warrant detailed analysis. Chao 
Yu-ling also comments:  
Chan noticed the cultural characteristics and the source ideas of the dance, 
but ignored other dance elements (such as costume, movement dynamics, 
choreographic structure, lighting, décor and props) that are crucial in the 
creation and presentation of the dance works. (Chao, 2005: 8) 
Nevertheless, Chan’s observation that there are three periods of development in Cloud 
Gate’s work, and that these relate to changes in Taiwanese identity, holds good in 
general. During the early period, most of Lin Hwai-min’s works were inspired by 
Chinese sources. Revenge of A Lonely Ghost, Han Shih, The Tale of White Serpent, 
The Dream of Red Chamber, Nine Songs are good examples that reflect his early 
determination to create Chinese contemporary dance. Later work drew inspiration 
from a wider range of sources. 
    Contemporary dance is an abstract, conceptual and philosophically-based genre 
and these characteristics are prominent in most of Lin’s work. Thus, for example, some 
of his signature works mentioned in the Table 5.3 use Chinese symbols. Cloud Gate 
dancers are trained in traditional Chinese disciplines such as meditation, qi gong (氣
功), and martial arts as well as modern dance and ballet (Cloud Gate Dance Theatre, 
2016), and the combination of Chinese and internationally-based elements is 
characteristic of Lin’s work.  
    In a similar way, Chinese (Peking) opera and calligraphy add to the distinctive 
charm of this very Taiwanese dance company. Lin has always kept his focus on 
Taiwan and draws attention in his work to historical events related to Taiwan. As 
examples, shortly after founding Cloud Gate, Legacy (1978) and Liao Tien Ting (1979) 
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were created. Subsequently, My Nostalgia, My Songs (1986), Portrait of the Families 
(1997), The Road to the Mountain (2004), Listening to the River (2010), How Can I 
Live on Without You (2011), Rice (2013) and Formosa (2017) track Taiwan’s social 
development and reflect the artist’s thoughts about his land. Lin has shown himself to 
be increasingly concerned to focus on Taiwan, especially over the last decade. In 2005, 
Chao Yu-ling claimed in the ‘Lin Hwai-min International Dance Conference’: 
Cloud Gate’s development of a unique contemporary dance style reflects 
Taiwanese culture through the transformation of dance. The company’s 
repertoire is a synthesis of different ethno-cultural elements such as Chinese, 
Western, Taiwanese, Taiwanese indigenous, Japanese and other Asian 
cultures. (Chao: 2005: 6) 
During my interview with him on 6 May 2015, Lin Hwai-min explained how he started 
Cloud Gate and how he created his works: 
To establish Cloud Gate was my primary objective and I wanted to react to 
the culturally over-westernised Taiwan of the 1960s. My work is all about my 
personal development in trying to perceive and understand the place where I 
was born and grew up in an adult way that I would not have been able to do 
when I was a child. For me, the most important thing is that I care about my 
people, my audience and my place. (Lin, interview of 6 May 2015, translated 
from Mandarin by the author).  
Although Lin did not put it this way, we can perceive how the development of his work 
runs parallel to the changes in Taiwanese life. The line of evolution in Lin’s work is 
not a direct progression from Chinese to Taiwanese but instead, as Chao describes, 
more of a mix of different cultural elements. Lin feels that his creations are all about 
him, and his personal experiences and as Chao observes: 
The evolution of Cloud Gate’s repertoire in essence follows Lin Hwai-min’s 
search for a cultural identity in a diasporic society. Lin began his search with 
a re-evaluation of the Chinese in Taiwan, and then a re-evaluation of 
Taiwanese culture… After clarifying his cultural identity, Lin Hwai-min 
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attempts to develop vocabularies that match the pulse of time. (Chao, 2005: 
14) 
    In this way, Lin and other Taiwanese artists of his generation who were keen to 
create works ‘by Chinese’ and ‘for Chinese’ were making manifest the ‘imagining’ 
(Anderson, 2006) of a Chinese (Zhonghua) cultural identity in Taiwan. For Lin and 
other Taiwanese people like him, whether they were Han Taiwanese or second 
generation mainlanders, if they were neither born in mainland China nor even visited 
it as they grew up, the notion of ‘by Chinese’ or ‘for Chinese’ in reality came to mean 
‘Taiwanese’. This was the origin of the concept of ‘Taiwanese’ as an identity in its 
own right. 
 
5.3.3 Case Study Three: the Guo Guang Opera Company  
The Guo Guang (國光) Opera Company was established in 1995 as the sole national 
theatre company under the Ministry of Education in Taiwan. It had its origins in the 
Chinese Opera companies that belonged to the armed forces: Lu Guang (army), Da 
Peng (air force), and Hai Guang (navy). The Company was then transferred from the 
Ministry of Education to the Council of Cultural Affairs in 2008. (Guo Guang Opera 
Company, 2019). Wong Ah-chi, Artistic Director of Guo Guang, points out the 
significance of the separation of Guo Guang from the military which is ‘to detach from 
the political party (KMT) and military system and return to a cultural and educational 
structure’ (Wong, 2002: 130).  
The Taiwanese theatre scholar Lin He-yi (2015) explains that Chinese Opera was 
a privileged genre when the KMT government transferred to Taiwan, and because 
many Chinese opera performers followed the KMT to Taiwan, its arrival swamped 
Taiwan’s existing traditional theatre scenario. With strong support from both the 
Government and the military who established their own Chinese Opera troupes and 
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schools, Chinese opera was very popular until the late 1970s when enthusiasm for 
different kinds of entertainment started to grow (Lin, 2015: 233-234). Because of this 
there was originally a proposal to build a ‘National Chinese Opera Theatre’ instead of 
a ‘National Theatre’ when the idea of establishing the NCKSCC was initiated (Hu, 
interview of 25 May 2018) and indeed, Chinese Opera programmes predominated in 
the Centre’s programmes for the first decade after its 1987 opening.  
Chinese Opera is a very traditional theatre form in which exactly following the 
set steps is essential with little room for innovation. As discussed above, before the 
PRC was recognised internationally as the official representative of ‘China’, the ROC 
took the role of guardian of Chinese tradition and it was therefore natural that it should 
wholeheartedly promote ‘National Opera’, i.e. Chinese Opera. However, after cross-
strait exchange started in 1987, and the democratic movement emerged in Taiwan, 
‘mainland fever’ and ‘localisation fever’ struggled for supremacy in the development 
of Taiwan’s Chinese Opera (Wong, 2002: 130-131).  
Lu Guang, Da Peng, and Hai Guang regularly performed at the NCKSCC and, 
like its predecessors, Guo Guang has continued in partnership with the NCKSCC by 
co-presenting programmes. Because of this it is particularly interesting to review Guo 
Guang’s programmes at the NCKSCC in order to observe how this Company with its 
very fundamental ‘Chinese’ background adapted itself to the new era of innovation 
during the time of Taiwanese identity change.      
Table 5.4 Chronological list of works by the Guo Guang Opera Company (1997-2015) 
No Year Name Content Note 
1 1997 The Phoenix Hairpin Based on a romance of Song 





2 1997 Beautiful Country Based on the story of the last 
Emperor of the Southern Tang 
Dynasty, Li Yu. 
New creation. 
3 1998 Mazu The story of the Chinese/Taiwanese 
sea goddess, Mazu. 
New creation and it is 
part of Taiwan Trilogy. 
4 1999 Cheng Ch’eng-kung 
and Taiwan 
The story of Cheng Ch’eng-kung 
and Taiwan. 
Rental programme, new 
creation and it is 
Taiwan Trilogy. 
5 1999 Hsiao He and Han Hsin The story of two Han Dynasty 
ministers. 
New creation. 
6 1999 Liao Tien Ting Based on a Taiwanese folktale of 
the Japanese colonial period. 
New creation and it is 
part of Taiwan Trilogy. 
7 2000 Traditional Gala for 5th 
Anniversary 
Traditional pieces.   
8 2001 A Celestial Romance 
between the Galaxy 
Traditional Chinese romantic 
tragedy. 
New creation. 
9 2002 Journey through Hell Chinese story of a scholar and his 
journey through hell. 
New creation. 
10 2004  Li Shi-min and Wei 
Cheng 
Based on the story of the Taizong 
Emperor of the Tang Dynasty, Li 




11 2004 Liang and Chu—the 
Butterfly Lovers 




12 2005 1.Journey through Hell 
2.Wang Shi-fong Stirs 
Up Unrest in the Ning 
Residence 
Wang Shi-fong Stirs Up Unrest in 
the Ning Residence is based on The 
Dream of Red Chamber. 
10th anniversary work. 
13 2006 Pei Yen-ling  
in Chinese Opera 
Special event for the Chinese Opera 
artist, Pei Yen-ling. 
Chinese performer from 
PRC.  
14 2006 Hu Shiue -yan The story of a Qing Dynasty 
Chinese businessman.  
New creation. 
15 2007 Sunlight after Snowfall Inspired by Chinese calligrapher, 
Wang Xi-zhi’s masterpiece. 
New creation  
with the NSO. 
16 2008 Journey through Hell Chinese story of a scholar on his 
journey through hell. 
 
17 2010 Comedy Classics 
Laughing All the Way 





18 2012 Cleopatra and Her 
Fools 
Inspired by Shakespeare’s Anthony 
and Cleopatra. 
New creation. 
19 2013 Flowing Sleeves and 
Rouge 
Inspired by the romance of 
Emperor Ming of Tang (Tang 
Ming-huang) and his Royal Consort 
Yang (Yan Gui-fei). 
New creation. 
20 2014 1.Wang Shi-fong Stirs 
Up Unrest in the Ning 
Residence  
2.Tan Chun 
Both are based on The Dream of the 
Red Chamber. 
Tan Chun is a new 
creation. 
21 2015 The Painting of 18 
Lohans 
Story about Chinese painters. New creation. 
Source: own compilation from NCKSCC programme data  
Table 5.4 extracts Guo Guang’s programme data from the overall list of performances 
at the NCKSCC. Taiwan Bangzi Opera Company was part of Guo Guang from 1996 
to 2008, and also regularly cooperated with the NCKSCC, but this case study focuses 
solely on Guo Guang itself. Also, although Lu Guang, Da Peng, and Hai Guang 
performed regularly at the National Theatre from its opening in 1987 until they were 
merged, their programmes were mainly based on traditional Chinese elements. Their 
programmes are not included in this case study. 
Observations 
Table 5.4 shows that Guo Gang has tried hard to find a way of establishing an identity 
for itself by ‘introducing contemporary ideologies into traditional Chinese (Peking) 
Opera’ through modernisation and literary advancement. Diverse motifs were 
introduced (Guo Guang Opera Company, 2019) and, to reflect the shift in Taiwanese 
identity, ‘localisation’ was a major feature when Guo Guang was newly launched. 
Their Artistic Director, Wong An-chi, explains this move as an approach to escape 
from the fixed mainland Chinese view and to connect with the land where it was based 
by embracing the native culture of Taiwan. Their main task was to establish new 
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characteristics for Taiwanese Chinese opera with a ‘new tempo’ and a ‘new viewpoint’. 
She stressed that localisation should include: 
1. Local elements: amended scripts to include to local stories. 
2. Local influence: from local artistic trends and local theatre styles. 
3. Local prospect and angle: embed the point of view and interpretation of local 
people. (Wong, 2002: 131)  
This corresponds with the Taiwan scholar, Chang Bi-yu’s view: 
The DPP government saw the concept of Taiwanese culture in a different way 
from the previous KMT government… at a time of nation building, tradition 
and cultural heritage become very useful and ‘traditional theatre’ (Xiqu, 戲
曲) is used as an articulation of culture and representative of identity. (Chang: 
2007: 66) 
The DPP government came to power in 2000, some five years after Guo Guang 
had been launched. But, as Wong An-chi mentioned, ‘mainland fever’ started in 1987 
and Taiwan’s Chinese Opera had already begun to differentiate itself from the 
mainland Chinese version. What is more, Chinese opera was no longer the ‘national 
opera’, and other Taiwanese traditional theatre genres, such as Taiwanese opera and 
Hakka opera started to share in importance to form a new spectrum of Taiwanese 
traditional theatre.  
At that stage, it was critical for Guo Guang as a ‘national’ traditional opera 
company to find a new position for itself and to develop characteristics that fitted with 
the new government’s search for a Taiwanese identity. Hobsbawm (1983) claims that 
‘the invention of tradition’ is particularly seen in nationalism’s wish to ‘develop a 
national identity’ and Chang Bi-yu agrees: 
The way ‘tradition’ is defined indicates how we see or wish to see ourselves. 
Throughout modern history, ‘tradition’ has been invented and deployed to 
produce a sense of community. By evoking historical pride and memory, Xiqu 
(traditional theatre) has become one means by which national identity can be 
refused and reshaped. (Chang, 2007: 66) 
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    The most notable example of this approach is the Taiwan Trilogy: Mazu, Cheng 
Ch’eng-kung and Taiwan, and Liao Tien Ting in 1998 and 1999. This is evidence of 
the way in which the company was keen to find an appropriate position for itself as a 
national company during the shift in Taiwanese identity when it faced a major change 
in the political climate. However, since the formula, aesthetics, and customs of Chinese 
opera are long-established, it took time to internalise the new aesthetic and to avoid 
superficial Taiwaneseness. Wong An-chi emphasises:  
Respecting traditions and keeping origination should be as important as 
localisation and that is why Guo Guang was launched with the Kun Opera, 
The Phoenix Hairpin as its opening presentation. Kun opera has been called 
‘the mother of all kinds of Chinese traditional theatre’ and presenting The 
Phoenix Hairpin proclaims how tradition is important to Guo Guang. (Wong: 
2002: 131)  
This gave Guo Guang the formidable task of discovering how to balance the new and 
the old while creating a distinct identity for itself. Their solution, as shown by the 
productions listed above, was to present traditional myths, stories, history and 
characters, but with an innovative new approach by creating ‘Taiwanese’ Chinese 
(Peking) operas. Productions such as Sunlight after Snowfall, Flowing Sleeves and 
Rouge and The Painting of 18 Lohans attracted a new generation of audiences and 
established Guo Guang’s own identity in the Chinese Opera world. In 2009, Guo 
Guang even collaborated with the NCKSCC for Robert Wilson’s Orlando as a 
deliberate attempt to try new production styles, and also Cleopatra and Her Fools by 
Taiwanese playwright Chi Wei-lan inspired by Shakespeare’s Anthony and Cleopatra 
in 2012. As such, this national theatre troupe not only conforms to government cultural 
policy, but also reflects the transformation of Taiwanese society. To explain the change 
of Guo Guang, Huang Pen-ting (NCKSCC Programme Manager 2014-2016) explains 
that nowadays, when the company is seeking a script for a new production, they 
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naturally develop it with local Taiwanese elements, and are unlikely to work with 
something from mainland China, for example, Sichuan Province or the Silk Road. 
Huang believes that it is natural for Guo Guang to take ‘the closest, local and familiar 
material from where they grew up to initiate the research’. Nevertheless, from the box 
office point of view, they have to produce programmes which can be recognised by 
the local audience (Huang, interview of 3 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by the 
author).  
Lee Huey-mei (NCKCC Artistic Director 2014-2018) agrees with Huang and 
adds that Guo Guang has created its own direction which is totally different from the 
PRC’s Chinese opera. It is also evident that Guo Guang’s audience is very different 
from that of the PRC’s Chinese opera performances in Taiwan (Lee, interview of 7 
December 2015). Guo Guang has established its own characteristics and distinctive 
features which are based on the traditional Chinese (Peking) form but created with 
Taiwanese elements. The company has now reformed itself as the ‘Taiwanese Chinese 
(Peking) Opera Company’. The NCKSCC’s former Programme Manager (2012-2014), 
Li Chia-chi asks: 
Would we still regard Guo Guang’s productions as having a ‘Chinese 
element’? When Guo Gang tours to mainland China, the locals all see it as a 
‘Taiwanese production performed by a Taiwanese company’, because all the 
programmes were created in Taiwan, and performed by Taiwanese artists. 
Guo Guan’s programmes are therefore Taiwanese. (Li, interview of 27 June 
2018, translated from Mandarin by the author) 
This coincides what Chien Wen-ping, the current Artistic Director of the Weiwuying, 
who was also the Music Director of the NSO from 2001 to 2007 asserts in the Section 
5.2.2 above that although classical music is a Western arts form and most classical 
works are by foreign composers, ‘as long as the music is played by Taiwanese, it 
should be called Taiwanese’ (Chien, interview of 1 June 2018, translated from 
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Mandarin by the author). Although Peking Opera and classical music were not 
originally Taiwanese, they have become universal art forms that can be played by 
performing arts companies of any nationality and Guo Guang is a good example of 
this. 
Taiwan scholar Chang Bi-yu also comments on the new identity of Taiwan’s 
traditional theatre: 
Today, which Xiqu (traditional theatre) form is Taiwan’s Guoju (national opera) 
is no longer an issue for debate. Taiwan’s Xiqu heritage offers a multicultural 
tradition for contemporary Taiwan and represents its new image to 
international society. By negotiating our sense of identity, constructing new 
heritages and historical memories, and by reclaiming the legitimacy of 
‘tradition’, a new national narrative is formulated and takes effect. A newly 
invented Xiqu ‘tradition’ seems to speak for us, and to us, as a national narrative, 
telling a story so unique that only we, the Taiwanese, can claim the ownership. 
(Chang, 2007: 67) 
This means that Taiwan no longer needs a ‘national opera’ because none of the 
Taiwanese traditional theatre genres can be regarded as dominant enough to deserve 
that distinction; each is defined by its own characteristics. More importantly, in a 
democratic country with a diverse society, different performing art forms may be 
preferred or disliked. Thus, the significant thing is not how they are regarded, but how 
excellent their performances are. After all, the most important issue is the evaluation 
by the audience and the market.  
It therefore makes no difference whether the art form arrived in Taiwan centuries 
ago from south China (e.g. puppet theatre, Nan guan and Bei guan) and has been 
regarded as Taiwanese traditional theatre, or whether it arrived seven decades ago 
from mainland China (e.g. Chinese opera and Bangzi opera), or whether it is original 
Taiwanese opera, because all have become part of a newly forged ‘Taiwanese 
traditional theatre’ that is an important component of today’s Taiwanese culture. The 
275 
 
evolution of Guo Gang, along with other Taiwanese traditional theatre companies, is 
a prime example of the transformation in Taiwan from mono-Chinese culture to 
multi-Taiwanese culture, including Chinese (Zhonghua) culture.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter analyses data of the 4,067 programmes produced and presented by the 
NCKSCC between 1987 and 2017. It also looks at three case studies: the 9 Flagship 
Productions of the NCKSCC; the 44 programmes of the Government-subsidised Cloud 
Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan; and the 21 programmes of the state-owned Guo Guang 
Opera Company in order to investigate the relationship between the development of 
the NCKSCC’s programmes and the shift of Taiwanese identity. The analysis shows 
that the trend of the NCKSCC’s programmes corresponds to that of Taiwanese identity 
as a whole in which Chinese identity is declining and Taiwanese is increasing. The 
same trend appears in the NCKSCC’s Flagship Productions, Cloud Gate’s 
programmes and Guo Gang’s productions. The reason for this correlation is that the 
NCKSCC relies on both its own artistic preferences as well as those of its partner 
artists and companies in its programming, and all of these programmes reflect the 
Taiwanese identity of their decision makers.  
Constructing programmes involves making a balance between the Centre’s 
artistic vision and the needs of its audience and this becomes the ‘core idea’ and 
‘branding’ of the Centre. There is, therefore, an interaction between the NCKSCC, the 
artists and the audience where each has an influence on the direction of the 
programming. For example, since audiences for Chinese Opera are declining while 
those for Taiwanese Opera are on the increase, the programmers at the NCKSCC take 
note of this as they plan their programmes and this is equally true for the artists in 
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Cloud Gate and Guo Guang. At the same time, the Centre can take the initiative and, 
by offering more Taiwanese programmes to the audience, it can generate a new 
enthusiasm for ‘Taiwaneseness’ (Taiwan shing, 台灣性) in programming. It is the 
responsibility of artists to innovate with new work that attracts an audience as it 
follows their creative concepts, and thereby moving cultural life forward. 
The research illustrates that the NCKSCC’s programming, its Flagship 
Productions, the works of the Cloud Gate Dance of Taiwan, and the Guo Guang Opera 
Company epitomise the performing arts life in Taiwan and go hand in hand with the 
shift in Taiwanese identity. However, the most contentious issue is how to define 
‘Taiwanese’ and ‘Chinese’ cultures in a clear way because Taiwan and the PRC share 
much of their cultural heritage and there is ongoing competition between them for 
ownership of cultural origins. The ‘distinctiveness of Taiwanese culture is as not clear-
cut as the new DPP government might wish’ (Chang, 2007: 66). Taiwan has for 
centuries been a migrant society, so Taiwanese culture is an ongoing mélange emerging 
from its history and does not have a single identity. ‘Toleration and respect for 
differences is essential’ (Jung, interview of 11 June 2018, translated from Mandarin by 
the author). 
The reality is that the essence, character, and spirit of the performing arts at the 
NCKSCC have not changed through the years. What has changed is the way in which 
programmers, artists and companies see them. At one time, concerts by Taiwanese 
composers would be given in a ‘Chinese Composer Series’, but nowadays the same 
concert would be part of a ‘Taiwanese Composer Series’. Once, indigenous dance 
would have appeared in a ‘Chinese Minority Series’, but now it is part of a ‘Taiwanese 
Indigenous Series’. The performance itself is the same, but the way people look at it 
has changed as they invent for themselves a new tradition in Hobsbawm’s sense 
(Hobsbawm, 1983). Equally, the notion that all the ethnic groups that were once 
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amalgamated into a broad-based Chinese family is now appreciated in a different light 
and a multicultural Taiwanese nation has been newly imagined in Anderson’s sense 
(Anderson, 2006). This chapter also shows how new forms, new stories and new ways 
of production have emerged as a redefined multi-Taiwanese culture has been 
recognised. The most important thing is still the excellence of the productions along 
with audience satisfaction. 
    Since Performing Arts Centres were originally a concept borrowed from Western 
culture, the Western performing arts heritage has heavily influenced the NCKSCC’s 
programmes. Nowadays, most programmes contain international elements even if they 
are performed by Taiwanese companies or artists and there is a growing belief that 
whenever programmes are created by Taiwanese artists, they are Taiwanese. The 
NCKSCC’s Flagship Productions revealed a determination to demonstrate innovation 
in Taiwanese performing arts and to obtain international recognition that Taiwanese 
identity has been transformed. There is an enthusiasm to go out onto the world stage 
and demonstrate confidence in Taiwan through its performing arts, whatever the 











Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 From the Past to the Present: Research Findings 
This thesis has been designed to answer the question posed in its title: What is the 
relationship between Taiwanese identity, government cultural policy and 
programming at the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre/National 
Performing Arts Centre? and this chapter brings together the findings to give an 
answer to that question. In order to do so, it has been useful in the first place to 
subdivide the main question into a number of lower-ranking questions which have 
been investigated chapter by chapter, so that their answers can be combined to present 
the main conclusion here along with thoughts about future useful research. 
    It may be helpful to reiterate the lower-ranking research questions (RQs) and to 
indicate in which chapter the research findings can be located, 
In chapter 2: 
RQ 1. How can Taiwanese identity be defined, and how has it evolved? What are the 
factors that shape or influence Taiwanese identity?  
In chapter 3: 
RQ 2. How has Taiwan’s cultural policy evolved under different government regimes? 
Does Taiwanese identity relate to the making of cultural policy and if so, how? 
In chapter 4: 
RQ 3. How have the performing arts and performing arts centres developed in Taiwan? 
How does the Government support them? Have changes in Taiwanese identity 
affected the performing arts? 
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RQ 4. What is the relationship between the Government and the state-owned 
NCKSCC/NPAC? How is government cultural policy translated into the Centre’s 
programmes? 
In chapter 5: 
RQ5. What is the relationship between the historical changes in programming at the 
NCKSCC/NPAC and Taiwanese identity?  
Research findings 
Chapter 2 discusses the question of Taiwanese identity: how can it be defined, how 
has it evolved and what factors have influenced it. A literature review concluded that 
Raymond Williams’s broad definition of culture as ‘a whole way of life, material, 
intellectual and spiritual’ (Williams, 1958, 1983: xvi) gives useful analytical guidance 
to the present research. This definition is relevant because it shows how issues of 
identity, policy, democracy, artistic autonomy, immigration and so on, are influential 
components of culture taken as a whole. In one sense Taiwan has only become a 
‘nation’ in the last seventy years since the arrival of Chang Kai-shek and his followers 
and the political split with the mainland. Thus, although the roots of Taiwanese identity 
can be found on mainland China, and on Taiwan itself (including its time under 
Japanese colonial rule), the chapter’s investigation into the formation of a new national 
identity for Taiwan as a nation has focused on the period since 1949. One feature is 
quite clear: cultural identity in Taiwan is a constantly changing concept that is 
‘becoming’ rather than settled and static.  
The changing political situation in Taiwan has resulted in an ‘imagined’ 
Taiwanese identity that varies among the population according to people’s political 
identification. Within the space of a single century, Taiwan has seen a number of very 
different regimes, and policies are strikingly different now from what they were in 
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1949 when the new regime had traditional Chinese history and culture at its heart. 
There have been fundamental changes to every aspect of Taiwanese society with the 
most significant taking place in 1987 when martial law was lifted and Taiwan became 
a democratic country. Democracy altered the relationship between the Government 
and the governed so that the thoughts and aspirations of the Taiwanese people began 
to have great impact on the way government policy is formulated—not least cultural 
policy. As well as regime change, the country’s ethnic composition has changed 
greatly in recent years which has meant that Taiwanese identity has evolved to form a 
specifically Taiwan-centred identity. Although the important role of Chinese 
(Zhonghua) culture in Taiwan is acknowledged, the way identity is imagined and 
recognised today by different ethnic or immigrant communities of Taiwanese society 
differs widely according to an individual’s background.  
There is pressure from the People’s Republic of China to make Taiwanese people 
believe that their culture is Chinese. Yet, the reality is that as well as Chinese, 
indigenous culture, cultures brought by new migrants and a whole range of other sub-
cultures are recognised, and the whole package is now appreciated as ‘Taiwanese 
culture’. Taiwanese multiculturalism (Taiwan duo yuan wen hua, 台灣多元文化) is 
seen as a way of encouraging a sense of nationhood and there is a recognition that 
collectively held systems of meaning and customary patterns of thought and behaviour 
can be shared by all the people of Taiwan.  
Just as Taiwanese identity has changed under a varying political climate, so the 
Government’s approach to formulating cultural policy has shown a parallel evolution. 
Chapter 3 looked at the way cultural policy has developed from 1949 to 2017 by 
examining policy-making under different government regimes. Some policies are 
overtly cultural (explicit) while other policies (implicit) affect the nation’s culture in 
the broad sense without being acknowledged as cultural policies. When the KMT’s 
281 
 
committees dominated the country’s cultural affairs, their policies were implemented 
through coercion and censorship. Culture was an evident priority for them as 
demonstrated by the establishment in 1981 of the Council of Cultural Affairs at 
Cabinet-level in the Government and of the National Cultural and Arts Foundation in 
1996. But after democracy, a series of culture white papers indicated the changed 
direction of cultural policy which was to be implemented largely by selective project 
funding. The CCA was upgraded to become the Ministry of Culture whose mission is 
to create equal cultural rights for everyone. 
In 1949 the incoming government was determined to defend the supremacy and 
homogeneity of ‘great Chinese culture’ against the communist philistines on the 
mainland and implemented this top-down policy in Taiwan by force. But in democratic 
Taiwan, there has been bottom-up pressure from the Taiwanese people through their 
elected representatives in the Government to create a specifically Taiwanese identity 
which acknowledges cultural diversity and respects minority Taiwanese groups. 
Politics, Taiwanese identity and cultural policy are demonstrably interconnected.  
Chapter 4 sharpened the focus down to the performing arts and the role they play 
in Taiwan’s cultural life, especially through performing arts centres with their 
programmes of events. Cultural identity and policy as well as the pursuit of 
institutional autonomy are significant factors for a performing arts centre. Taiwan’s 
PACs have shown an overall change from programming designed to protect and 
promote the supremacy of Chinese culture to programmes that celebrate a 
contemporary cultural landscape where Zhonghua Chinese heritage is associated with, 
and changed by both Western and home-grown Taiwanese local influences. Apart 
from shaping Taiwanese identity, another crucial aspect of government cultural policy 
has been the development of PACs which were initially a home for the high arts to 
become more community-based venues. Policy dictates a PAC’s nature and identity 
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but its own staff decide what appears there, and are thus the driving mechanism behind 
its artistic development in a way that reflects the social and political climate.  
The opportunity to interview all the eight surviving Directors and Artistic 
Directors of the NCKSCC between its opening in 1987 and 2017, as well as the first 
directors of the two new centres of the NPAC has been a unique privilege for this 
research. In addition, three of the NCKSCC’s Chairmen and two Executive Sectaries 
of its Board as well as two Programme Managers have been interviewed to discover 
how this state-owned PAC has operated from the point of view of its management and 
programming, as well as its relationship with government ministers and their policies. 
These interviews have given a special insight into the thinking of the most influential 
people in deciding cultural policy in Taiwan. Their thoughts and the resulting policies 
have contributed to the thesis’s understanding of Taiwan’s cultural history and the 
political climate within which the PACs have operated. 
The NCKSCC was the first non-departmental public body in Taiwan. It operates 
under the arm’s-length principle through which the Taiwanese Government allows the 
management of performing arts organisations autonomy from political interference, 
despite a subsidy of around 50% of the Centre’s income. It is in the nature of arts 
programming to have a slow momentum because programmes are commissioned up 
to two years in advance. This means that the NCKSCC appears to develop its missions 
and objectives independently of changes in government policy because its 
programmes are fixed in advance of more rapid changes to political thinking. As a 
result, rather than immediately following every new government cultural policy, the 
NCKSCC’s programmes have represented the choices of its Directors with their 
variety of backgrounds. To an extent, these reflect the cultural and social environment 
of their time, but they are also influenced by Directors’ sensitivity to government aims.  
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The Government’s cultural polices are very much in the minds of the Centre’s 
Board members as they oversee its work, so it is not surprising that the NCKSCC’s 
objectives dovetail neatly with those of the Government. At the same time, the 
Government’s cultural policy is worded in such a non-specific and general way that 
clever wording on the Centre’s part can make almost anything it wants to do appear to 
comply with government policy. Sensitivity to the political climate on the part of the 
Centre’s senior management and the rapport between them and government officials 
(along with concern for continued government subsidy) mean that the Government’s 
cultural policy has had an undeniable influence over the work of the NCKSCC, but it 
is maintained in an implicit and informal ‘arm’s-length’ way. The comments made at 
interview by senior government and Centre officials are very relevant to the way that 
non-departmental public bodies operate through the arm’s-length principle in other 
countries apart from Taiwan, and provide an interesting contribution to the literature 
on the subject. 
To explore the correlation between the NCKSCC’S programming and changing 
Taiwanese identity, Chapter 5 undertook a pioneering investigation by analysing the 
4,067 programmes produced and presented at the Centre from its opening in 1987 until 
its 30th anniversary in 2017. Detailed case studies of the 44 programmes of the Cloud 
Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan, and the 21 programmes of the Guo Guang Opera 
Company were designed to probe whether their programmes correlate with 
developments in Taiwanese identity. The analysis carried out here shows a clear link 
in the Centre’s programmes between trends in programming and shifts in national 
identity, and this is true for both its own programmes and those of associated 
companies. Where there was once a deliberate emphasis on traditional Chinese, there 
is now multicultural Taiwanese, perhaps demonstrating an increasing maturity, 
individuality and self-confidence in the nation. Programming development at the 
284 
 
NCKSCC, has gone through a process of Taiwanisation inspired by local stories, 
talents, audiences, and collaboration. There is a growing belief that no matter where 
artistic forms originated, whenever programmes are created or performed by 
Taiwanese artists, they should be regarded as Taiwanese programmes.  
The National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre, as the Government’s main venue 
for the presentation of the performing arts, is a window to display every kind of idea, 
expression or identity planted by their creators in the works it presents. Its 
presentations also reflect the preferences and thoughts of programmers who have to 
consider a whole range of factors in maintaining its autonomy from the Government. 
The performing arts have a reputation of being ‘high culture’ and not as popular as 
other more commercial shows, but programmes nowadays are not intended for an elite 
audience and if the intention is to attract a wider spectrum of society, the Centre now 
must make a careful balance between popularising its programmes and maintaining 
cutting-edge artistic innovation. Looking into the future, it partly depends on what 
proportion of the Centre’s finance comes from the box office and what from 
government subsidy. If the Government were to expect the Centre to become more 
financially self-sufficient, the implication is that it would have to put on more crowd-
pleasing shows. If, on the other hand, it expects the Centre to continue to be a showcase 
for cutting-edge Taiwanese cultural innovation both at home and abroad, it will need 
to provide commensurate financial support. However, there is clearly a danger here of 
being unrealistic by attempting to provide innovate performances to a mass audience 
who are not ready to pay money at the box office for unfamiliar and perhaps esoteric 
artworks. Clear thinking when setting objectives is a necessity. 
Cultural policy is made by people in the government who are children of their 
time and who respond to the prevailing zeitgeist. And programming at the Centre is 
planned by directors who are equally people of their time. Since 1949, the ideas of 
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both politicians in power and Centre directors have evolved in the same direction, each 
reflecting the nature of culture in their time. Government cultural policy and 
programming at the Centre have therefore developed along parallel lines without direct 
and explicit intervention between them. The programming of the Centre accordingly 
mirrors the development of a Taiwanese identity which is also reflected in the way 
cultural policy has changed. Policy has not dictated programming. This is a significant 
finding and it may be that the system works in Taiwan and perhaps elsewhere because 
all the significant decision-makers in both government and arts administration tend to 
come from a similar stratum of society who are likely to know one another and to think 
along similar lines. This leads to a comfortable feeling of trust that nobody is likely to 
upset the equilibrium by setting unrealistic targets or by putting on shows that invite 
public opprobrium. 
Contribution of the study 
This thesis offers a number of contributions to the academic discussion of the 
performing arts and cultural policy. Some are specific to Taiwan, and some have 
broader relevance.  
The specific focus is on the shift of Taiwanese identity, the evolution of 
Taiwanese performing arts and the development of the NCKSCC/NPAC’s 
programming. This adds to the knowledge of those spheres in studies of both Taiwan 
and performing arts centres in general. The thesis also contributes to the emerging field 
of research into the management of the performing arts, both in theory and in practice, 
by bringing in new data and analysis and offering a historical interpretation of a state-
supported performing arts centre of national significance. It does so through a 
synthesis of literature from studies in cultural policy, cultural identity and cultural 
autonomy. Its principal purpose is to establish the historical cultural significance of 
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the performing arts programming of a national cultural institution and as a result, the 
thesis demonstrates how a sustained historical study of the preforming arts 
programming can make a contribution to the broader cultural historical understanding 
of an independent country.  
As for the broader significance for academics working on similar subjects in other 
parts of the world. Firstly, the findings illustrate how democratisation in both politics 
and culture has played a significant role in the transformation of national and cultural 
identity, and therefore in the making of cultural policy. Secondly, they emphasise that 
a PAC, especially a state-owned one, is part of the fabric of a country’s everyday life 
which means that its programmes not only reflect the PAC’s identity, but also that of 
its country as a whole. Government policy, PAC programming and public identity have 
a mutually interconnected relationship where each affects the others to a certain extent.     
The third finding of general interest relates to the way an arm’s-length relationship 
between the government and its PAC operates in practice and it has been significant 
to find that everybody on both sides of this relationship at the NCKSCC is adamant 
that the Government has no influence on PAC programming. But in saying that, both 
government and PAC are neglecting to mention that the PACs are subject to 
assessment through performance indicators, are reliant on continued government 
subsidy and that the government has a cultural policy, albeit a broadly-worded one. 
All this means that the PAC knows very well that there are limits to acceptable 
programming and that this is monitored by a government-appointed Board. 
Nevertheless, the system works smoothly and, at least in Taiwan, this is to a large 
extent because everybody involved, on both sides of the equation, are well-known to 





6.2 The Future of the National Performing Arts Centre 
Taiwan’s National Performing Arts Centre (NPAC) is an ‘umbrella’ institution 
launched in April 2014. This brought together the National Theatre & Concert Hall 
(NTCH), which had supplanted the National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre 
(NCKSCC), and two new venues. The National Taichung Theatre (NTT), opened in 
September 2016 and the National Kaohsiung Centre for the Arts (Weiwuying), was 
launched in October 2018 and they are both too recent to have had a noticeable 
influence to Taiwan’s performing arts environment so far, although that is the longer-
term aim of the three-venue NAPC. 
    Nevertheless, some distinctions between the three venues have already emerged 
and this will deserve future research. In the first place, the two new venues are nearly 
30 years younger than the NTCH and were conceived in an era when Taiwan’s social 
atmosphere and identity had changed a great deal. They are, as a result, very different 
organisations from the capital-city NTCH, not least in their architecture. Plate 6.1 
shows the National Theatre and Concert Hall in the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Park. 
The whole park was designed by mainland Chinese architect Yang Cho-cheng as a 
memorial to a great man who was concerned to preserve Chinese culture. The 
architecture is therefore in the ‘Chinese Palace’ style reminiscent of Beijing. In 
contrast, Plate 6.2 shows the National Taichung Theatre which was designed by 
Japanese architect Toyo Ito, while Plate 6.3 is the National Kaohsiung Centre for the 
Arts designed by the Dutch architect Francine Houben. Both the latter are entirely 
different from the style of the NTCH and are in an international style with nothing 




     
Plate 6.1. The National Theatre & Concert Hall (source, official website)   
      




Plate 6.3 The National Kaohsiung Centre for the Arts (Weiwuying) 
(source, official website) 
These outward signs of the way that Taiwanese identity has changed are 
significant for the future of the three institutions illustrated. The NTCH has decades of 
history behind it and over that time has accommodated the development of entirely 
new ways of thinking about Taiwanese identity and its own role in the country’s 
cultural life. Nevertheless, the architecture is a daily reminder of its original purpose 
to both staff and the public and proclaims a central, national, role as befits a capital 
city. The two new centres do not carry this historical baggage. They are part of the 
NPAC, but are starting life with a specifically local role in supporting and encouraging 
the cultural life of their areas.  
The NPAC is a non-departmental public body, and the MOC recognises its 
autonomy under the oversight of a Board that is responsible for all three PACs. But 
with the arrival of the two additional Centres, the dynamic between the NPAC and the 
Ministry, and between the three sister Centres has altered the focus of the Board. The 
NTT and Weiwuying still have to establish themselves within their local communities, 
to create their own identity and to avoid appearing merely local branches of the NTCH. 
Thus, although the overall policy is to spread government-sponsored access to the 
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performing arts broadly across the country, the way this is being carried out in practice 
makes a clear distinction between the national role of the NTCH and the local role of 
the two new centres.  
When the NCKSCC was under the Ministry of Education (MOE), its budget was 
a small fraction of the total for the Ministry and its work was on the periphery of the 
Ministry’s educational affairs. However, under the MOC, the NPAC has become a 
large proportion of that smaller Ministry’s concerns, with the result that it is likely to 
receive more detailed ministerial attention and scrutiny. And since the NPAC is now 
nearer to the heart of cultural policy-making it will be all the more important for it to 
pay attention to personal relationships between it and its Ministry. If the NPAC is more 
closely under the eye of the MOC than the NCKSCC was with the MOE, there is more 
opportunity for politicians to interfere with the Centre’s work. But at the same time, 
the Centre may be able to have more influence over the way cultural policy is 
formulated. Despite any arm’s-length relationship, the MOC and its Minister are still 
accountable to the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) and the MOC will always be 
concerned to demonstrate to the Legislative Yuan that it is keeping efficient control 
over government spending through the NPAC. How to make a proper balance in its 
programming between artistic considerations, the audience and cultural policy is 
therefore the critical crucial task for the NPAC. Both the MOC and NPAC are still 
young, so continued observation of the development of their relationship would 
provide significant material for future research. 
The long gap between the opening of the NCKSCC and action to make the NTT 
and Weiwuying a reality is evidence that arts policy takes a low priority for 
government spending. Even though performing arts companies are lively and well 
developed in Taiwan, the ability (or inclination) of the Government to spend money 
on them is limited. Up to now, the focus has always been on the capital, Taipei. 
291 
 
Stepping out from Taipei and creating national-level performing arts centres in central 
and south Taiwan demonstrates a willingness to encourage a nationwide balance and 
to achieve the goal of democratising culture. But now that there are three Centres to 
be funded with appropriate levels of government subsidy, how far will this intention 
to spread access to culture across the country be translated into the reality of further 
financial support? Will the NTCH find its subsidy reduced in order to service the new 
Centres or will the grant to the NPAC be increased to allow each Centre to function at 
an effective level? Time will tell, and the state of Taiwan’s economy will play a 
significant role here. If additional money is not forthcoming, will the NPAC be forced 
to become more commercial in its operations and to programme more crowd-pleasing 
block busters at the expense of innovative new artworks that have less public appeal? 
Decisions of this kind have a profound effect on cultural life and if the Government 
sees culture as a desirable luxury that has low financial priority compared with, say, 
defence or education, challenging economic times for the country would hit the NPAC 
hard. 
Meanwhile, in pursuit of making themselves a new local presence, the NTT has 
announced its vision of constant evolution in arts and lifestyle and a mission to build 
a ‘Wow! Awesome!’ theatre for artists, audiences, and local residents, along with 
outreach programmes and lectures taking place in different venues in the surrounding 
counties (NTT, 2016). In the same way, during construction of its building, 
Weiwuying initiated the ‘Southern Performing Art Development Project’ with 
outreach programmes aiming to cultivate creative talent, performing arts companies 
and management staff, and also to develop the audience in Southern Taiwan (The 
Preparatory Office of Weiwuying, 2016). After its opening, it put into practice its 
ambition to be a ‘Centre for the arts, and arts for the people’ by forming a welcoming 
space open to the public and hoping that the performing arts would ‘become part of 
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everyday life’ (Weiwuying, 2019). Both new centres show their commitment to local 
communities and are keen to inject a local perspective into the arts which is very 
different from that of the NCKSCC.  
All three Artistic Directors interviewed for this thesis agreed that collaboration 
and coproduction are vital to the new working mode of the NPAC, but they also said 
that forging close local connections is an important task for them. This was emphasised 
by the NTT and Weiwuying. The NPAC says that it shares a common mission to 
cultivate talent, undertake international collaboration and promote local development, 
but how far this promotion of local talent will apply to the NTCH has yet to emerge. 
It may be that while the NTT and the Weiwuying see ‘local’ as meaning their local 
areas, the NTCH feels that ‘local’ means Taiwan.  
Since the Chairman and Board of Directors of the NPAC hold part-time honorary 
positions, and there is no NPAC executive body, one of the significant issues for the 
future will be how the NPAC coordinates the policies of its three complexes. How will 
the NPAC administer its programmes or productions? Does this suggest that the NPAC 
will tend to present programmes from other venues instead of being its own production 
house? Or will it bring together associated artists and companies locally to produce its 
own programmes? The NPAC has not yet settled into a regular mode of operation, so 
whether and how it will reshape the cultural environment in Taiwan is an ongoing 
question whose answer will change with time and require further research. In particular, 
with three lively Centres promoting local talent in different parts of the country it will 






6.3 Subjects for Future Research 
In the course of conducting the research for this thesis and writing up its findings, some 
topics have suggested themselves for future research into Taiwan’s performing arts. 
The research reported on here has concentrated on the NCKSCC/NTCH because it 
provides data on programming over a long period. But the newly formed NPAC with 
its very young PACs, the NTT and Weiwuying, deserve continuous research along the 
lines used for this thesis to investigate how they develop their relationship with their 
localities and audiences in Taichung (NTT) and Kaohsiung (Weiwuying) respectively, 
and whether they inspire local creativity and appreciation of the arts. At a broader level, 
the role that the performing arts in general, and the NPAC in particular, play in 
Taiwan’s political concern for international recognition, influence and collaboration is 
also a fruitful topic for research. From this and from the observations made about the 
future in 6.2 above, a number of themes for worthwhile future research become clear. 
Local identity 
As government cultural policy has become concerned with democratisation of culture 
and has sought to spread access to performing arts across the country, it has initiated a 
new era of local arts through its two new PACs. Each of them has professed an 
enthusiasm for encouraging and performing the work of local artists and attracting new 
local audiences in a way that has not been done before. The local Centres are new and 
are now in the process of finding their feet and discovering how best to work for their 
localities. So it is an opportune moment to follow their progress and to find out whether 
the focus on circumscribed localities gives rise to a distinct local character to creative 
work. Will there be evidence of local identity development in the NTT and Weiwuying 
through encouraging local audience and supporting local artists in Taichung and 
Kaohsiung? What will be the common and distinctive features through the 
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programming development connected to local stories and materials at the NTT and 
Weiwuying? And what will be the relationship of their localities with Taiwanese 
identity? These will be the appealing subjects to start the research and to collect 
programme data from now as there two Centres just launched not long ago. Moreover, 
it will be also significant to carry on the research on the NTCH’s programming 
development focusing on its ‘locality’ as it is no longer the one and only national 
performing arts centre of the country.  
The audience 
This research has concentrated on the relationship between national cultural identity, 
government policy and programming at the NPAC. Clearly, both government officials 
and senior staff at the Centre have a deciding influence on programming. But there is 
a third influence that has not been the subject of this research project—the audience. A 
Centre does not programme work for itself, the process is intended to attract, entertain 
and educate members of the public. But those people choose whether or not to attend 
a performance, so understanding more about what influences their decision-making is 
important in directing future programming and discovering whether government 
intentions in providing subsidies are fulfilled. At the moment, there is no information 
about exactly who attends performances or whether attendance is restricted to any 
particular stratum of society. Current KPIs for the Centre focus on the numbers of 
people who attend performances, but if the intention is to democratise culture and to 
show that taxpayers’ money is spent fairly across the whole population, more detailed 
analysis of who attends what kind of performance is critical knowledge. Also, through 
this subject, the indication of cultural democracy in the way that the audience obtains 
the right and channel to participate in the process of programming will be another 




National PACs are subsidised by the Government. But the amount of money that is 
allocated to them is dependent on the state of the national economy and there is always 
pressure on PACs to operate on diminishing government subsidy. The simplest way 
for a PAC to increase its self-generated income is through the box office and this 
implies putting on more crowd-pleasing shows at the expense of innovative artworks 
that push the creative boundaries but are less commercially attractive. Continuing 
analysis of programming at the NPAC can reveal any tendency for the balance between 
innovation and box office appeal to change. This is significant because it has an effect 
on the cultural life of the country and the ability of Taiwanese artists to develop both 
their art and the artistic awareness of the public. 
International strategy 
Taiwan’s contested status as a country means that its government is continually 
concerned to present Taiwan as somewhere different to, and separate from, its 
overbearing neighbour. Culture has played a part in Taiwan’s strategy to pursue this 
policy. For the home population it has been important to bring in the best of foreign 
culture—orchestras, theatre, dance groups and so on—in order to promote education 
on international culture and on the trends that are exciting people worldwide. Equally, 
it has been important for Taiwan to present itself to the outside world as a country rich 
in creative talent that should be taken seriously by cultural cognoscenti. Obviously, the 
NCKSCC has been aiming to promote international exchange for a long time. Does 
the Centre’s hard effort achieve its purpose? To what extent do the programmes at the 
NPAC influence people’s awareness of international culture? Is there evidence that 
Taiwanese performing artists and culture are becoming better known abroad through 
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the Centre? What is the relationship between the Centre’s work and Taiwan’s 
diplomatic policy? These will be the fascinating research subjects to investigate. 
Cultural development in the PRC 
This research has followed the development of cultural identity in Taiwan through 
looking at the programming at the NPAC and its predecessors since 1949. Starting 
from a determinedly Chinese attitude on the part of the government, democracy has 
resulted in the creation of a distinctive Taiwanese culture today. But what of the 
mainland? An equivalent research project that looks at how mainland Chinese cultural 
identity has changed over the same period of time would produce fascinating results. 
The PRC’s political history over that time has been very different from Taiwan’s, but 
has there been cultural evolution there? In the absence of democracy, are pluralistic 
ideas of culture encouraged or even acknowledged? What role have international 
trends in the arts world played in influencing today’s Chinese culture and cultural 
identity? What can the programming at Beijing’s ‘National Centre for the Performing 
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The Constitution of the Republic of China 
The Amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of China 
 
2 1967 The First Draft of the Main Points for  
Reviving and Promoting Chinese Culture 
CRPCC 
3 1967 The Plan to Carry Out Reviving and Promoting Chinese Culture CRPCC 
4 1977 Twelve Construction Plans Executive 
Yuan 
5 1978 Plan of the MOE for Building County/Local Cultural Centres MOE 
6 1978 Plan for Enhancing Cultural and Educational Recreation Activities MOE 
7 1979 Regulation of Managing Entertainment and Arts Business MOE 
8 1982 Cultural Heritage Preservation Act CCA 
9 1987 Plan for Enhancing Cultural Construction 











    
 














4 20 50 7 22 103 
Dance/ 2 1 2 1 7 13 
10 1992 The International Performance Troupe Cultivation Plan CCA 
11 1998 The Performing Arts Group’s Development Foster Plan CCA 
12 1998 Culture white paper 1998 CCA 
13 2002 Cultural and Arts Reward Act CCA 
14 2004 Culture white paper 2004 CCA 
15 2004 National Chiang Kai-shek Cultural Centre Establishment Law  MOE 
16 2010 The Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries CCA 
17 2011 Non-Departmental Bodies Act Executive 
Yuan 
18 2012 Ministry of Culture Organisation Law Executive 
Yuan 
19 2014 Act for Establishment of National Performing Arts Centre MOC 
20 2019 Organisation Act of the Taiwan Creative Content Agency MOC 
    
 














1 14 18 2 11 46 




1 8 0 
 
0 1 10 






7 40 1 0 2 50 
Total 13 61 53 8 31 166 
 
1989  
    
 














2 15 79 17 32 147 




11 34 6 0 2 52 
Total 13 51 88 19 47 218 
 
1990  
    
 














7 18 104 18 53 200 




10 28 4 0 2 44 
Total 19 46 115 19 70 269 
 
1991  
    
 














5 29 57 14 22 127 
Dance/ 3 2 10 0 4 19 





Total 15 52 70 14 28 179 
 
1992  
    
 














8 23 56 8 15 110 




10 12 2 0 1 25 
Total 21 35 62 9 22 149 
  
1993 
    
 














7 14 41 15 14 91 




8 7 2 0 3(PRC1) 20 
Total 20 24 45 16 17 122 
 
1994 
    
 














7 13 50 8 24 102 




9 6 3 0 1 19 
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Total 23 20 54 8 28 133 
 
1995  
    
 














6 15 47 6 11 85 




6 2 5 0 3(PRC1) 16 
Total 17 18 53 6 15 109 
 
1996 
    
 














10 10 50 13 14 97 




6 3 1 1 1 12 
Total 19 15 52 15 15 116 
 
1997 
    
 














9 11 32 13 14 79 




14 3 2 1 4(PRC4) 24 








    
 














6 14 34 22 6 82 




3 2 4 0 3(PRC2) 12 
Total 14 16 39 22 11 102 
 
2000 
    
 














2 13 35 19 0 69 




6 4 4 0 6(PRC3) 20 
Total 15 17 39 19 9 99 
 
 
    
 














10 9 43 21 7 90 




14 3 2 1 3(PRC3) 23 




    
 






















7 4 3 0 2(PRC1) 16 






    
 














20 13 26 22 16(PRC1) 97 




18 5 2 9 3(PRC3) 37 
Total 43 19 28 31 20 141 
    
 














16 13 42 15 15(PRC1) 101 




14 5 8 1 5(PRC1) 33 




    
 














16 9 41 14 22 102 




16 3 4 0 10(PRC2) 33 






    
 














13 10 27 19 17(PRC1) 86 




13 4 0 3 10(PRC2) 30 
Total 33 15 28 23 34 133 
    
 














11 5 27 22 18(PRC1) 83 
Dance/ 
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10 4 2 5 8(PRC1) 29 




    
 























8 9 0 2 3 22 
Total 34 18 30 24 20 126 
 
2008 
    
 














15 3 47 13 12 90 




16 1 2 0 6 25 
Total 40 4 49 15 21 129 
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11 3 47 12 14 87 




13 6 0 1 4 24 







    
 














11 2 41 19 13 86 




15 2 0 1 8(PRC1) 26 
Total 33 5 41 22 24 125 
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9 4 3 2 9 27 
Total 18 6 39 26 30 119 
    
 














12 6 36 16 11 81 




6 3 5 2 7 23  








    
 














7 3 32 12 9 63 




8 0 3 1 7 19 
Total 24 3 36 15 23 101 
 
 
    
 














7 0 38 23 20 88 




9 0 1 0 5 15 
Total 21 0 40 26 32 119 
    
 














7 1 30 26 15 79 




8 4 0 3 8(PRC1) 23 




    
 














9 1 29 17 14 70 




7 0 4 3 6 20 
Total 21 1 33 21 25 101 
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14 0 30 19 13 76 




17 0 1 3 5 26 
Total 38 0 31 25 28 122 
 
